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1 
Introduction: 
  Philosophy begins in wonder. 
 
You wake up and for another 5 minutes you stay in the warmth of your bed to check 
the latest news on your smartphone. You see the headline about the Snowden 
revelations and read that the NSA –the U.S.A.’s National Security Agency- has 
compromised the backbone of the Internet, constructing secret back doors to enable 
them to eavesdrop on literally everybody. Although the scope of the surveillance 
seems to be much bigger than most experts had expected, you cannot say you are 
surprised –this is what secret intelligence services do, right? - You leave the news app 
to look at today’s weather forecast.  
In the tube, on your way to work, you check your Facebook page and like a few 
of the messages some of your 436 friends have posted. Next, you go to your Linkedin-
app and accept the pending requests to connect. Some of these people you only know 
vaguely, but they can become an interesting connection, you never know. 
At work, you log in on the company’s network. Before starting your busy day in 
the office, you quickly go to the website of your bank. You want to wire the money for 
a theatre ticket your friend has bought for you in advance. You log in with your 
username and password and verify if the green icon is visible in your browser to 
ascertain the trustworthiness of the connection. To be honest, you feel pretty good 
about doing that. You will not be fooled by any smart-ass cybercriminal pretending he 
–they are often male- is your bank, filching your log-in credentials. Also, the e-mails 
from the Nigerian prince who regularly contacts you to ask for your help with his 
enormous inheritance, you delete without a second thought.  
During your lunch break you check some travel sites, as you are still not sure 
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where to go to for the holidays. You do have some promising visions about white 
beaches, cocktails, and a lot of doing nothing. These daydreams are reflected in the 
advertisements following you around on the Net. Where you normally are quite able 
to ignore these commercial distractions, now you cannot resist clicking on them. 
Perhaps the golden destination is just one click away. 
Ping. There is a new message in your Whatsapp-theatre friends group. 
Someone has posted a link to a review of the play you will go to next week. The critic 
is ruthless. A funny Whatsapp-conversation arises about possible –and hilarious- 
ways to leave the theatre if the play is as awful as the reviewer claims.  
 
Just some highlights of a regular day that you encounter - but I could just as easily 
have written you and me.  
 
We have learned to navigate the World Wide Web, post messages, and check e-mail. 
We know how to wire money online, order our groceries, books, and other stuff in 
web shops. We chat, leave comments, friend and de-friend as we feel like it. Using the 
Internet and all the artefacts, applications, and services powered by that Internet 
seems to come naturally to us. It is not that we are not aware of the possible dangers 
attached to our use of all these handy artefacts. We read the news on the NSA, we 
know of cyber-attacks, and we are aware that these personalized advertisements 
following us around must be based on some personal information we have provided, 
willingly or not. We know all that; but in everyday life it simply does not seem to 
affect us.  
 
If philosophy begins in wonder, as the proverb goes, then my wonder is this: how can 
it be that we have so ostensibly easily adopted a technology, while we obviously are 
aware of the fact that this makes us vulnerable to all sorts of jeopardy? Do we trust 
the NSA to honour our privacy? Probably not. Do we believe that all the information 
platforms we use take care of our data in a responsible way? Perhaps not. Are we 
really sure that when the green icon pops up in our browser, we are in the clear? 
Maybe not. This uncertainty does not seem to hold us back, however. To put my 
wonder differently:  
How come we trust even when we know that there are clear reasons 
not to do so? 
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When I first started to think about this, I was very excited to have come across this 
paradox of trust. Philosophers, in general, love paradoxes. A paradox mostly unites 
two opposing statements, which on logical grounds cannot both be true, but after 
examination do seem to be true.  
What I found out during my research is that this paradox is in fact the main 
explanatory force of what trust is. It is the core of what trust is about. Trust is acting 
as if we are sure about our affairs while we at the same time are also aware that we 
will never be sure about our affairs. This connection between [the need to] trust and 
the contingency of life is crucial. If we could be sure of how things would turn out, 
trust would be redundant. We would simply know what the future looks like; no need 
for trust there. We would not need to act as if we know, we would just know. 
Trust is, however, a strategy to cope with the uncertainties inherent in human 
life. Trust does not take these uncertainties away. Trust makes them bearable in the 
sense that in the end “uncertainty need not be problematic in practice” (Möllering 
2006: 6).  
These uncertainties are derived on the one hand from our awareness of an 
ever-changing future and on the other hand from the fundamentally unpredictable 
behaviour of our fellow human beings. These uncertainties can be a burden or a 
chance to accomplish great things, depending on your take on life. Notwithstanding 
an optimistic or pessimistic view, on a daily basis every one of us has to deal with the 
fact that things could have been different and that we are never completely sure about 
what the person in front of us is thinking or how he or she is going to act.  
Of course, we can make some well-estimated guesses. My agenda can give you 
a pretty accurate idea of what I will be up to the next couple of days and based on our 
past experience with others we can also more or less predict how they will behave. 
However, there will always remain some odds and ends we have to deal with and that 
is the moment where trust comes in. Without some basic trust in the continuity of 
everyday life and in the self-evident aspects of our interactions, we would not even be 
able to get up in the morning. All the possible futures lying ahead of us would 
overwhelm us. We are just not equipped to think everything through or to find 
evidence for every aspect of our actions. In that respect, trust is always, more or less, 
blind trust.  
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1.1 Research on trust: Pandora’s box 
My initial wonder about our eagerness to make use of the Internet and all the services 
provided through that Internet, lead me to dive into the scholarly research on trust. It 
was as if I opened Pandora’s box.  
 
Seppanen et al. (2007: cited in Lyon et al. 2012) claim that in their review they found 
more than 70 different definitions of trust. And this was ‘just’ a review of the 
empirical research on inter-organizational trust. “As pervasive trust appears as a 
phenomenon, as elusive it seems as a concept”, Judith Simon (2013: 1) rightly 
concludes.  
The only thing scholars seem to agree upon is that trust is a fuzzy concept, 
meaning that depending on the domain in which one is working and the basic beliefs 
one holds about the defining features of human beings, the definition will differ.  
Trust is being researched in a large variety of domains, from psychology, 
economy, and sociology to philosophy. For psychologists, trust is one of the key 
aspects of our daily interactions (Desteno 2014). It has to do with the child expanding 
its view of the world by learning from others (Harris 2012), developing strong ties 
with primary caretakers by building what has been called “basic trust” (Erikson 
1950). This basic trust is a necessary condition to build up trust with other people and 
institutions further away from the safety of the home (also see Giddens 1991; Giddens 
1990).  
For economists, trust has to do with calculation and risk-assessment, averting 
negative outcomes. The main idea is that “…trust is reasonable when the trustee is 
trustworthy, which […] simply means unlikely to act opportunistically” (Möllering 
2006: 24). Based on this rational calculation actors decide whether or not to trust. 
Some key authors who conceptualize trust in the rational choice tradition include 
Coleman (1982; 1994), Bradach and Eccles (1989), and Axelrod (1984). 
For sociologists, trust is the cement or social capital of society (Fukuyama 
1995; Putnam 2000; for social capital on social networking sites: Grabner-Kräuter 
2009) and an important enabler of social interaction (Goffman 1959, 1990; Misztal 
2001).  
For philosophers, trust is an important aspect of the human condition; the way 
human beings are in the world. Trust is closely connected to autonomy (O'Neill 
2002a) and it is been acknowledged as a necessary condition for a healthy democratic 
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state (O'Neill 2002b), built on trustworthiness and institutional integrity (Meijboom 
2008). Trust has also been seen as a strategy to deal with vulnerability and uncertain 
relations with the environment and other people (Baier 1986). 
As this quick overview illustrates, the ways in which the concept of trust is 
applied strongly differs from one context to the other. Rather than deciding which 
uses of the concept are “proper” or “improper”, or trying to come up with one 
unifying theory on trust, it would be better to aim at developing a perspective on trust 
which encompasses the complexity as well as the richness of the phenomenon (Simon 
2013: 2). 
 
While it is true that developing a complete, all-encompassing theory on trust is rather 
impossible, we are able to identify a minimal number of key concepts that have to be 
taken into account when speaking of trust (Möllering 2006: 7-9). These are concepts 
that reappear in different research domains and therefore can be regarded as central 
to our understanding of trust.  
One of the first things is that we have to be able to identify an actor –often 
referred to in the literature on trust as the trustor- who has expectations of the 
intentions or behaviour of someone else (the trustee). We have to be able to 
distinguish a trustor and a trustee in order to speak of trust (Möllering 2006: 7). The 
expectations the trustor has of the trustee have to be positive and favourable. These 
expectations do not have to be conscious expectations. It is often the case that we 
have put trust in someone and only after the trust has been breached (e.g. ‘I should 
never have lent her my scarf. She forgot it on the train and now I have lost it’) we 
become aware of this act of trust.  
The relevance of trust is due to the principal vulnerability and uncertainty of 
the trustor towards the trustee. The trustor does not know for sure how the trustee 
will act. He or she can harm the trustor (idem: 8). Depending on the room to act 
giving by the trustor to the trustee, the trustor might be harmed more or less by the 
trustee. Therefore, the actions of the trustor and the trustee are interdependent 
(idem: 8). It has to be said that in order to speak of trust, the “social vulnerability and 
uncertainty have to be irreducible (emphasis added)” (idem: 8). It is not merely that 
the trustor does not have all information about the intentions of the trustee, but also 
that both are actors with a certain amount of autonomy; they have agency.  
This also means that trust cannot be forced or guaranteed. This willingness of 
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the trustor to be vulnerable, based on the expectation that the trustor will perform a 
specific action which is important to the trustee, does not imply some “masochistic 
desire” (idem: 9) to get hurt. On the contrary, this willingness to get hurt is actually 
the “highly optimistic expectation” that vulnerability is not a problem and no harm 
will be done (idem: 9). Here, trust differs crucially from other social processes that 
are about avoiding or diminishing vulnerability, rather than positively accepting it. 
Finally, another important aspect to recognize is that the trustor and the 
trustee are embedded in a social context which influences how exactly they can define 
themselves as actors and enact their agency (idem). Trust is, therefore, not something 
which is merely a part of an isolated interaction of the trustor and the trustee. The 
social context, history, and other actors also play a role in the establishing of trust. 
 
 
1.2 Guido Möllering. Trust: reason, routine, reflexivity  
In trying to develop such a rich account of trust, the research done by Guido 
Möllering (2001, 2006; 2005) –who we already met in the previous section- gave me 
a head start. Studying his work was of key importance to this book for at least two 
reasons. First, notwithstanding our different academic backgrounds –he is a 
professor of organisation and management, I am a starting philosopher of technology 
interested in philosophical anthropology- both our perspectives on trust show some 
important points of resemblance. Consequently, his work helped me to sharpen my 
own conceptual framework. Second, his focus on the leap of faith as the core of trust 
became the starting point for my theoretical analysis of trust in the next chapter. 
 As to the first, the paradox I identified lying at the heart of the concept of trust 
is by and large in line with Möllering’s approach. He states that “trust is ambivalent” 
–I would say paradoxical- “because it solves a basic problem of social relations 
without eliminating the problem” (Möllering 2006: 6). He also asserts the ‘as-if’ 
character of trust. By acting as-if, by creating fictions, uncertainty and vulnerability 
are not removed – rather, they are suspended. Trust may be based on a fiction, but it 
simultaneously is also productive by enabling a reality to take shape.  
In his 2006 book, ‘Trust: Reason, routine, reflexivity’, Möllering convincingly 
explains that: 
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“Trust is an ongoing process of building on reason, routine and reflexivity, 
suspending irreducible social vulnerability and uncertainty as if they were 
favourably resolved, and maintaining thereby a state of favourable 
expectation towards the actions and intentions of more or less specific 
others” (Möllering 2006: 111). 
With reason, routine, and reflexivity, Möllering refers to the three major approaches 
to trust he discerned in the scholarly domain. The first refers to the perspective that 
trust is foremost a rational choice, the second sees trust as a routine behaviour, and 
the last approaches trust as a reflexive reinforcement.  
As to the first, in the rational choice approach trust has been dominantly 
defined as a decision of the trustor based on an estimation of whether or not it is 
likely for the trustee to act in an expected manner and honour the trust that is placed 
in him (see for example Hardin 2001, 2002, 2006; Coleman 1994; Bacharach and 
Gambetta 2001). Following the rational choice paradigm, actors are self-interested 
and trust is the rational outcome of the imperfect estimations of a trustor’s 
perspective on the trustworthiness of a trustee.  
With the second approach, trustors, instead of making difficult rational 
choices in a complex and often puzzling world, base their actions on the things that 
are given and relatively stable. We all act following certain rules and adopting certain 
roles which make our actions much more predictable and stable. Trust then has a 
“taken-for-granted” character.  
The third approach is based on the idea that trust can be built up in 
interaction; it is a process in which actors learn to trust each other (Nooteboom 1997, 
2002; Nooteboom and Six 2003). Even when actors do not ‘really’ trust each other 
but just take a shot at it and start cooperating, trust may emerge out of this 
interaction and become ‘real’ trust. Step by step, trust can be established (Axelrod 
1984). 
 
In his book, Möllering (2006: 105-106) makes the argument that all three 
perspectives highlight important and meaningful grounds for trust, but by classifying 
trust as merely one of these perspectives, “the concept is stripped of its unique 
explanatory power”.  
Moreover, all three approaches seem to ‘explain away’ what trust is rather than 
to really look for its core, because in the end when do we have enough certainty to act, 
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how do we deal with the possibility of people acting ‘out-of-character’ and how do we 
take that first step in the process of building trust? To Möllering, this leap of faith 
that all three grounds of trust prepare is the essence of trust. Reason, routine, and 
reflexivity provide us with the grounds from which we are able to take this leap. 
Suspending our quests for more certainty, we can then whole-heartedly take the 
chance of being rewarded for our trust, or of getting hurt. In that sense, trust is 
always a “risky business” (Luhmann 1979) and is strongly connected to vulnerability 
(Baier 1986). With trust, there is always something at stake.  
Furthermore, Möllering argues that although concepts such as suspension and 
the leap of faith are at the centre of understanding trust, they are underdeveloped in 
the scholarly research. Next to his own work on bringing these concepts to the fore, 
he also refers to some other scholars who, often implicitly, have built on these notions 
in developing their account of trust.  
One of these scholars is the German sociologist, Nikolas Luhmann (1979). On 
several occasions in his book, Möllering refers to Luhmann as a scholar who 
developed “key initial ideas” for his own approach. Möllering (2006: 116) states: 
“…Luhmann argues that trust involves ‘a type of system-internal 
“suspension” (Aufhebung) (Luhmann, 1979, p.79). When actors achieve 
suspension they treat uncertainty and vulnerability as unproblematic, 
even if it could turn out that they are problematic. Luhmann (1979) 
describes trust as ‘a movement towards indifference: by introducing trust, 
certain possibilities of development can be excluded from consideration. 
Certain dangers which cannot be removed but which should not disrupt 
action are neutralized’ (p.25).” 
By analysing Luhmann’s work on trust, which focuses on its function to reduce 
complexity, I will take up Möllering’s challenge to further explore the leap of faith he 
identifies as being essential to our understanding of trust (Chapter 2). I will bring 
together Luhmann’s work on trust and the work of the German philosopher Helmuth 
Plessner (1975) to deepen our understanding of the leap of faith, which I will refer to 
as the bridging of a hiatus. From a philosophical anthropological perspective, I will 
relate the leap of faith or the bridging of the hiatus to the ontological distance 
inherent in human life. Because human beings can, as it were, from a distance look at 
themselves, at others, and at the world around them, they do not fully coincide with 
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themselves. They always have to bridge this three-fold distance, resulting in the 
previously mentioned uncertainties, which are inherent in human life. Referring to 
this external position human beings can take, Plessner (1975) speaks of an “eccentric 
positionality”. I will show how trust is a product of this eccentric positionality and 
that the ‘as if’ character of trust should be understood in the light of the ontological 
homelessness all human beings have to bear.  
   
A caveat. Do not expect to find a clear-cut, final definition of trust in this book. As 
Simon (2013) already wrote, there is not one all-encompassing definition that one 
can use to analyse this phenomenon without simultaneously losing the richness of it. 
In line with Wittgenstein (2009 [1953]: 67), I have therefore chosen to look for 
“family resemblances”, instead of trying –and inevitably failing- to come up with 
what is essential to trust. I have focused on a family of related concepts that I found 
chiefly in the work of Luhmann (1988, 1979), which in their interrelatedness shed a 
light on what trust might come down to. This trust-family consists of the following 
members: a familiar world, interpersonal trust, confidence or system trust, and the 
reducing of complexity.  
Trust as a way to reduce complexity inherent in human life can only take place 
in a familiar world. Although trust is a strong strategy to deal with uncertainty, it 
cannot function in a world, which is not to a certain extent already ‘familiar’. A world 
is familiar when it is based on shared values and norms. People inhabiting this 
familiar world presume that other people perceive the world in a more or less similar 
way and take certain aspects of life for granted.  
Taking this family of trust concepts to examine the networked era leads to 
interesting questions such as: how is the familiar world constituted online? Is it still 
possible to speak of system trust when smart artefacts and Internet services 
increasingly display pro-active and personalized functionalities? How do human 
beings deal with the complexity inherent in human life in the networked era? 
Next to these related concepts to analyse trust, looking into the work of 
Luhmann brought me another advantage. Because Luhmann not only considers 
interpersonal trust, but also studies system trust to understand how people can have 
confidence in large, opaque technical systems, he clears the way for an analysis of 
trust in cyberspace. As interpersonal trust in a globalized and technologized world is 
no longer sufficient to reduce complexities, a new kind of trust is being developed, 
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based on the belief in the complexity-reducing mechanisms of systems such as 
political systems, air traffic systems, banking systems etc. In the networked era, the 
Internet can be seen as one of the most dominant systems providing an infrastructure 
that impacts almost every aspect of daily life. 
 
 
1.3 e-Trust 
Every scholar has his or her final ground, the fundamental prepositions on which his 
or her analysis is built. Let me be upfront about mine. I basically assume two things: 
first, if you want to try to understand human beings you have to look at them in 
relation to their environment. Second, all our interactions are mediated interactions. 
The way we look at ourselves, others, and the world around us is influenced by the 
technologies –or other artificial means- that mediate these relations. Taking into 
account my background in the philosophy of technology and keen interest in theories 
of mediation (Plessner 1975; Ihde 1990, 1993; Verbeek 2000; Verbeek 2011b), these 
two beliefs may not come as a surprise.  
In my aim to understand my puzzlement about trust in a world mediated by 
the Internet, I will therefore be focussing on the way in which trust and the Internet 
interact. Or, to be more precise, how human beings establish trust through smart 
artefacts. Investigating the way in which the relation between man and technology 
takes shape is actually the focal point of the philosophy of technology (see for a full 
definition of the philosophy of technology Kaplan 2009). How do Internet-connected 
devices co-shape our experience of the world and influence the way in which we 
establish trust? And how do we as trust-giving beings attach meaning to these 
devices?  
 
From this specific theoretical angle, when reviewing the research on trust and e-trust 
more specifically, I encountered two difficulties.  
First, the dominant paradigm in trust research sees trust as first and foremost 
a phenomenon that manifests itself on the interpersonal level (McLeod 2014; Good 
1988) or at least as something that starts at the interpersonal level (Kohn 2008). 
Trust chiefly exists in the interaction between persons (trustor and trustee) and often 
these persons are seen as rational agents (remember the ‘trust as reason’ approach) 
(see for example in the e-trust domain Taddeo 2010a; or McGeer 2004: who 
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investigates trust between online rational agents who developed 'friendship trust'). As 
a consequence, the focus on the context in which this interaction takes place or on the 
technologies mediating this interaction is rather low. 
Second, in the literature on e-trust, where the technology obviously is part of 
the analysis, the conceptualisation of the technology remains rather broad. It often 
depicts the Internet as an ‘online world’ or ‘environment’ without really specifying 
which platform or service one is referring to (see for example: Pettit 2004). Also the 
devices through which the Internet is being accessed in general fall out of the scope of 
these analyses.  
In line with the empirical turn in the philosophy of technology (Achterhuis 
2001), I will argue in chapter 4 and 5 that in order to understand the ways in which 
trust is established in Internet-mediated contexts, it can be more fruitful to look at 
specific devices and practices than to investigate “The Technology” (capital T 
intended).  
 
There are of course also exceptions. For example, Kiran and Verbeek (2010) explore a 
post-phenomenological account of trust and illustrate this approach by looking into 
empirical cases such as the role of telemonitoring in e-health and the use of 
prosthetics. Also Coeckelbergh (2012), in his analysis of trust in robots, develops a 
phenomenological account of trust. In his philosophical analyses of online trust, De 
Laat (2005, 2012) pays a lot of attention to the different environments online, 
consequently bringing to the attention the importance of the specific, empirical 
aspects of the online world for our understanding of trust. And even in research that 
is predominantly based on a rational approach, the contextual aspects of trust do 
trickle down. For example, O’Hara (2012), although taking a rational approach to 
trust, simultaneously emphasizes the messiness of the human world and the 
increasing integration of people and machines, leading to a ‘mediated reality’, which 
poses a challenge to modelling trust in systems.  
 
While the post-phenomenological, mediated perspective is still underdeveloped in 
the research on trust and the Internet, there are several seminal works in the domain 
of e-trust, notwithstanding their differing theoretical bases, of which the findings can 
help to develop such a contextual account of Internet-mediated trust. Unfortunately, 
it is not in the scope of this research to provide a complete overview of all these works 
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(For a more comprehensive overview I like to refer to Simon 2013; Ess 2010; Taddeo 
2009), however, due to their direct influence on this book, I do explicitly want to list 
the following works. 
One of the earliest philosophical explorations of e-trust was undertaken by 
Hellen Nissenbaum (2001; 2004). Nissenbaum convincingly argues that trust cannot 
be replaced by security online. While it is true that security is an important 
precondition for trust to be established, it cannot be simplified to security, because 
such a shift would damage the creativity, the freewheeling, the political… facilitated 
by trust (Nissenbaum 2004: 179). She warns that although security is important and 
even crucial to online activities such as banking and e-commerce, we should be 
cautious to let this security paradigm take over the nature of cyberspace
1
. 
Over the years, a couple of special issues have been published also devoted to 
the subject of e-trust. In 2004, Analyse und Kritik published a special issue titled 
“Trust and community on the Internet. Opportunities and restrictions for online 
cooperation”. Dominantly from an analytic point of view, the contributions focus on 
the question of if and how cooperation online is possible. Trust is valued as an 
important precondition for any cooperation. In this special issue “… the potential, the 
pre-conditions and the limits of the Internet for the emergence of trust and 
community building are discussed” (Lahno and Matzat 2004: 1). Also in this issue, 
Pettit (2004) retakes his influential article “The cunning of trust” (Pettit 1995) to 
argue that a rich account of trust on the Internet is impossible due to the absence of 
three key forms of evidence: the evidence of face, the evidence of frame, and the 
evidence of a file of the shared history. According to Pettit, online you miss bodily 
cues (face) you do not see how people interact with others (frame), and you cannot 
keep a record of past behaviour (file), consequently, trust between actors merely 
known to each other in an online context is impossible. In the same issue, also Hardin 
(2004) shows himself skeptical about the possibility of trust online. In line with 
 
                                                   
1
 In their article “The case of online trust” Turilli et al. (2010) seem to suggest that Nissenbaum rejects 
the possibility of trust online. However, in my reading Nissenbaum only rejects the possibility of 
obtaining trust through security online. The obstacles to trust online Nissenbaum identifies are not 
unsolvable nor that fundamental to dismiss trust and replace it for security online altogether. They do 
invite the rethinking of the balance between security and freedom (the latter which is nurtured by 
trust).  
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Pettit, he finds the relationships online to be too thin to foster cooperation.  
 In 2010, Knowledge, Technology & Policy published an issue called “Trust in 
Technology”, guest edited by Mariarosaria Taddeo (2010b) revolving around the 
claimed problematic nature of trust in technology invoked by the widespread 
development of ICTs. From a diverse disciplinary background, the scholars 
contributing to this issue addressed –amongst others- the social responsibility of 
Internet Service Providers and hosting companies (Cohen-Almagor 2010) and the 
importance of value-sensitive design for trust online (Vermaas et al. 2010). This issue 
also contains a thorough overview of the literature on e-trust (from an ethical 
perspective) (Ess 2010) and the previously-mentioned phenomenological account of 
trust by Kiran and Verbeek (2010).  
In 2011, Taddeo, now together with Luciano Floridi (2011), edited an issue of 
Ethics and Information Technology called “The case for e-trust: a new ethical 
challenge”. The issue promotes a hybrid approach, combining conceptual analysis 
with empirical data. It especially draws on models developed in the domain of 
artificial intelligence (AI). I would also like to highlight the contribution of 
Grodzinsky et al. (2011) who provide a thorough review of the research on e-trust and 
specifically focus on the way in which the human actors design, introduce, and use 
the artificial agents. Also the article of Pieters (2011) who focuses on the role of the 
explanation provided to the users for assessing the trustworthiness of systems is 
highly relevant. In chapter 5 of this book, the importance of users being explained 
how systems function returns. 
Also in 2011, a book was published called “Trust and virtual worlds. 
Contemporary perspectives” edited by Charles Ess and May Thorseth (2011). One of 
the starting points of this book is that in Internet research –and therefore in e-trust 
research as well- one has to look beyond the online-offline divide, a point I will 
elaborate in the next chapter. Consequently, the online or virtual environment is of 
utmost importance for analyzing trust
2
.  
 
                                                   
2 I especially want to mention the interesting academic discussion that unfolded between Taddeo 
(2011) and John Weckert (2011) in this volume concerning the question of whether Artificial Agents 
(AAs) have some sort of moral agency and to what level human beings are defined by this moral agency 
which AAs may or may not possess. Where Taddeo provides a rationalistic, Kantian account of trust, 
Weckert suggests that trust is more like a hermeneutic framework influencing how we act and perceive 
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1.4 The Internet 
Next to coming to grips with what trust entails, also the Internet itself needed to be 
conceptualized. The Internet is not a one-dimensional technological innovation. 
Although it is a ‘global network’ and it has entered virtually every domain in life, it 
cannot be approached as a heteronomous system. One cannot say anything 
meaningful about trust in or on ‘the’ Internet, because what the Internet comes down 
to simply is not clear-cut.  
The conceptualization of the Internet in this book is based on the layered 
design of the Internet itself, which will be discussed in chapter 4. In order to take into 
account those aspects of the Internet, which dominantly influence the formation of 
trust, I have discerned four cornerstones of the current Internet: construction, 
curation, codification and context.
3
  
These four Cs I deem to be crucial to understand trust mediated by current 
smart artefacts and Internet platforms. I explicitly say ‘current’ as the Internet is still 
a system ‘under construction’ and it can be questioned if it will ever leave this state. 
These four Cs, therefore, may still change over time. However, for now they constitute 
the conceptual lens I will use to analyse trust in the specific cases presented at the 
end of this book.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
the world. 
3
 I do not pretend to have come up with a thorough definition of what the identity of the Internet then 
in fact is. Based on the conceptual analysis of trust that I develop in chapter 2 and 3, I have mainly 
brought to the fore those aspects of the Internet, which are key to understanding trust in the 
networked era. Without any doubt, I therefore have left out fundamental aspects of the Internet, such 
as the physical tubes of the network (Blum 2012) or its cultural imbeddedness (Deibert 2008; Deibert 
et al. 2012a; Deibert et al. 2010). These aspects of the Internet would definitely deserve their place in a 
more general definition of the Internet. They are, however, left out here because they are of less 
importance to understand the way in which users trust or have confidence in and through their 
devices.  
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1.4.1 Context 
Context refers to users experiencing the world through their smartphones, 
interacting with others on social network sites, making use of services of information 
intermediaries such as Google or Facebook. As we have seen in the short overview on 
the academic literature on trust, it is generally accepted that trust arises on this 
interpersonal, micro-level. Based on insights deriving from theories of mediations, I 
will show how smart artefacts invite users to act and interact in certain ways and how 
this may enable or challenge trust. Because of their easy-to-use design and proactive 
and personalized services, smart artefacts generally persuade users to have 
confidence in the functioning of the artefact. Consequently, users may tend to 
“forget” the mediating workings of the smart artefact, assessing their interactions as 
direct instead of mediated. This may lead to the utopian belief that interactions can 
be based on merely interpersonal trust, without taking into account the system 
component of the interaction.  
Although the context level generally can be seen as the starting point for the 
analysis of the way in which users are experiencing trust, it should never be the sole 
focal point. Due to its networked ontology, Internet technology is far more complex 
than what merely becomes present or visible in the phenomenological experience on 
the micro-level. The other Cs should therefore also be taken into account when 
analysing trust mediated by smart artefacts, platforms, or online services. 
 
1.4.2 Curation 
Curation stands for the actors who govern the Internet. This can be, amongst others, 
governments, international organizations, private parties, and/or civil society 
organizations. These actors, on the one hand, contribute to the familiar world by 
maintaining the infrastructure, developing standards and protocols, designing user-
friendly interfaces and providing users with personalized services. On the other hand, 
these curators may endanger the familiar world when they make use of the Internet 
for their own interest. Remember the NSA altering the Internet infrastructure to 
enforce backdoors in its technical backbone. Or, think of information intermediaries 
such as Google or Facebook collecting all sorts of data from their users to sell to third 
parties. Due to the networked ontology of smart artefacts, a new relation of mediation 
occurs between curators and users. Users become increasingly visible to curators in 
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an invisible manner due to the data that is collected by smart artefacts and Internet 
services. Although these relations of users and curators almost never enter the 
phenomenological experience of users, they may have an impact on trust in the 
services provided by the curator and in the smart device as such. 
 
1.4.3 Codification 
With codification, I explicitly refer to the rules and regulations put forth by the 
curators. Through their terms and conditions, but also by the way they design the 
device and set up the protocols regulating their platforms and services (Lessig 2006), 
they pre-sort certain behaviour in their users. As we have seen, trust is only possible 
in a familiar world. A legal framework, technical protocols, corporate rules and 
regulations, and implicit norms and values contribute to this familiar world. 
However, when these rules and regulations are susceptible to change, losing their 
self-evident character, it becomes more difficult to trust as the complexity (that has to 
be reduced) rises.  
 
1.4.4 Construction 
With construction, I refer to the design of the artefact. Smart artefacts generally have 
hardware as well as software elements. The often-slick design of smart devices invite 
users to assess them in a one-dimensional way: do they or do they not work. 
The ways in which algorithms perform the collecting and mining of data, the 
way these data are interpreted and used to influence the user’s experience are 
difficult to ascertain. Devices are designed to be used, not to be understood. 
Therefore, it becomes increasingly difficult for the average user to come to grips with 
the impact of his or her interaction with the smart device or online service. Even the 
programmers themselves do not even always understand how their coding ends up 
delivering certain outcomes (Aupers 2002).  
 
1.4.5 A two-fold use 
The analytic framework - context, curators, codification, and construction- can be put 
to use in two different manners. First of all it is a descriptive tool. By taking into 
account these four layers and not just limiting ourselves to the interpersonal level or 
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context level, I can do justice to the influence of the networked character of the smart 
artefacts and services.  
Second, this conceptual lens can also be part of more evaluative practices. 
Analysing specific cases of trust mediated by internet-based artefacts through the 
proposed conceptual lens of the 4Cs, can help ethicist and policymakers to determine 
whether or not trust is being given in a justified manner. Moreover, the 4Cs enable 
them to pinpoint on which level measures might be taken to strengthen trust. 
 
 
 
1.5 Outline 
This is how this book is composed. Overall, there are three parts. The first part 
contains chapters 2 and 3, which focus on trust. The second part, chapters 4 and 5, 
focusses on the Internet and how trust is established there, and the third part, 
chapters 6,7, and 8, consists of two cases and an analysis of a more encompassing 
trend to illustrate in a more detailed manner how trust is shaped in cyberspace. The 
book ends with a short epilogue. 
 
1.5.1 Chapter 2 
In the following chapter, I will first study trust on the ontological level, meaning that 
I will dive into the question of what trust means to human beings and how it relates 
to the way human beings are in the world. Central to this analysis will be the work of 
Niklas Luhmann who focused on the functionality of trust: a strategy to reduce 
complexity. By replenishing the work of Luhmann with insights from the work of 
Helmuth Plessner, I will show that although all living things have to deal with 
complexity, the complexity human beings have to cope with is even more radical due 
to their eccentric positionality. I will also pay attention to the “three anthropological 
laws” Plessner has formulated. These laws will return as an instrument to investigate 
trust on the micro-level (context) in chapter 5.  
 
1.5.2 Chapter 3 
In chapter 3, I will look at trust from a sociological/historical perspective and argue 
that in modernity and late modernity, interpersonal trust increasingly had to make 
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way for system trust due to the arrival and dominant presence of large and opaque 
systems in society. Elaborating on the work of Luhmann and Giddens, I will focus on 
system trust and confidence and how these new forms of trust relate to interpersonal 
trust. At the end of this chapter, the whole family of trust notions will have been 
discussed.  
 
1.5.3 Chapter 4 
Central to this chapter is the Internet as infrastructure and it revolves around the 
question if and how the Internet can function as a familiar world. I first retell the 
history of the Internet by focusing on the role trust plays in the collaboration between 
the founding fathers of the Internet. Next, I look at the layered structure of the 
Internet and show how this layered structure has been a fruitful starting point for 
conceptualizing the Internet not only for me but for other scholars as well. I will 
argue that curators such as governments, private parties, and non-profit 
organizations on the one hand contribute to the Internet as a familiar world by 
developing rules and regulations, protocols and by maintaining the infrastructure. All 
these actions help to make the Internet a reliable infrastructure and environment 
where trust can thrive. On the other hand, these curators also use the Internet as a 
tool to set and reach their own goals. This may conflict with the earlier goal of 
creating a reliable and steady Internet infrastructure and environment. As a way of 
conclusion, I reflect on the transition of the Internet as an open environment to the 
Internet as a more controlled and closed environment. 
 
1.5.4 Chapter 5 
Where in chapter 4, I take a macro-perspective on the Internet, I now move to the 
micro-level, where the experience of users is central to the analysis. In this chapter 
the context level of the Internet is the main point of departure for my study of trust. 
By replenishing the three anthropological laws of Plessner with insights deriving from 
the philosophy of technology and constructionism, I analyse the current networked 
era and the way in which trust is being established.  
I think of this chapter as being the heart of this book. It not only shows how 
interpersonal trust starting at the context level is intrinsically connected to the other 
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layers –curators, codification, and construction- consequently transforming into 
interpersonal system trust. It also is where I develop, based on the building stones 
crafted in the earlier chapters, my take on the specific challenges posed by the 
networked era on the building and maintaining of trust. These findings will be further 
substantiated by two cases –in chapter 6 and 7- and an exploration of online 
personalization as a dominant and recurring theme in the networked era – in chapter 
8-. 
 
1.5.5 Chapter 6 
The first case starts off with the often-cited example of the not-returned hotel key, by 
Bruno Latour. In this example, Latour investigates how by adding an extra weight to 
the key, the imperative “bring back your hotel key when you leave the hotel’ is being 
inscribed in the artefact. This new ‘actant’ alters the interaction and trust relation of 
the actors involved. This chapter shows how due to technological changes the hotel 
key transforms, simultaneously also transforming the trust interaction of the actors 
involved. 
 
1.5.6 Chapter 7 
The second case will focus on the online platform AirBnB. The aim of this platform is 
to connect people who want to rent their house or a room in their house and people 
who are looking for a place to stay while traveling. AirBnB is a prime example of the 
shared economy movement. This movement wants to change the economic system, 
which is based on ownership, to a system that is based on access. In short, it should 
no longer be important to own things but to have access to them. By cutting out the 
middleman, in this case the hotel owner, old forms of trust based on reputation and 
reciprocity can be reinvented. In other words, trust is solely something that is part of 
the context level. I will, however, argue that this view is based on a utopian belief that 
technology can restore the indirectness of the ontological distance that is at the centre 
of every interaction. I will show how not only the construction of the platform is 
shaping the building of trust, but that also the interests of the curator – AirBnB, a 
privately owned company - and the codification of AirBnB and several state actors 
should be taken into account when analysing trust between users of AirBnB. 
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1.5.7 Chapter 8 
This chapter not so much focuses on a specific case but on a dominant tendency that 
affects a variety of practices in the networked era: personalization. Increasingly, 
online services are tailored to a specific profile of a user based on collected data that 
are mined to discover patterns of behaviour. In this chapter, I will argue that 
although this may lead to a personalized world very familiar to the users themselves 
as it seemingly fits their individual preferences, it is not a familiar world where trust 
can easily thrive. A world dominantly based on personalized preferences does not 
necessarily also function as a familiar background of shared norms and values. 
Instead it confirms a person in her initial beliefs and convictions, raising the bar for 
projecting herself into the position of someone else with different beliefs. The 
distance inherent to every interaction becomes more difficult to bear if this situation 
is not reflected- even contradicted- in the personalized environment. 
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2 
The concept of trust. 
Niklas Luhmann meets Helmuth Plessner 
 
To understand the meaning of trust in human life, we have to ask the preliminary, 
transcendental question: “what makes it even possible for human beings to 
experience such a thing as trust?” This chapter will focus on what is (often implicitly) 
presupposed when we talk about trust but which in fact should be acknowledged as 
its core explanatory force: bridging the hiatus inherent in human life. This hiatus or 
distance lies at the core of human existence. The uncertainty about, amongst others, 
the action of others and the way in which the future will unfold, results in a hiatus 
between human beings and the world they inhabit. Fundamentally, trust is about 
dealing with this hiatus. The hiatus cannot be resolved or taken away. The positive 
expectations we hold towards others enable us to act as if the future is certain, as if 
the hiatus is not there. Trust cannot erase this ontological distance, but neutralizes 
the anxiety, as it were, for a potential bad outcome.  
In the introduction, it was already stated that Möllering (2006) argues that the 
majority of research being done on trust chiefly focuses on the grounds for trust –
which he clusters around three themes: reason, routine and reflexivity- instead of 
analysing how these grounds interact with the bridging of this hiatus –which he 
refers to as “a leap of faith”- that occurs when people act on trust. He argues that 
more effort should be put into understanding why and how this leap of faith or the 
bridging of the hiatus takes place and how, in fact, the act of bridging is essential to 
reinforce and consolidate the grounds on which trust is made possible in the first 
place.  
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In this chapter, I will take on this challenge by conceptualizing trust as the bridging of 
a hiatus, consequently, connecting it to the ontology of human beings. The work of 
Niklas Luhmann (1979) on trust will be our starting point. Not only is his theory, 
which first and foremost focuses on the function of trust, very influential in different 
research domains, it also already incorporates several elements to help us understand 
the connection between trust and the bridging of the hiatus4. Although more than 
informative, Luhmann’s theory on trust is not sufficient to grasp the consequences of 
the hiatus at the heart of human existence.  
In the second part of this chapter, I will therefore make use of some key insights 
deriving from philosophical anthropology, and more specifically from the work of 
German philosopher Helmuth Plessner, to replenish Luhmann’s account of trust. It 
has to be noted that although Luhmann himself positively refers to Plessner in some 
footnotes in Trust, he later in his career explicitly distanced himself from 
philosophical anthropology. It therefore is questionable if Luhmann himself would 
appreciate this connection between his work and that of Plessner. Nevertheless, I will 
show that bringing together Luhmann’s trust account and Plessner’s philosophy gives 
us a better understanding of trust as a way of dealing with complexity caused by the 
hiatus inherent in human life.  
 
 
2.1 Introducing Niklas Luhmann 
Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998) was an influential German sociologist who published 
more than 50 books and 300 articles on a variety of topics between 1964 and 1997. In 
1997, he published his main work called Theory of Society which according to 
Arnoldi (2001: 2), can be seen as “a synthesis of his sociological work and his general 
system theory”, the latter being the accomplishment he is most famous for. However, 
an earlier work called Social Systems (1995) should also be mentioned because of the 
 
                                                   
4
 Möllering (2001) argues that in fact some key notions of Luhmann’s theory can and should be traced 
back to the work of Georg Simmel. Also Misztal (1996) has acknowledged the importance of Simmel’s 
work on trust. However, since the work of Simmel is hardly ever directly recognized by other trust 
scholars and in general is only known through the work of Luhmann, I will mainly focus on Luhmann’s 
theory. 
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introduction and thorough analysis of some of his key concepts (Paul 2001).  
Unfortunately, it would lead us too far to give a detailed description of his 
whole oeuvre, especially because our main interest concerns just one book called 
Vertrauen published in Germany in 1968, translated into English and bundled 
together with another work called Power in 19795. Trust belongs to the early period of 
Luhmann’s work and stands rather apart from his later work. It is, next to one article 
published in 1988, his only work that is completely dedicated to the analysis of trust.  
In this early stage, Luhmann was mainly interested in expounding and 
justifying the concept of the reduction of complexity (Poggi 1979). His chief 
assumption is that there are empirical systems that have to establish their place in an 
environment far more complex than their own internal structure (Paul 2001). 
Systems try to reduce this external complexity by building internal or ordered 
complexity. Trust, next to other options such as a legal framework and the use of 
contracts, is a way to reduce this complexity in social life.  
Although key notions in Luhmann’s thinking such as autopoesis and double 
contingency are only elaborated later on in his career, his most important thoughts 
on how society should be conceptualized and analysed are already set in place in 
Trust. Where useful to understand the specifics of his trust account, I will try to 
embed these theoretical notions. 
 
Possibly, the reason for the popularity of Luhmann’s work on trust in the social 
sciences and beyond can partly be found in the preface to his book Trust. In the one-
page introduction, he states that far too often sociology makes use of concepts coming 
from common usage or from other disciplines such as ethics. However, before 
starting the dialogue with other disciplines, sociology should strive at formulating a 
theory of its own. He sees it as his task, difficult but not impossible, to bridge the gulf 
between theory and empirical work. His effort to thoroughly think through the 
concept of trust and relate it to a network of grounding ideas has been an important 
source of inspiration for many trust-scholars. 
As the first sociologist to provide a conceptual framework for understanding 
 
                                                   
5
 Although the official title of the English translation is Trust and Power, I will refer to it as Trust, 
simply because Power is another work that stands on its own. 
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trust (Misztal 1996), Luhmann’s theory can be indicated as “the starting point for the 
modern approach to trust and its cognate concepts” (Taddeo 2009: 3). He provided 
trust-scholars “with what is no doubt the richest set of insights and understandings of 
trust currently available” (Seligman 1997: 18). 
Because of his functionalistic approach, leaving out normative connotations, 
Luhmann’s conceptualization of trust is open to different realizations, which might be 
the main reason why he has “inspired trust researchers across a broad range of 
disciplines” (Möllering 2006: 5). Despite the abstract nature of his theoretical 
framework and his rather inaccessible style of writing, the level of abstractness in fact 
turned out to make his theory applicable and useful in a variety of research domains. 
Luhmann himself has illustrated this by using his theoretical concepts as a basis to 
write about a wide range of topics such as love, risk, and mass media. 
 
 
2.2 Luhmann’s theory of trust 
In his book Trust, Luhmann launches the hypothesis that trust is a manner to reduce 
the complexity of the world. Simply put, the environment of every living system 
contains more possibilities than the system itself can actualize. Therefore, every 
system has to make selections in order to persevere (Bednarz 1984). Although all 
systems have to deal with the complexity of their environment, only human beings 
are conscious about the world’s contingency. This awareness poses upon human 
beings the burden of choice. They have to make selections, because they cannot 
accept all the possibilities the world inhibits. Because these selections cannot be 
made based on sufficient evidence –in the end, we are not sure about what tomorrow 
brings nor can we foresee all the actions of our fellow-human beings – trust is “a 
blending of knowledge and ignorance” (Luhmann 1979: 25). It is to act as if the future 
is certain.  
 
In the following paragraphs, I will give a compact outline of Luhmann’s theory on 
trust (1979), based on the key concepts: complexity, risk, familiarity, roles, 
confidence, and system theory. Another important concept in Luhmann’s theory, 
namely system trust will be elaborated in the following chapter. For now, I will 
mainly focus on interpersonal trust.  
Furthermore, I will pay attention to the phenomenological influence on his 
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conceptualization and the connection this conceptualization might have with 
philosophical anthropology (Poggi 1979). Principally in his early work, it is clear that 
Luhmann is influenced by philosophical anthropology as well as by phenomenology, 
specifically by Husserl (Paul 2001).  
I will argue that the connection between his approach on trust and some basic 
ideas originating from philosophical anthropology is very fruitful to grasp the core 
aspect of trust. It has to be stressed that Luhmann himself, especially in his later 
work, never explicitly made this connection. Even more so, he categorically distances 
himself from the philosophical anthropological discipline. Therefore, in the second 
part of this chapter, by taking Luhmann’s concept of trust and relating it to insights 
deriving from philosophical anthropology, we move beyond what Luhmann aimed at 
in his work on trust. I will especially look at the work of Helmuth Plessner, one of the 
founding fathers of philosophical anthropology, to explore more in depth the hiatus 
central to trust. Finally, in line with Möllering (2001, 2006) I will then make the 
argument that up and foremost trust is defined by the suspension of uncertainty and 
by the attempting to bridge the gap.  
 
2.2.1 Complexity 
Trust is a basic fact of social life. Without some sense of trust, it would be impossible 
to get up in the morning. We would be overwhelmed by the idea of all the possible 
turns fate could take when we leave the warm safety of our bed. Without the 
conviction that others will act in character and that the ways of the world will not 
change overnight, we would be paralysed. It would become impossible to do the 
things we want to do, to believe in our own ability to act. Our lives would stagnate, as 
if time had frozen and we had gotten stuck in the bubble of an everlasting present. 
 
Trust, as Luhmann defines it, is a way to reduce complexity that is inherent in the 
world we inhabit. To human beings the world is open and has no boundaries. It 
excludes no possibilities and, therefore, it is always more complex than the systems 
which are living in it. While it is true that all systems, whether made of stones, 
animals, or human beings, live in a selectively constituted environment, human 
beings are the only ones who “are conscious of the world’s complexity and therefore 
of the possibility of selecting their environment” (Luhmann 1979: 6). The world as a 
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whole is the “universal horizon of all human experience” (idem: 5) and, from a more 
Husserlian perspective, human beings have to focus their attention against this 
background of all other possibilities over and over again (Arnoldi 2001: 5). 
Consequently, human beings are aware of the fact that things could have been 
different. This awareness of contingency implicates uncertainty about “a future 
characterized by more or less indeterminate complexity” (Luhmann 1979: 15). Trust 
is necessary to reduce this complexity and to tolerate the risks and uncertainties 
which accompany it. 
 
This complexity enters the human world by means of two elements: the other and 
time, revealing a social and a temporal level in the complexity of the world.  
On a social level, this complexity is connected to the “subjective –I-ness” of 
other human beings (Luhmann 1979: 6). Complexity comes into the world because of 
the possibility of unanticipated actions by other human beings, constituting a source 
of insecurity. For Luhmann, other egos are in fact black boxes. After all, other people 
are, to a certain degree, free to see things differently, to have their own perspective 
and understanding of the world. We do not have direct access to the others we 
interact with, so, in consequence, they can act in unforeseen ways.  
On a temporal level, human beings are aware of the discrepancy between 
possible futures and the one future that will become reality. In the present they have 
to cope with an over-complex future. Therefore, trust has also to do with anticipating 
the future. Trust is “to behave as though the future were certain” (idem: 10).  
Because of this future-orientatedness, trust is closely tied to expectations. 
Possible fulfilment, if it happens at all, only appears after the action has taken place, 
while commitment has to be there beforehand. “This problem of time is bridged by 
trust, paid ahead of time as an advance on success for a certain time” (idem: 25). To 
trust is to have positive expectations concerning the future actions of other actors. It 
is not about having control over events, rather it is a move to indifference (idem: 25). 
It is an attitude of becoming indifferent to the many, very different ways the future 
can unfold. With the act of trust, certain options can be set aside and dangers which 
cannot be removed are neutralized. The act of trust enables one possible future to 
stand out, blending all other options into the background. This ability to trust is not 
given and has to be learned. Its process of learning already starts in the earliest stages 
of life in interaction with family members and steadily expands to other actors and 
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systems in the broader social world.  
2.2.2 Risk 
Trust is a risky investment (Luhmann 1979: 42) because there is, by definition, 
always something at stake for the trustor. The goal the trustor wants to achieve 
cannot be reached without the interference of a trustee. To trust someone means to 
be vulnerable and dependent on the action of a trustee who in his turn can take 
advantage of this situation of vulnerability and betray the trustor. Luhmann takes it 
even a step further and explicates that:  
“Trust therefore always bears upon a critical alternative, in which the 
harm resulting from a breach of trust may be greater than the benefit to 
be gained from the trust proving warranted.” (Luhmann 1979: 24).  
Luhmann’s emphasis on the fact that trust has to make a difference in a decision –
otherwise we have merely hope - does not entail that trust also has to be rational. 
Trust can happen thoughtlessly and carelessly, almost completely based on routines. 
Rationality for Luhmann does not refer to the decision-process as such, as is the case 
in rational choice theory, but to the fact that trust is functional for the system to 
reduce complexity (Möllering 2006). Therefore, Luhmann should not be categorized 
as a disciple of rational choice theory or any other rational approach to trust as some 
scholars seem to argue (Coeckelbergh 2012; Taddeo 2009). Luhmann (1979: 88) 
himself clearly states: 
“Trust is not a means that can be chosen for particular ends, much less an 
end/means structure capable of being optimized […] Trust is, however, 
something other than a reasonable assumption on which to decide 
correctly, and for this reason models for calculating correct decisions miss 
the point of the question of trust”. 
That being said, Luhmann nonetheless recognizes the importance of reasons to 
support an act of trust. However, he interprets reasoning rather as a way of upholding 
self-respect and justifying oneself socially than as building a sufficient basis for trust 
(idem: 26). With Lewis and Weigert (1985: 976), who are influenced by Luhmann, we 
can conclude that “trust begins where prediction ends”.  
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2.2.3 Familiarity 
While it is true that the complexity of the environment can be overwhelming, it is 
equally true that we live in a familiar world. We take the presence of the world, our 
fellow human beings and the objects we encounter for granted. In everyday life, we do 
not doubt their existence. Moreover, we expect to see and experience the world in a 
similar way as our fellow human beings do. They are, so to speak, “presupposed and 
co-experienced” (Luhmann 1979: 18).  
Trust can only take place in a familiar world in which existence is already 
structured in a pre-reflexive way. Our experience of the world automatically entails 
the intersubjective constitution of meaning. “There is no differentiation in the 
operation of constituting meaning and world, which brings everybody together in a 
diffuse consensus” (Luhmann 1979: 18).  
As long as our fellow human beings do not shatter this shared worldview and 
are only perceived as objects inhabiting this familiar world, trust is redundant. 
However, when another actor appears in the trustor’s consciousness, Luhmann 
speaks in line with Husserl of an “alter ego”, where she becomes, due to her freedom 
to act, a source of complexity. It is through this alter ego’s mediation of the world that 
“man’s environment becomes man’s own world” (idem: 7).6 Simultaneously, by 
presenting us with other perspectives of the world, the alter ego makes us aware of 
the world’s horizon of infinite possibilities. As we will see later, this familiar world 
resembles the lifeworld, a central notion in phenomenology. 
 
2.2.4 Roles 
In addition to this familiar world, which functions as a precondition for trust, 
Luhmann also pays attention to role-taking and self-presentation as essential in 
building trust. To earn trust, actors have to take part in social life and be able to 
absorb the expectations of others into their own self-presentation (Luhmann 1979: 
62).  
 
                                                   
6
 This is the first time Luhmann (1979) refers to Helmuth Plessner in the notes. 
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He frequently refers to symbolic-interactionist sociologists such as Herbert 
Mead (1934; 1938), Harold Garfinkel (1963), and Erving Goffman (1959) to explain 
that trust rests on the assumption that people act in character. In an interaction, 
actors are signalling and detecting important behavioural cues such as the definition 
of the situation, social status, and intentions (Vanderstraeten 2002). However, for 
Luhmann trust does not just come down to a trustor who is expecting the trustee to 
conform to her role-repertoire. On the contrary, trust entails that eventually these 
general expectations are replaced with expectations tailored to the specific 
capabilities of the trustee.  
 
Role-predictability differs from the predictability that is part of rationalist theories 
such as rational choice theory and standard theories of economics. Where in the 
latter theories predictability is understood as a calculative indicator of 
trustworthiness, in the interactionistic view this predictability is a stepping-stone for 
trust, shaped by unquestioned routines and procedures (see also Möllering 2006).  
Trust itself is for Luhmann an act of self-presentation. “People and social 
systems strive to draw a consistent picture of themselves and make it socially 
accepted” (Luhmann 1979: 81). To trust is to assume that a certain trait of behaviour 
will fit meaningfully with one’s own expectations and patterns of life (idem 1979: 71). 
Or in the words of Henslin (1967: cited in Möllering 2006: 68):  
“When an actor has offered a definition of himself and the audience is 
willing to interact with the actor on the basis of that definition, we are 
saying that trust exists.” 
This emphasis of Luhmann on self-presentation to build trust entails that first and 
foremost trust is a matter of representation. It has not so much to do with the actual 
characteristics of the trust relationship rather than with the beliefs people attach to it. 
Or more precisely, with the beliefs people hold about other people’s beliefs on the 
matter (Misztal 1996). It therefore becomes apparent that trust is a ‘risky business’ 
not only for the trustor but also for the trustee. 
“Anyone who has been around for some time is known, has trusted and 
enjoys trust, is thus entangled with his self-presentation in a web or [sic] 
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norms which he himself has helped to create, and from which he cannot 
withdraw without leaving parts of himself behind” (Luhmann 1979: 63). 
Because in every action people disclose more information about themselves than they 
intended or even are aware of, every appearance presupposes a minimum amount of 
trust (Luhmann 1979: 40). Every actor has some basic trust that the other will not 
misinterpret the performance and that she will fill in the informational gaps and 
inconsistencies all communications entail.  
For Luhmann, trust is built, step-by-step, in the process of interaction. Trust is 
a learning process which he also refers to as the “principle of gradualness” (Luhmann 
1979: 41). In the starting phase, the stakes will not be high: people help each other 
with small tasks or display trustworthy behaviour for example by returning a 
forgotten scarf. Only after a basic form of trust has been established, it can be tested 
more thoroughly.  
Luhmann describes several elements, which could stimulate the deepening of 
trust. I will focus on the two most important ones: freedom of action and the 
presence of a risky investment.  
 
First, it must be possible to attribute actions to a person in order to judge her 
trustworthiness. A person’s trustworthiness cannot be judged in a situation where she 
is forced to act in a certain manner. What counts as a ‘free action’ is often determined 
by social expectations. Luhmann illustrates this with an example of an employee 
whose actions are a result of a direct order of a supervisor. These actions do not really 
deepen trust because they are not perceived as being ‘free’. Therefore, if the employee 
wants to show herself as trustworthy, she has to act beyond what is generally 
expected of her. On the other hand, the supervisor is generally perceived as an actor 
who has the freedom to make her own decisions –even though in reality these 
decisions are often pre-sorted by corporal structures. Consequently, her actions are 
more likely to be regarded as tokens of trustworthiness.  
We will see in the second part of this book that attributing an action to a 
person might become problematic when technologies are involved. Because, who is 
responsible for a plane crash? Who is responsible for the leaking of data? Or as 
Luhmann puts it: 
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“…(t)he outcome of any complex technological process […] appears to be 
relatively impersonal. The greater the combination of recognizable causes, 
the more difficult it becomes to isolate who originated the action” 
(Luhmann 1979: 41). 
Second, Luhmann stresses that especially in situations where there is a significant 
risky investment involved and it is possible and even desirable for the trustee to 
abuse the trust invested, one can really test and, eventually, build trust. When the 
stakes become high and the interests of the trustor do not align with those of the 
trustee, trustworthiness might really be put to the test. Therefore, especially 
“supererogatory performances”, which are performances that move beyond mere 
duty and rule-following, increase the possibility to deepen trust (Luhmann 1979: 43).  
 
Thus, where Luhmann on the one hand stresses that trust can only take place in a 
familiar world made possible by –amongst others- a social structure with clear roles 
and rules of interaction in order to temper the radical complexity human beings 
encounter, he on the other hand also emphasizes the importance of risk-taking and 
the “deliberate imprudence and deviance on the part of the actors” (Möllering 2006: 
88) to deepen trust.  
It, however, has to be noted that this risk-taking perspective of Luhmann is 
generally considered rather extreme. Many authors argue that mere positive 
experiences, preferable consistently recurring, are sufficient as a foundation for trust 
(idem: 88). Nonetheless, the basic ideas that trust is often process-based 
(Nooteboom 1997, 2002; Zand 1972: cited in Möllering 2006: 85-87) and always 
involves some sort of risk-taking (Sztompka 1999; Hardin 2006) are widely shared 
amongst trust-scholars.  
 
2.2.5 Confidence 
In an article in 1988, Luhmann elaborates the distinction between confidence and 
trust in relation to familiarity (also see: Jalava 2003). Confidence is what I would 
refer to as the default setting. You are confident that your expectations will be 
confirmed and that things turn out as anticipated. You do not call in to question the 
security of the bridge you cross, the honesty of your husband, or the value of your 
money in the bank. You ignore the possibility of disappointment because the 
41 
 
alternative would be “to live in a state of permanent uncertainty and to withdraw 
expectations without having anything with which to replace them” (Luhmann 1988: 
97). 
Considering the fact that familiarity, confidence, and trust can be seen as 
“different modes of asserting expectations” (idem: 97) confidence is situated between 
familiarity and trust. Where familiarity structures the world by ignoring its 
contingency, confidence and trust both have to do with expectations that can turn out 
to be disappointments. However, where trust requires previous engagement and a 
certain element of choice, confidence is characterized by not considering 
alternatives. In the case of confidence, disappointment will lead to external 
attribution (it is the fault of the government the bridge collapsed because there was 
not enough money reserved to maintain it). In the case of a breach of trust, there will 
be internal attribution (I should never have trusted her taking care of my child). 
Where trust has to do with considering other options and is linked to a situation of 
risk, confidence is about putting aside possible alternatives.  
 
2.2.6 Systems theory 
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, Luhmann is known for his work on 
systems theory. Also in Trust, he conceptualizes trust with the aid of rather abstract 
terms deriving from systems theory.  
“The objective world is more complex than any system: it comprises more 
possibilities than the system itself provides and can realize. In this sense 
the system exhibits a greater degree of order (fewer possibilities, less 
variety), than the world. This discrepancy in the degree of order, as 
already indicated, is offset through the system developing a ‘subjective’ 
image of the world. That is, the system interprets the world selectively, 
overdrawing on the information which it possesses, reduces the world’s 
extreme complexity to an amount of complexity to which it can 
meaningfully orient itself, and so structures the possibilities of its own 
experience and action” (Luhmann 1979: 32). 
Although it is perfectly feasible to understand Luhmann’s trust account without 
making use of the language of general systems theory, this quote imbedded in the 
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systems theory approach is illuminating for three important reasons. First, this quote 
discloses the dialectic manoeuvre that occurs in the act of trust. Second, it can be 
interpreted in such a way that it reveals the common ground shared with 
philosophical anthropology. Third, this quote illustrates the influence of 
phenomenology on Luhmann’s conceptualization of trust.  
 
As to the first point, a system does not eliminate trust but reduces it “to an amount of 
complexity to which it can meaningfully orient itself” (Luhmann 1979: 32). 
Complexity is made manageable and at the same time is preserved by it. 
Consequently, in the act of trust, as a manner to reduce and manage this complexity, 
a dialectic manoeuvre occurs. Complexity is taken in, absorbed by trust and internally 
transformed into an “ordered complexity”, maintaining uncertainty in a bearable 
form. The ontological structure of a system is, as it were, defined by complexity. 
 
As to the second point, an essential element in philosophical anthropology is the 
innate relation between organism and environment. In the quote above, Luhmann 
defines this relation in terms of the difference in degree of complexity between 
system and environment. The world always contains more possibilities than a system 
can realize. The main function of a system is to reduce this complexity. Because a 
system is open in the sense that to survive it has to interact with its environment, the 
primary act to fulfil this function is “…to establish a border which filters the 
environment for the system” (Paul 2001: 381). The reduction of complexity takes 
place “through the stabilization of an inner/outer difference” (Bednarz 1984: 58). The 
outer complexity of the world forces the system to make selections and establish an 
inner-simplified complexity. Or as Poggi (1979: 4) formulates it: “The trick, at any 
rate for living and social systems, is to manage complexity without being 
overwhelmed by it or entirely sacrificing it”. This ontological necessity of a border 
and border traffic for a system to be able to exist in an overly complex environment is 
one of the central themes in the work of Helmuth Plessner and it will be of great 
importance in the further conceptualization of trust.  
 
Finally, in this quote hints the influence of phenomenology. Phenomenology or the 
science of phenomenons is a 20th century philosophical discipline, often traced back 
to philosopher Edmund Husserl whose rallying cry was “to the things themselves”. 
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Apart from scientific knowledge and its strict apparatus, he and other 
phenomenologists are concerned with the description of how things, other human 
beings, and the world show themselves from a first-order perspective in everyday 
life.  
The focal point in the phenomenological description is a so-called intentional 
consciousness. Intentional refers to the fact that consciousness is always conscious of 
something. In the act of intentionality, objects do not ‘just’ appear but they show 
themselves under a certain perspective. In the intentional act of consciousness, 
meaning is constituted. This constitution of meaning happens against the background 
of what is called a lifeworld. A lifeworld refers to an often-unreflected background 
consisting of meanings and beliefs that ground everyday interaction. In addition, 
Husserl also claims that it is part of the structure of intentional consciousness to 
assume that other human beings more or less perceive the world in a similar manner. 
Garfinkel (1963 in Möllering 2006: 56) speaks of a “common-sense world” and 
Schütz (1967 [1932]) emphasizes the necessity of this taken-for-grantedness in all 
social interaction.  
Taking into account this -rather brief- description of phenomenology, it 
nevertheless becomes clear that the manner in which Luhmann describes systems as 
actors that interpret the world by drawing subjective images to orient and structure 
their actions, resembles Husserl’s concept of intentionality. For Luhmann, social 
systems are systems of communication that ‘make sense’ of their environment. This 
element of ‘sense-making’ he shares with the phenomenological tradition. Moreover, 
the earlier mentioned familiarity resembles Husserl’s lifeworld. For Luhmann trust 
can only take place in a familiar world. Although other human beings are a source of 
complexity, this cannot be as absolute as to doubt the existence of some minimally 
shared worldview. This kind of complexity would be a paralysing form of complexity, 
one that cannot be tamed. 
 
It is important to understand that although Luhmann is influenced by 
phenomenology, -even in his dissertation Functionen und Folgen Formaler 
Organisationen (Luhmann 1964), there are clear traces of philosophical 
anthropology to be found (Fischer 2006)- he is also critical about it. Especially in his 
later work, Luhmann distances himself from fundamental phenomenological 
concepts such as intersubjectivity or first-order-experience. In his analysis, he takes 
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on a third persons perspective (Arnoldi 2001) and argues that there is no such thing 
as intersubjectivity. He speaks of persons as being “black boxes” to each other 
(Arnoldi 2001: 6). Communication between persons does not happen in a direct 
manner, because of what he calls double contingency. Focussing on communication 
instead of perception, as did Husserl, he conceptualized communication as an apart, 
closed system. Communication is therefore not a direct transmission of meaning 
between persons but always contains a third system (idem).  
  
However, in the early stages of his work this critical attitude towards phenomenology, 
and philosophical anthropology for that matter, is not that outspoken and clear-cut as 
is the case in his later work. In the beginning of his career, Luhmann did not deny 
being influenced by philosophical anthropology and philosophers like Gehlen, 
Plessner and Husserl. In 1968 he claimed:  
“Uberhaupt trifft die hier skizzierte Theorie sozialer Systeme sich in 
wesentlichen Punkten mit einer anthropologischen Soziologie, welche die 
“Weltoffenheit” und die entsprechende Verunsicherung des Menschen 
zum Bezugspunkt von (letztlich funktionalen) Analysen macht. Siehe auch 
Helmuth Plessner, Conditio Humana, Pfullingen 1964” (Luhmann 1970: 
116).7  
However, twenty years later he declares “…Philosophical Anthropology, I have never 
liked it…” (Luhmann in Hahn 2004: 285). Although Luhmann casts aside the 
connection between his social systems theory and philosophical anthropology and in 
his later work no longer mentions philosophical anthropology, Habermas already 
confronted him with this link to philosophical anthropology in a debate in 1972 
(Habermas and Luhmann 1972). Hahn (2004) explains this change of heart by the 
fact that after 1968 it was no longer fashionable to develop a sociology that touched 
on philosophical anthropology. Moreover, Fischer (2006) argues that Luhmann’s 
 
                                                   
7
 English translation: “At important points, the above described social systems theory comes together 
with the anthropological sociology which takes as its starting point for an, in the end, functional 
analysis of man concepts such as ‘openness to the world’ and the uncertainty that comes along with 
that. Also see Helmuth Plessner, Conditio Humana, Pfullingen 1964.” 
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sudden dislike of philosophical anthropology had to do with his need for conceptual 
freedom to elaborate his own theory. Moreover, Luhmann himself speaks of a 
paradigm shift in system theory. All in all, it becomes clear that the role of man and 
hence of philosophical anthropology in Luhmann’s theory changed fundamentally 
over time. Nevertheless, unlike Luhmann, I will, through the work of Plessner, 
incorporate insights deriving from philosophical anthropology in my trust account. 
 
 
2.3 Trust: bridging the hiatus 
Now that we have gained a basic understanding of what Luhmann’s theory on trust is 
about, I would like to draw your attention to one specific element which logically 
follows from his perspective on trust, but is only implicitly present in his theory (also 
see Möllering 2006). The difference in complexity between an actor and her 
environment and the fact that human beings are aware of this difference in 
complexity results in a hiatus, a void or gap between system and environment 
(Keymolen 2008). 
“Trust rests on an illusion” Luhmann (1979: 32) states. There is never enough 
information to give assurance and let complexity dissolve. Trust reduces complexity; 
it does not take it away. As a consequence, trust always entails a kind of gap that has 
to be bridged, a hole in the road that cannot be filled with evidence of a certain and 
clear-cut future. In his conceptualization of trust, Luhmann also indirectly indicates 
trust’s somewhat transcendental nature (Möllering 2001: 409). By speaking of 
reducing complexity instead of eliminating it, by characterizing trust as an illusion 
and emphasizing its as if nature, he implies that the act of trust is oriented to deal 
with something rather than to erase it. Trust for Luhmann is “functionally rational” 
but simultaneously “epistemologically and ontologically transcendental” (idem). 
 
All in all, this hiatus is a grounding aspect of trust and needs to be included in our 
analysis to fully grasp the meaning of trust; it is so to say its essential explanatory 
force. After all, if we know for sure how others are going to act and things are 
evolving, trust would be redundant. It is the unsolvable uncertainty brought forth by 
this distance between ourselves and the world around us that brings trust in our lives.  
 
My focus on this hiatus reminds of Möllering’s analysis of trust as a leap of faith that 
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entails suspension and bracketing. According to Möllering (2006: 115), actors 
bracket out irreducible social vulnerability and uncertainty as if these issues were 
resolved. They suspend looking for evidence or certainty and act as if they are in 
control. My analysis of trust can be situated in the domain of trust research, set on 
the agenda by Möllering (2001, 2006), who takes the suspension of vulnerability and 
uncertainty (the leap of faith) to be the core elements of conceptualizing trust. 
 
Although Luhmann’s theory on trust presupposes the hiatus and, therefore, is a 
fruitful ground for a preliminary exploration of this grounding concept, it does not 
elaborate nor draws a connection between the bridging of the hiatus and the other 
related concepts, such as familiarity, risk, and roles. 
Although he is very explicit on the fact that only human beings are aware of the 
world’s contingency and the overwhelming complexity this brings along, he does not 
face the question as to where this special position derives from. While he admits 
employing a transcendental-phenomenological account, he constrains himself by 
referring to human beings as systems that interpret and give meaning to the world. 
He does not concern himself for example with bodily perception, intersubjectivity or 
the question how it is even possible that human beings are open systems that in 
interaction with their environment have to uphold their boundaries in order to exist. 
Or as Poggi (1979: xi) formulates it:  
“Consistently with his functionalist viewpoint, Luhmann concerns himself 
not so much with what makes meaning possible, as with what meaning 
makes possible- that is, a peculiarly effective complexity-reducing 
strategy.”  
Luhmann does not question but simply issues the thesis that in experiencing and 
giving meaning to the world certain beliefs and expectations are constituted, which 
reduce complexity and enable action. For Luhmann, experiencing the world is first 
and foremost about beliefs, about deciding what is in and out, in short about 
communication. 
 
All in all, to explicate the presupposed hiatus, we need to look further than 
Luhmann’s account of trust. I will, therefore, turn to the domain of philosophical 
anthropology, a branch of philosophy, which revolves around the fundamental 
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question: “what is man?”.  
The basic assumption in philosophical anthropology is that in our 
understanding of human life, we already, often implicitly, have a perception of what 
human beings are as a whole. It is these presuppositions the philosophical 
anthropologist focuses on when clarifying the structures or categories that are already 
set in place when people think, argue, love, go online or…trust. Because of this 
objective to explicate suppositions and to map the distinctive features or ‘make up’ of 
man, philosophical anthropology can also be characterized as a transcendental 
discipline (Corbey 1986: 51). It is the aim of the philosophical anthropologist to 
understand human beings as part of their “concrete social, historical, every day and 
natural world” (Borsari 2009: 119). Consequently, a philosophical anthropologist 
aspires to explicate the structures that ground scientific knowledge as well as human 
experience as a whole (de Mul 1994: 5). This holistic approach should not be 
understood as leading to a full-scale ontology but rather it is a methodological 
position or model that enables the philosophical anthropologist to analyse different 
aspects of human nature (Thies 2009: 38). Turning to philosophical anthropology 
seems fitting to analyse why trust is essential to our way of coping with complexity 
and how the hiatus plays a crucial role in establishing trust.  
In one of the only passages in Trust where Luhmann does refer in a (more or 
less) explicit manner to the hiatus, he grounds his analysis on the thoughts of 
Helmuth Plessner (1978), one of the founding fathers of philosophical anthropology: 
“The complexity of its inherent possibilities [of the world] does 
nevertheless make itself felt in particular as a break, a schism, between 
the familiar and the unfamiliar, the strange, the uncanny, something 
which has to be either fought against or treated as mysterious” (Luhmann 
1979: 19). 
In the notes, we can read that Luhmann positions himself in line with Plessner, who 
he thinks “rightly sees a fundamental difference between the familiar world of the 
close-at-hand for humans and the environment of animals” (idem: 22). While the 
connection between Luhmann’s thinking and that of another protagonist of 
philosophical anthropology, namely Gehlen, is well-known (Poggi 1979; Paul 2001), 
his connection with Helmuth Plessner is often overlooked.  
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In the second part of this chapter, I will bridge the gulf between the work on trust of 
Luhmann and the philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner; certainly not 
because this is something Luhmann would encourage or like –I think not- but 
because I regard it as the most fruitful strategy to conceptualize the hiatus, key to our 
understanding of trust. Making use of Plessner’s theoretical framework that he 
developed in his magnus opus Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch (Plessner 
1975), I will come up with a philosophical anthropological account of trust in which 
trust as a way to bridge the hiatus is elaborated. This account of trust will function as 
the basis for our further investigation of trust in relation to the Internet in the 
following chapters. 
 
 
2.4 Helmuth Plessner and philosophical anthropology 
Considering Luhmann’s emphasis on a radical complexity inherent in human life, it 
only seems logical to investigate if there are any points of support to be found in the 
building scheme of human beings that might ground such an account. The second 
part of this chapter will therefore be dedicated to explaining how this complexity is 
brought forth by the specific, eccentric positionality of human beings, making use of 
Plessner’s theory developed in Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. The aim 
is to develop an account of trust that honours the hiatus as grounding explanatory 
force and is based on a multi-layered understanding of the way human beings are in 
the world. 
 
Plessner, as a true philosophical anthropologist, poses the very fundamental and 
ambitious question: “what is the nature of the preconditions that make human life 
possible?” Or, in other words, “what is the human a priori?” If we adapt these 
questions to our quest, the rallying query of this section becomes: “what are the 
preconditions for trust to be possible?”  
One of Plessner’s basic assumptions is that to map man’s ontological 
blueprint, he has to move beyond the Cartesian divide. Cartesian dualism discerns 
two fundamentally ontological poles, namely: res cogitans and res extensa; mind and 
body. How these two poles relate or which pole should be leading in the analysis of 
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human life has been up to debate since Descartes formulated the issue in the 17th 
century.8 Also in current debates the divide can be discerned and the tendency to 
make one pole outweigh the other. For example:  
“…evolutionary biology claims now to explain not only life but the 
sociocultural world as a whole and, vice versa, culturalism, by means of 
the linguistic turn, explains natural science and the evolutionary pattern 
as a mere cultural interpretation-scheme of special historicity” (Fischer 
2014: 43-44). 
Of course the human mind, reasoning, and subjectivity are all important aspects of 
the human make-up. Nonetheless, in order to use this human mind, one above all has 
to live, and this existence always implies a material ground. Choosing one perspective 
above the other would do no right to the fact that man in fact is both. A human being 
is mind as well as body, inner as well as outer, subject as well as object. The self-
experience of human beings is open to both perspectives; the domain of the mind and 
the domain of the body are continuously intersecting each other. In fact, it is this 
ontological conflict of existence that is the ground of man’s existential structure, 
which Plessner wants to grasp (Plessner 1975: 32). Plessner aims at describing man 
as a psychophysical indifferent unity9, a lived body, taking into account both sides of 
the equation. In doing so, he begins his analysis with the fundamental category that 
grounds both mind and matter: living nature.  
 
2.4.1 Living nature 
For decades, living nature has been the domain of biologists and empirical 
researchers. Although Plessner acknowledges the importance of their work, he also 
blames them for mistakenly using categories where they in fact are speaking of 
concepts (Plessner 1975: 116). This mix-up makes it almost impossible to determine 
what is mere empirical, a-posteriori or a-priori knowledge in their work. For Plessner, 
 
                                                   
8
 The mind-body problem in different terms also occurs with the pre-Aristotelian philosophers. 
9
 I have translated all German concepts and quotes of Helmuth Plessner myself, unless noted 
differently.  
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who wants to unfold the building scheme of human beings, the so-called existential 
structures are categories of an a-priori character, which cannot be exclusively 
analysed in an empirical way. Empirical findings such as ‘metabolism’ and ‘genetics’ 
are very interesting concepts that most likely point to a-priori structures, but they 
cannot be aligned with them. It is therefore up to philosophical anthropology to take 
on this transcendental assignment (Weiland 1999).  
 
From a phenomenological perspective, Plessner starts off by describing how we 
intuitively perceive a difference between non-living and living objects.10 Where both 
kinds of objects fill in an objective place in space and time, there is a difference in the 
way they have this place. A living thing does not only has a place -as do all objects 
whether or not they are alive- it also takes its place. There is some kind of activity in 
the way they maintain their space. A living thing does not only have a boundary that 
separates it from the outer world and other objects, it also upholds its own boundary. 
This results in a two-way relation: “both directed into the body and away from the 
body” (Grene 1966: 261). “[I]t is the way an organism bounds itself that is essential. 
It is a question not only of a Grenze, but of Begrenzung” (idem: 255). Plessner (1975: 
129) proposes to refer to this characteristic way of boundary-upholding, when a living 
thing both has its body and is it as positionality. 
 
Living things, by upholding their own boundaries, are defined by an inner and outer 
junction. Plessner (1975: 128) speaks of bi-aspectivity. Living creatures, whether they 
be plants, animals, or human beings, have a relation towards their environment and 
towards themselves. Or to put it differently, “they have a relationship to both sides of 
their constituting boundary, both to the inner and the outer side” (de Mul 2003: 
252). As a result, there is a cut, an in-between, a distinction, a hiatus (here it is!) 
between living things and their environment. A living thing has its boundary as part 
of itself and to interact with the environment, it has to cross this boundary. The way 
in which this boundary traffic -the bridging of the hiatus- takes place, ontologically 
 
                                                   
10
 Plessner, who studied with Husserl, was certainly influenced by phenomenology but as Marjorie 
Grene eloquently puts it: “…without the heavy emphasis on the new ‘method’ and its new certainty 
which makes much phenomenological philosophy so difficult for the outsider to penetrate (Grene 
1966: 250).” 
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defines the positionality of living nature.  
Unlike living things, non-living things have contours instead of boundaries. 
They simply stop where the environment or medium as Plessner calls it begins. There 
is no distinction between a non-living thing and its contours; it coincides with it. 
Therefore, in non-living things there is not at all something like boundary traffic or 
positionality. Non-living things are characterized by passivity. 
It is important to keep in mind that the perceived difference between non-
living and living things is not based on an empirical but an intuitive, 
phenomenological observation. All the attributes we associate with liveliness such as 
movement, irregularity, and plasticity are only indicators of life and cannot be 
aligned with life as such.  
 
 
2.5 Three times in a row: Positionality 
With positionality, Plessner refers to the typical way in which living things uphold 
their own boundaries, defining their place in and towards the environment. Analysing 
the manner in which this positionality is organized, three ideal-types are disclosed, 
namely: plant, animal, and human being. From one stage to the other, Plessner 
gradually builds up the different positionalities of living nature, respectively 
characterized as being open, centric (or closed), and eccentric. 
 
2.5.1 Plants 
Plants, according to Plessner (idem: 219-220), are characterized by an open 
positionality. In the totality of their existence, plants are directed towards their 
environment. Although the boundaries of a plant are entirely part of it, there is 
nothing behind the boundaries. There is no centre that steers organs to gather food or 
initiates action. The movement some plants display is not mediated by a centre but 
consists out of impulses that arise in the interaction between plant and environment. 
For example, the flower opens and closes its calyx in reaction to day and night-time. 
Because of the plant’s open positionality, the bi-aspectivity, which characterizes all 
living nature, is not standing out as much as it will be the case at the following stage 
that is reserved for the animal. 
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2.5.2 Animals 
Animals are defined by a closed positionality. Unlike plants, they are driven by a 
centre that is often represented by a central nervous system or a more primitive 
equivalent (Grene 1966). It is through the mediation of this centre they can, to a 
certain extent, control their body. They are both a body and are in this body; they 
have a body (Körper) and a lived body (Leib).  
Animals are aware of their environment, which Plessner refers to as Umwelt, 
and of their body, but this awareness does not correspond to what is often referred to 
as self-consciousness. First, animals live in the present, in what Plessner calls the 
here and now (Hier-Jetzt); they do not experience a past or future. Their centre of 
experience is “absorbed without residue into the here and now” (Grene 1966: 273). 
 Second, although they are grounded by the double position of being and 
having a body, they are not aware of this double position. This ontological 
organization resulting in their closed positionality is kept from them. They carry it, 
but aren’t familiar with it. The animal is just out there, ascending in the here and now 
(Plessner 1975: 239-240). “The animal lives out from its centre, into its centre, but he 
does not live as a centre” (idem: 288). 
As far as an animal is aware of the outside world and his own body, he can 
spontaneously respond to the stimuli coming from his environment. Plessner speaks 
of frontality to describe this direct interaction of animals with their environment 
(idem: 241). The animal “takes not only a place, but a stand” (Grene 1966: 271). 
However, animals are ‘captured’ in a Funktionkreis, a building scheme that 
limits this spontaneity. Animals are aware of their environment as far as their 
Funktionkreis permits them. In line with Von Uexküll, Plessner (1975) speaks of an 
Umwelt, a species-specific environment animals inhabit. The information animals 
receive from their Umwelt can only be of use in a specific situation, for example when 
they perceive an enemy close by and have to choose between fleeing, fighting, and 
freezing. These limited inclinations always fit in a fixed and pre-existing knowledge 
frame, related to the here-and-now.  
Consequently, animals cannot reflect upon their choices. They cannot break 
out of the actual situation, sit down and wonder how to bring their strategies to 
perfection (Keymolen 2014a). The animal world, therefore, may not be a reflected 
world; it is, nonetheless, a familiar world. Generally, the way the world shows itself 
to the animal is in line with the repertoire of actions the animal itself is able to 
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produce. 
 
2.5.3 Human beings  
The third stage Plessner discerns is that of human beings, who are defined by their 
eccentric positionality. Human beings still live out from and into their centre, but 
unlike animals they also live as a centre. Plessner (1975: 293) writes:  
“Positionality there is a threefold situation: the living thing is body, is in 
its body (as inner life…) and outside the body as the point of view from 
which it is both (body and inner life)” (translation by Grene 1966: 274). 
Without cutting across the animal centricity, the life of human beings is also placed 
outside themselves, eccentric. This detachment enables awareness and reflexivity. 
“Man not only exists, and experiences his existing, but he also experiences the 
experience of his existence” (Plessner 1975: 364). For this reflexivity to take place, a 
distance has to be created -a new, second hiatus if you want- between me, as an ‘I’, 
and my centre. To enable this detachment, the centre of experience has to split and 
this division can only happen if the realm of the here and now is forced open and a 
past and future are fed in (Plessner 1975: 289).  
What differentiates human beings from animals is the fact that their 
positionality is based on this detachment. To be human means to be shattered, to be 
broken. Human beings are defined by a hiatus, which makes it possible to take a 
position outside of the centre and subsequently also have a relation towards this 
centre. Although human beings, just like animals, have a natural place and live in the 
here and now, they are not fully merged into it. Unlike animals living in a familiar 
world, human beings are aware of the world’s contingency, consequently, the human 
world is not at hand but has to be built. It is only by means of men’s creative powers 
that, the world they inhabit can become a familiar world. With an existence that is 
literally “based on nothing” (translation by Grene 1966: 274) they can be everywhere 
and nowhere. Human beings are homeless by constitution. Or as Plessner writes 
(idem: 291): 
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“There he stands, on both sides of the hiatus, bound to its body, bound to 
its soul but at the same time, nowhere, homeless except for the ties of 
time and space. And like that, he is man.” 
 
2.5.4 Three worlds 
The bi-aspectivity –the fact that by upholding their own boundaries living things have 
an outer and inner side- becomes radical in human beings because, unlike animals, 
they are aware of this ontological distinction. As a consequence, they find themselves 
in a world, which, depending on the position they take can be defined as an outer 
world, an inner world, or a shared world of culture. Grounded in bi-aspectivity, 
these three worlds are characterized by a double perspective: both the relation from 
as towards the boundary is taken into account. 
First, in the outer world, human beings are aware of their body as a lived body 
on the one hand and as an object amongst other objects on the other. Plessner (1975: 
294) refers to this specific effect of bi-aspectivity as lived body (Leib) and body 
(Körper).  
Second, in the inner world, human beings know themselves as centres of 
experience and action and at the same time grasp that they are at the mercy of their 
feelings and emotions. Plessner (1975: 295) speaks of experience (Erlebnis) and soul 
(Seele).  
Third, the world of culture (Mitwelt) is the world that is reserved for human 
beings only and in which their eccentricity manifests. It is the world in which you, the 
other, and me as an “I”, a person, are inextricably intertwined. It is where a “we” 
appears (Plessner 1975: 308). Human beings are grounded in and supported by this 
world of culture and simultaneously it is up to those human beings themselves to 
create and shape it. The necessity of shaping, of making and building one’s own life 
directly derives from human being’s eccentric positionality. Based on nothing, they 
can only lead the life they have constructed first (Plessner 1975). The world of culture, 
characterized by “protection and familiarity” (Geborgenheit und Vertrautheit) is the 
only place where human beings can seek refuge (Plessner 2003: 185). One’s country, 
mother tongue, family, and rituals but also institutions and technologies are all used 
to create a home for this ontologically homeless creature. Consequently, “technology 
and culture are not only- and not even in the first place- instruments of survival but 
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an ontic necessity” (de Mul 2003: 254).  
The inner and outer worlds rest on this latter world of culture because it is only 
in interaction with other human beings, an individual can objectify the outside world 
and himself. Man’s ability to take the point of view from which he is both body and 
soul rests on this world of culture. Consequently, it is in the world of culture the 
bridging of the hiatus takes place. Or as De Mul describes: 
“The world of technology and culture is the expression of the desire of 
human beings to bridge the distance that separates them from the world, 
their fellow humans and themselves” (de Mul 2003: 254). 
Sometimes, the world of culture has been judged as comparable to the Umwelt 
animals inhabit (Plessner 1975: 307). However, this is not completely accurate. 
Although at first sight both the Umwelt and the world of culture are closed 
environments, the world of culture can, contrary to the Umwelt, only be built and 
understood against the background of an open world. The world of culture only 
functions as a filter between human beings and the open world they live in, enabling 
them to develop a fragile and frequently disturbed balance that lies at the root of their 
daily life. Culture can be seen as man’s second nature and because it is a world that 
has been made and not been given, trust is a necessary condition for it to become 
reality (Grene 1995). 
Animals cannot leave their Umwelt. For them, there is nothing beyond the 
world they inhabit. They interact in a direct manner with their environment. 
Intuitions guide them through life; no reflection is possible or needed. Human beings 
often seem to forget that their world of norms and values actually is made of brittle 
compromises. They gladly embrace the comforting idea of a closed and steady world 
in which their daily life rests on a fixed order of values and norms. While it is true 
that human beings heavily lean on the way society, with its predictable roles and 
expectations, is organised, the open world with all its unforeseen and disturbing 
stimuli is continuously shining through, unsettling the delicate balance human beings 
obtained by furnishing their world with culture (Plessner 2003: 186). This balance 
therefore can only be temporary. It never resolves the ambivalence of human 
existence. 
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2.5.5 Three anthropological principles 
In the last chapter of the Stufen, Plessner elaborates his notion of eccentric 
positionality by identifying three anthropological principles. He claims that man is 
artificial by nature, is defined by mediated immediacy and has the desire to employ 
a utopian standpoint. All three principles have in common that they identify a 
specific aspect of the continuous and never completely fulfilled endeavour of human 
beings bridging the hiatus lying at the heart of their existence. Moreover, to underline 
that this conflict of existence cannot be resolved, Plessner connects for every 
anthropological principle two -at first glance- contradicting concepts, which together 
illustrate the ambivalent character of human life.  
 
His observation that man is artificial by nature is a direct consequence of the 
necessity for human beings to build the environment they lack on biological grounds. 
To compensate for the ambivalent character of their eccentric form of life, human 
beings have to bring forth things that have enough weight to anchor their own 
existence. For a creature with an existence that is based on nothing, it is natural to 
build an artificial environment to live in (Plessner 1975: 310). Or as Plessner (idem: 
320) says: “By means of production man only wants to provide himself with that what 
nature owes him”.  
As a result, it is impossible to make a clear distinction between natural and 
artificial adaptations in human life (Plessner 2003: 183). All non-natural features 
human beings need to exist, are in fact natural because of the inescapable demands 
their eccentric positionality imposes on them. Nevertheless, Plessner emphasizes that 
by producing artefacts only a temporary equilibrium can be reached. Artefacts, when 
they enter the domain of culture, gain their own momentum, they have a kind of 
heaviness that stands apart from the people who created them. Or as Plessner (1975: 
321) writes:  
“Equally essential for the technical artefact is its inner weight, its 
objectivity that discloses the aspect of technology that only can be found 
or discovered, but never made. Everything that enters the sphere of 
culture shows its dependence on human creation. But at the same time 
(and to the same extent) it is independent from man” (translation by de 
Mul 2003: 261). 
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The second anthropological principle of mediated immediacy points out the way in 
which human beings relate to the things around them. Because human beings have a 
relation towards their centre and do not completely coincide with it, this centre has a 
mediating function between “I” and the environment. As a result, the way human 
beings perceive the world and interact in the world is of a broken, indirect nature. 
Man needs a detour along artefacts, language, and other human beings to establish a 
meaningful relation with his environment. They form, as it were, the link between 
man and its environment. They make direct what is indirect by nature. Consequently, 
notwithstanding the indirect relation human beings have towards the world, they still 
experience the world -just like other animals do- in a direct manner (Plessner 1975: 
325). The principle mediated immediacy may be contradictive on logical grounds, it 
nevertheless is perfectly feasible when applied to the relation of man and its 
environment (Plessner 1975: 324). Both indirect and direct at the same time, the 
nature of this relationship reflects man’s eccentric positionality. 
 
The third anthropological principle is that of the utopian standpoint. It refers to 
man’s awareness of the triviality (Nichtigkeit) or contingency of his existence and 
that of the world. Being aware of his existence as just a chance coincidence (Zufall), 
he does not get to know what his place in the world is (Plessner 1975: 342). His desire 
to find a final ground for his existence leads him to the domain of religion. 
Throughout history, religion has had different forms and names, but it always appeals 
to that what man lacks and at the same time defines him, a definitivum. As Plessner 
(1975: 342) describes: 
“A final connection and order, a place for life and death, protection, a 
reconciliation with faith, an explanation of reality, a home; it can only be 
bestowed by religion.” 
Because of man’s eccentric positionality, he can imagine a god as a final ground and 
capture the idea of the Absolute. However, at the same time it is through his eccentric 
positionality that he is also open to doubt the presence of a god. “Giving up this idea 
means giving up the idea of one unifying world. It is easier said than done, being an 
atheist” (idem: 346). On the one hand man builds himself a reality in the inner world, 
the outer world and the world of culture. On the other hand he makes way for the 
awareness of his own contingency. Only religion can bring the final order to man. 
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Those who believe will always come home (Plessner 1975: 346). However, those who 
choose to stay in the realm of the mind will never return (Weiland 1999: 114). 
 
 
2.6 An anthropological perspective on trust 
The comprehensive theory Plessner developed in the Stufen, which I have briefly 
summarized above, is of great value to our understanding of trust. Where Luhmann 
mainly focuses on the functionality of trust, we are now able, by applying the work of 
Plessner, to replenish his account of trust with a solid anthropological basis. As a 
result, we can now make explicit that trust, as a strategy to reduce complexity in fact 
is the bridging of a hiatus that lies at the heart of human existence. Taking into 
account the eccentric positionality of human beings and the three anthropological 
laws deriving from that positionality, we can substantiate the “as if” character of trust 
and the “bracketing” and “suspension” of uncertainty.  
 
First, we can explain why the high level of complexity that Luhmann identified is 
inherent in human life. Because of their eccentric positionality – caused by the 
ontological distance between themselves and their centre- human beings are aware of 
the fact that they are both outer and inner, body and soul, matter and mind. 
Moreover, it is due to this eccentric positionality that the world’s contingency 
shines through, that the freedom of action of other human beings is undeniably 
present, and that the inner world can be a settling as well as a disturbing experience. 
While it is true that a fragile balance can be reached in the world of culture, this 
always concerns a temporary balance that continuously is being disturbed by the 
open and unpredictable world on which it is based. The complexity human beings 
have to endure is radical because it is indissolubly attached to their ‘humanness’. 
Consequently, trust can never resolve the uncertainty deriving from this complexity; 
it can only reduce it to a bearable level. Although we live in a familiar world, where 
uncertainties can decrease because of role-predictability and self-presentation, this 
world remains fragile and susceptible to change. For Luhmann, trust, therefore, is 
always blind trust. It has a fictive aspect. Trust is to act as if the future is certain and 
as if all complexity has vanished. 
Second, where trust is first and foremost a strategy to deal with complexity in 
interactions situated in the world of culture, with Plessner we see that this is only one 
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specific aspect of trust. Just like other animals, human beings live in an outer and 
inner world, the former defined as the realm of the body, the latter defined as the 
realm of the mind. As a result, in analysing trust, one should not only look at the 
interpersonal level, but also take into account bodily aspects (reliance on the outside 
world) and mental aspects (emotions, self-confidence, ontological security).  
Third, in the next chapter we will see that Luhmann and other authors argue 
that in modern times institutions and technologies increasingly mediate interactions, 
resulting in a growing demand for trust. With Plessner we can already substantiate 
this claim. Because human beings, unlike animals, do not have a direct relation with 
their environment, but need some kind of mediation to restore this direct experience, 
artefacts are made and set in place to bridge this gap. However, these artefacts 
shaped by human beings are at the same time standing on their own, bringing forth 
new complexity. In other words, in and through the use of artefacts trust can be 
placed and undermined; it can be established and questioned. To understand how 
trust takes shape, we have to include the workings of the artefacts that mediate our 
interactions. As we will see in the following chapters, this mediation becomes 
particularly conspicuous in modern society. 
Fourth, the hiatus we have already indirectly identified in the work of 
Luhmann becomes central to Plessner’s analysis of eccentric positionality. In fact, 
one could say that this hiatus is twofold. The first hiatus grounds the existence of all 
living things. By upholding their own boundaries, living things have an inner and 
outer side, which makes that there is a hiatus between the living thing and its 
environment. This hiatus brings forth the complexity all living nature has to process. 
Or in Luhmanns terms: this hiatus is the reason why all systems have to develop ways 
to absorb and transform complexity. The second hiatus, however, is reserved for 
human beings who not only experience a distance between themselves and their 
environment, but also between themselves and their centre of experience. It is this 
second hiatus, which is unique for human beings and grounds their eccentric 
positionality that brings in the radical complexity trust has to reduce. Consequently, 
to speak meaningfully about trust as a way to reduce complexity, one has to take into 
account the effects brought forth by this second hiatus.  
Finally, the three anthropological laws identified by Plessner illuminate how 
trust can only reduce and never completely take away complexity. The distance 
human beings experience in themselves, between each other and their environment 
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can only be bridged temporally. The paradoxical character of the three 
anthropological laws reminds us of the fundamental openness of human beings to the 
world. Being artificial by nature refers to the active shaping of a world of culture, 
which brings human beings a familiar world but simultaneously confronts them with 
new complexity. The principle mediated immediacy refers to the double-faced 
character of their interactions, which are experienced as direct and therefore 
unambiguous, but which are in fact broken and open-ended. Human beings can 
never fully grasp the intentions and motivations of others; therefore, a sense of trust 
is part of every interaction. The utopian standpoint, being the last anthropological 
law, illustrates how human beings, notwithstanding the paradoxical nature of their 
existence, strive for stability and certainty. Trust is good, certainty is better, as the 
proverb goes. Although the hiatus lies at the heart of human life, there is always this 
deep felt urge to dismiss its presence. 
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3 
System trust in late modernity. 
 
In the previous chapter, we took Luhmann’s influential theory of trust as a starting 
point to map the fundamental aspects of the concept of trust. By defining trust as a 
way to reduce complexity, Luhmann takes a functionalistic approach, focusing on the 
specific way human beings as social systems uphold themselves in a radically 
complex environment. This complexity is brought forth by the human awareness that 
others can act in unforeseen ways and that the future can unfold in many different 
directions. Trust is a strategy to deal with this complexity. Trust neutralizes the 
dangers, which cannot be taken away; consequently, it enables people to act as if the 
future is certain.  
Although Luhmann never elaborates it, his theory logically entails that the act 
of trust merely reduces and does not take away complexity; there always remains 
some kind of informational gap or hiatus, some uncertainty that needs to be dealt 
with in interactions. It is the bridging of this ontological hiatus, which is essential for 
our understanding of trust. By taking into account both Luhmann’s theory and the 
work of Plessner, it becomes possible to substantiate this approach and show that not 
only is the bridging of the hiatus fundamental to human life, but also that in everyday 
life the act of trust is an essential strategy to cope with this hiatus. 
The previous chapter, in fact, lays the ontological foundation of the concept of 
trust. It answers the question: “what makes trust an indissoluble and fundamental 
aspect of human life?” by showing how trust is necessary to bridge the distance 
human beings experience towards themselves, others, and the world around them.  
As Möllering (2006: 192) convincingly argues, most trust research, at best, 
presupposes this hiatus, but is not focused on explaining how the leap is made. 
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Rather, the emphasis lies on how to avoid, reduce or eliminate the gap. However, to 
fully grasp the idea of trust as the bridging of the hiatus, we cannot suffice with a 
purely theoretical approach as laid down in the previous chapter. We have to put 
flesh on the bones of these concepts in order to understand how trust is placed and 
shaped in everyday life.  
 
In this chapter, I will take a first step by analyzing how socio-historical developments 
affect the meaning and workings of trust. More specifically, this chapter will explain 
how changes related to the arrival of modern and late modern society have reshaped 
trust and other closely related concepts belonging to the trust family such as 
familiarity and confidence. 
Since modernity, we have witnessed the arrival of what can be called system-
interactions. To go about everyday life, we increasingly have become to depend on 
systems such as the financial system (although the general confidence people have in 
this system is rather shaky nowadays due to the financial crisis), democratic 
institutions, technologies and corporations, (see Giddens 1991; Seligman 1997; 
Luhmann 1979; Misztal 1996). This has lead to a new form of trust, referred to as 
system trust or trust in abstract systems. System trust holds the promise of reducing 
societal complexity, enabling global instead of merely local interactions. However, 
authors such as Giddens, Beck, and Seligman argue that together with the arrival of 
this system trust, the earlier, self-evident character of interpersonal trust has 
changed. In what has been called the period of late modernity, systems are constantly 
being shaped and reshaped, bringing forth new complexity instead of primarily 
reducing it. This new complexity penetrating everyday life, influences the way trust 
takes shape on the interpersonal level. In other words, where system trust is on the 
one hand a solution to deal with the complexity of everyday life in late modernity, it 
is, on the other hand, also the source of new complexity, which human beings, 
consequently have to deal with. 
 
Although trust is first and foremost something that is established between persons, 
the context in which an interaction takes place and, more specifically, the systems 
and artefacts that are used to initiate and support everyday life have an impact on the 
way in which trust is built. This may not come as a surprise. With Plessner, we have 
already seen that due to the second hiatus defining human life (see 2.6), human 
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beings are simultaneously privileged and deemed to make use of artificial means 
(ranging from language to technology) to engage with each other and the world 
around them. After all, they are artificial by nature. This mediation or necessary 
detour is never neutral. A telephone call differs from a face–to-face interaction, even 
when the words that are spoken are exactly the same. Artefacts gain, as Plessner says, 
their own weight. They make a difference and therefore influence the way trust is 
being established.  
In late modernity, due to technological developments, this mediation becomes 
particular conspicuous. Interactions are no longer confined to the local society to 
which one belongs, but increasingly bear on the interplay with layered and often 
opaque systems such as the healthcare system, the air traffic system, and –central 
topic in the next chapter - the Internet. Under these circumstances, interpersonal 
trust is no longer sufficient to support such interactions. Trust, then, has to be put 
into and found within the system itself.  
 
We will begin with a short recap of the conceptual trust-cluster “familiarity-
confidence-interpersonal trust” and see where system trust fits in. Next we will look 
into the arrival of system trust in late modernity, based predominantly on the work of 
Giddens and Luhmann. 
Finally, we will look deeper into the interplay between system trust, 
familiarity, and interpersonal trust in late modern society. Some empirically-
informed examples will be used to illustrate the most important aspects of system 
trust and the way in which new complexity arises due to these systems.  
At the end of this chapter, the basic ideas that were outlined in the previous 
chapter will have been placed in a socio-historical setting and the preconditions for 
system trust will have been explained and analyzed. In the following chapter, this will 
enable us to further explore the bridging of the hiatus in one of the most influential 
realms in contemporary life: cyberspace.  
 
 
3.1 Introducing: system trust 
Trust is first and foremost interpersonal, something which takes place in the 
interaction between human beings. Without trust, the uncertainty caused by not 
knowing for sure how others will behave and act, bringing along an unknown future, 
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would result in a situation of total paralysis. Luhmann sees trust therefore as: 
“[t]he generalized expectation that the other will handle his freedom, his 
disturbing potential for diverse action, in keeping with his personality…” 
(Luhmann 1979: 39). 
Notwithstanding the fact that trust is interpersonal, when social reality becomes too 
complex, interpersonal trust no longer suffices to temper this complexity, therefore, it 
has to be extended to other domains of human life (Luhmann 1988, 1979; Giddens 
1991; Seligman 1997). In contrast to the traditional world where control, 
socialization, and familiarity were adequate to establish trust, in the modern world 
with its wide variety of contingent risks, trust based on solely interpersonal 
interactions is no longer adequate (Jalava 2003: 174). 
Luhmann introduces the concept of system trust to describe the way in which 
human beings have become used to putting trust in abstract systems such as the 
political system or the banking system to reduce complexity. This generalized trust 
replaces the enormous amount of personal interactions that would be necessary to 
ensure a stable and trustworthy interaction (Luhmann 1979: 51). 
 
3.1.1 Familiarity, confidence and trust revised 
Before looking deeper into the connection between the arrival of (late) modernity and 
system trust, and how this influences the relations of some of the members of the 
conceptual trust family, let us first recapture some key notions surrounding trust in 
general. In the previous chapter, we have seen that trust is closely connected and 
depending on the concepts of familiarity (2.2.3) and confidence (2.2.5). Where, in 
this cluster of concepts, can system trust be placed?  
 
Familiarity, confidence, and trust can all be seen as “different modes of asserting 
expectations” (Luhmann 1988: 97). Where familiarity structures the world by 
ignoring its contingency, confidence and trust both have to do with expectations that 
can turn out to be disappointments. Trust requires previous engagement; there is a 
certain element of choice involved and acting on that choice makes you vulnerable to 
significant risks. Confidence, however, is characterized by not considering 
alternatives. It is the default setting. You assume the bridge will not collapse, that 
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your lawyer is competent, and the food you are eating is safe. In the case of 
confidence, disappointment will lead to external attribution (it is the fault of the 
government I have eaten poisoned bread because they did not sufficiently control the 
production process). In the case of a breach of trust, there will be an internal 
attribution (I should never have trusted him to mail that letter in time). Where trust 
has to do with considering other options and is linked to a situation of uncertainty 
and doubt, confidence is about putting aside possible alternatives.  
Unlike confidence and trust, familiarity structures the world by ignoring its 
contingent character. We take the presence of the world, our fellow human beings, 
and the objects we encounter at face value. In everyday life, we do not bother to 
question their existence. Moreover, we even expect to see and experience the world in 
a way similar to how our fellow human beings do. They are also, so to speak, 
“presupposed and co-experienced” (Luhmann 1979: 18). Trust can only take place in 
a familiar world in which existence is already structured in a pre-reflexive way.  
 
So, where does system trust fit in, in this cluster of concepts? System trust, just like 
interpersonal trust, always entails the risk of disappointment. However, where a 
breach of trust will lead to internal attribution, the attribution in the case of 
misplaced system trust will be, similar to the case of confidence, external (everyone 
had an account of this Icelandic bank!). And although system trust in general has a 
latent character, it fundamentally differs from the ignorance that accompanies 
familiarity, because with system trust one is aware that:  
“everything that is accomplished is a product, that each action has been 
decided on after comparison with other possibilities. System trust counts 
on explicit processes for the reduction of complexity, i.e. on people, not 
nature (emphases in original) ” (Luhmann 1979: 58). 
All in all, we can conclude that system trust resembles in fact confidence and that it 
therefore can be situated between familiarity and interpersonal trust. In his later 
work, Luhmann indeed seems to use system trust and confidence interchangeably 
(Luhmann 1988; see Möllering 2006; Jalava 2003: 184; Seligman 1997: 19). 
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3.2 System trust and late modernity 
Now that we have recaptured the relations between familiarity, confidence and trust, 
and specifically, the way in which confidence and system trust relate, we will now 
turn to the connection between modernity and system trust.  
 
Luhmann (but also other authors such as: Giddens 1991; Beck 1994; Seligman 1997; 
Möllering 2006) observes that interpersonal trust as a basis for interactions is 
eroding in modern societies, blurring the boundaries between the familiar and the 
unfamiliar.
11
 He (1988: 96) characterizes the arrival of modernity as a shift from 
“cosmology to technology”, marking the transformation from a world in which 
unfamiliar and unforeseen events were seen as “an expression of the hidden 
meanings of nature or the hidden intentions of God” towards a world where 
unexpected events may be the simple effect of our own actions and behavior.
12
 
Although the arrival of modernity is linked to Luhmann’s focus on system 
trust, in his work Trust he does not elaborate this connection. We, therefore, turn to 
the sociologist Anthony Giddens (1991), definitely influenced by the work of 
Luhmann, who analyses new conditions for trust brought forth by a transition from 
traditional to modern society.  
Giddens (1991: 14-15) uses the term modernity in a very general way, referring 
 
                                                   
11
 Of course, also in pre-modern time people have put their trust in systems. However, these systems 
were mostly grounded on religious assumptions or natural law. There were only few alternative 
grounds systems were built on. The human disposition was presupposed and fully encapsulated in the 
system. There was no critical distance between persons and the systems they were living in. The 
complexity inherent in human life was therefore assumed to be already reduced by the ordering of the 
system. Whenever there was the need to explain certain ordering principles, one turned to authorities, 
which functioned as third party trust, such as gods, priests or other “wise men”.  
12
 In line with Luhmann, the sociologist Seligman observes a similar shift. In his analysis of Christian 
thought, he argues that in traditional society, the presence of God provides a foundation for personal 
relations. The rules set in place by a shared faith in an all-overseeing God structured the interactions of 
fellow believers. “Thus, in the transcendent otherness of God and of ‘amore Dei’, people found not only 
their own individuality, but the very model for relations with the mundane other” (Seligman 1997: 48). 
It is with the death of God, Seligman claims, man with his unpredictable behavior no longer mediated 
by a transcendent entity, became “a problem for human knowledge” (Seligman 1997: 50).  
 
67 
 
to institutions and patterns of behavior which were first established in post-feudal 
Europe, but which have become dominant in a “world-historical” sense in the 
twentieth century.  
He identifies three closely interconnected elements that define modernity, 
which he roughly refers to as the “industrial civilization” or the “modern society” 
(Giddens and Pierson 1998: 95): the separation of time and space, the presence of 
disembedding mechanisms, and institutional reflexivity.
13
  
These three elements are important to our understanding of trust because they 
form the preconditions for the development of system trust, which is not merely the 
intensification of the initial interpersonal trust or the eroding of familiarity, but in 
fact becomes a different and specific form of trust in modern and late-modern 
society. 
 
First, the separation of time and space refers to the fact that in late modernity, time 
and space no longer are connected through a fixed place. For Giddens, our 
interactions increasingly become disembedded.  
“[L]arger and larger numbers of people live in circumstances in which 
disembedded institutions, linking local practices with globalised social 
relations, organise major aspects of day-to-day life” (Giddens 1990: 79).14 
Social relations can be established across wide spans of time and space, even globally. 
As we will see in the next chapter, this specific aspect of late modernity is an 
 
                                                   
13
 When Giddens specifically focuses his analysis on the separation of time and space, the presence of 
disembedding mechanisms, and institutional reflexivity, he in fact refers to the “post-traditional order 
of modernity”, also called high or late modernity. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to it as late 
modernity. 
14
 Seligman (1997) claims that especially in modern society, characterized by its differentiation in roles, 
the room to negotiate these roles becomes more substantial. Not only do people have more roles than 
in premodern society, they also encounter more ‘relevant others’ and in their different roles have to 
deal with a wide range of interactions (Seligman speaks of role-sets). There is much less overlap 
between these different roles which brings along a greater potential for conflict and contradiction. Or 
in other words, “(t)he greater indeterminacy and the greater negotiability of role expectations lead to 
the greater possibility for the development of trust as a form of social relations” (Seligman 1997: 39).  
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important characteristic of Internet technology as well.  
 
Second, the separation of time and space also makes possible the use of 
disembedding mechanisms. Giddens distinguishes two types of disembedding 
mechanisms: symbolic tokens (such as money) and expert systems (healthcare 
system, telecoms system, science system), which he refers to both as abstract 
systems.
15
 
These mechanisms make it possible to separate or “lift out” activities from 
local contexts. Events happening on the other side of the world are increasingly 
shaping our local everyday lives. Also economic exchanges are taking place on a 
global level resulting in labor practices being “lifting out” of the local community and 
which are “recombined across time and space” (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 98).  
It has to be noted that unlike other sociologists such as Luhmann and 
Seligman, Giddens deliberately chooses not to use the term differentiation here. 
Differentiation in general refers to the separation of roles and functions bringing 
forth a specialized and precise society, where Giddens (1991: 18) values the 
detachment between action and context and how these two become re-embedded as 
more fundamental to modern society. Perhaps, Meyrowitz’s (2005: 25) concept of the 
glocality describes best what Giddens has in mind: the fact that in today’s 
consciousness “the local and the global co-exist in the glocality”. What we for example 
learn through media about other places, foreign politics and cultures is as much of 
importance in the shaping of everyday life, as is the influence of our local 
environment. Modernity is just as much about fragmentation as it is about 
unification, Giddens (1991: 27) claims.
16
  
 
 
                                                   
15
 Luhmann speaks just of “systems” instead of “abstract systems” as Giddens does, but in fact they 
both refer to the same phenomenon. Therefore, I will use them interchangeably throughout my 
dissertation. 
16
 Although Giddens specifically focuses on the influence of global events and developments on 
everyday life, he does not deny that the physical place or locality is still an important aspect of our 
daily interactions. While less explicitly, with this statement he affirms Meyrowitz’s (1985) principal 
argument that although the physical context and societal context become separated, the local context 
still is an important setting for everyday life. 
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The third fundamental aspect of late modernity is institutional reflexivity, which 
touches on the use of knowledge in all domains of social life. Knowledge gained about 
a certain aspect of life - education, health - flows back to that domain, simultaneously 
constituting it. Giddens’ concept of reflexivity –Adams (2004) speaks of “heightened 
reflexivity”- should not be confused with the eccentric positionality we discussed in 
the previous chapter. The latter refers to the ontological distance of human beings 
which entails that “man not only exists, and experiences his existing, but that he also 
experiences the experience of his existence” (Plessner 1975: 364). The former, on the 
other hand, refers to the flows of information about possible ways to organize society 
(macro-level) as well as everyday life (micro-level). This knowledge is not bound to 
the borders of institutions and therefore can always become a question of debate, by 
experts as well as by laymen. Living in a modern world means living in a world of 
change and, even more importantly, in a world of radical doubt. Leaving religion and 
dogmas behind, the Enlightenment falsely promised that reason would bring us 
certainty, however:  
“[N]o matter how cherished, and apparently well established, a given 
scientific tenet might be, it is open to revision – or might have to be 
discarded altogether – in the light of new ideas or findings. The integral 
relation between modernity and radical doubt is an issue which, once 
exposed to view, is not only disturbing to philosophers but is existentially 
troubling (emphasis in original) for ordinary individuals” (Giddens 1991: 
21).  
 
3.2.1 Risk in late modernity 
Perceiving and dealing with risks and uncertainty becomes inevitable in a society 
where all knowledge is questionable and traditions are increasingly becoming eroded.  
In general, risk refers to an active and explicit engagement with future threats. 
When we talk about risks, we talk about the chance or probability that a certain–
often undesirable - event will occur. When we refer to uncertainty, on the other hand, 
we face possible unpredictable outcomes. For example, when a new technology is 
being introduced it is difficult to predict possible side effects because there is no 
previous experience on which one can fall back. In such a situation of high 
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uncertainty, it becomes increasingly difficult to clearly identify risks.  
Nevertheless, in contrast to what this rather strict distinction between risk and 
uncertainty might seem to imply - eloquently described by Knight (1921) in his 
influential study Risk, Uncertainty and Profit -, we have seen in the previous chapter 
that risk and uncertainty are indissolubly intertwined both on the ontological and the 
epistemological level (also see: WRR 2008). Not only does the world confront us with 
uncertainty because of the variability and indeterminacy of social processes, we are 
also aware that our knowledge of risk-determinacy, impact, and causal effect are 
limited. To put it differently, even when we talk about risks there is uncertainty 
because we might have doubts about our risk perception. From some risks we may be 
more convinced than from others. Some authors, therefore, see uncertainty as an 
attribute of risk (Asselt 2000).  
 
The connection Giddens makes between modernity and risk is in line with and partly 
based on the work of Ulrich Beck (1994, 1992b) on the risk society. What makes risk 
– nuclear powers, biotechnology - different than danger - natural disasters, 
epidemics - which were already present in pre-modern society is that the former is 
the consequence of a techno-economic decision, where the latter is nothing more and 
nothing less than “‘strokes of fate’ raining down on mankind from ‘outside’ and 
attributable to an ‘other’ – gods, demons or Nature” (Beck 1992a: 98).  
However, these techno-economic decisions that bring forth risks cannot be 
easily attributed to individuals nor is the average citizen in general actively involved 
in such decision-making processes. As we will see in the next chapters, with the 
arrival of ICTs, people seem more and more to be responsible for what happens in the 
world, while simultaneously it becomes increasingly more difficult to point directly at 
the specific sources of responsibility (Floridi 2015a: 21). 
Also Luhmann (1990) sees a difference in the appreciation of risk between 
decision makers and other people. The former believe they put technologies into 
practice based on rationally calculated risks, whereas the later feel they are simply 
exposed to dangerous technologies. People who are not part of the decision-making 
process are less willing to accept such dangers. Apparently, a double standard of 
evaluation is being used, based on whether or not someone is in control of the 
situation (idem: 226). The distant locus of decision-making in relation to the 
significant impact these decisions may have on everyday life means that “risk and 
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danger are part of our daily lives” and that simultaneously these risks are “out of our 
control and there is nobody who could be held accountable” (Misztal 1996: 93).  
Beck (1992a: 99) speaks of the “mathematical ethics of the technological age”. 
This is a type of ethics without morality, where insurance and liability laws replace 
personal accountability. Nowadays, we develop actions based on prevention, 
compensation, and precautionary principles, making events that not yet have 
occurred our object of interest and concern. All these actions are aimed at providing 
us with security in the face of an uncertain future (Beck 1992a: 100).  
 
3.2.2 Trust in abstract systems 
Notwithstanding the presence of risk in late modern society, Giddens does not 
presuppose a lack of trust, rather he sees the erosion of local and traditional order as 
an instigator for the reconstruction of new traditions and structures on the global 
level (also see Misztal 1996: 89). For Giddens we do not abandon or move beyond 
modernity, but we continue it with different means. As we have seen, trust is closely 
connected to risk because it can function as a way to cope with it.  
“Trust is also about the binding of time and space, because trust means 
giving commitment to a person, group or system across future time” 
(Giddens and Pierson 1998: 101).  
Trusting a teacher or the healthcare system might turn out to be a very effective way 
of setting potential bad outcomes aside and –as we have seen with Luhmann - to be 
able to act as if the future is certain. For Giddens trust, consequently, is a 
characteristic of modernity par excellence because it is essentially about organizing 
and confronting an open future.  
 
Giddens differentiates between two types of trust: trust in persons (facework 
commitments) and trust in abstract systems (faceless commitments). He claims that 
trust in abstract systems – which by and large overlaps with Luhmann’s concept of 
system trust - becomes dominant in modernity.  
Abstract systems, consisting of symbolic tokens such as money and expert 
systems such as healthcare, enable people not only to temper the uncertainty about 
an open future, but also to cope with the reflexivity of knowledge that shapes the 
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organization of society. The trust we have in abstract systems provides us with a 
sense of security, which is necessary to lead our everyday life. Every time someone 
uses an ATM machine, drinks tap water, uses aspirin or brings her child to school, 
she puts – often implicitly - trust in the abstract systems that enable these actions. 
We all suppose that the money we have in our pocket will keep its value overnight, we 
trust that there are competent people who are checking the water running out of the 
tap for bacteria and other harmful substances, we trust the science that underlies the 
workings of medicines, and we trust the schooling system to teach children 
adequately.  
Characteristic for late modern society is that it is rather difficult to opt out 
from these abstract systems (Giddens 1990). The overall presence of “low-probability 
high consequence risks” in late modernity, people cannot bear individually. Not only 
is it impossible to withdraw from the risks involved in some abstract systems (even 
when you refuse to use nuclear power, a meltdown of an installation will nevertheless 
affect you), - in order to function in society you need to trust the expert systems, 
which enable you to fulfill your role –referring to Seligman (1997) - in everyday life. 
Abstract systems, and especially expert systems, not only provide a sense of security, 
they also produce the world with all its chances and possibilities we are nowadays 
living in (Giddens 1990: 84). 
 
3.2.3 Giddens versus Luhmann 
For Luhmann, anyone who puts her trust in a system basically counts on its 
functioning well more than she believes the people who make that functioning 
possible are all trustworthy actors in a personal and intimate setting. Although the 
personal sphere can still be an element of importance in an interaction (for example, 
your doctor can also be a friend of the family) for the continuity of the interaction, it 
becomes more decisive that you as a patient trust the medical system in which the 
doctor is educated and trained and that you trust the safety valves that are set in 
place in the system: ranging from a second opinion to evidence-based treatments. It 
would be impossible to be acquainted with all the employees of the hospital, the bank 
or any other large institution for that matter. You trust them as representatives of an 
abstract system. The trust you invest in them is not longer necessarily based on 
personal and intimate experiences. Their presence merely reassures you that the 
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system, which technicalities you cannot fully understand, is properly functioning. 
Luhmann (1979: 52) states: 
 
“In other words, he has to be able to depend and to rely on the processing 
of information by other people. He knows, that is, others who know how 
the engine of his car works, how his gastritis can best be treated; he might 
mistrust the newspapers but still assumes that their news is at least news; 
he relies on the fact that the representatives of his insurance firm give him 
factually correct information on insurance matters. In a highly complex 
environment this type of trust can not longer take the form of person 
trust…” 
Although Giddens’ analysis of trust and modernity is by and large in line with the 
analysis of Luhmann, there are some differences of opinion in the details. Where they 
both see an important role for system trust or trust in abstract systems, Giddens, 
contrary to Luhmann, values the personal and the impersonal –or the facework 
commitments and faceless commitments- differently. More than Luhmann, Giddens 
emphasizes the continuous state of trust by showing how the impersonal and the 
personal are intertwined in modernity. He pays more attention to the different ways 
in which people place their trust in abstract systems (Möllering 2006: 73) and how 
system trust instigates a transformation of interpersonal trust. More than Luhmann, 
who sees it to be the function of experts to control the system, Giddens argues that 
people working as representatives for a system have an important role in 
transforming impersonal interactions at the “access points” (Möllering 2006: 74). 
This different approach leads Giddens (1990: 33) to state in the introduction of his 
book The Consequence of Modernity that he will “conceptualise trust and its 
attendant notions differently” than Luhmann has done.  
 
While it might be true that Luhmann does not analyse in detail the role of 
interpersonal interactions in establishing system trust, I believe Giddens’ reading of 
Luhmann’s demarcation between interpersonal trust and system trust (or simply 
trust and confidence) might also be too stringent.  
The difference Luhmann makes between trust and confidence is not primarily 
based on the question of whether or not “individuals consciously contemplate 
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alternative courses of action” as Giddens (1990: 32) claims. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter (see 2.2.2), trust, for Luhmann, can be placed in an almost careless 
way and certainly is not the outcome of a rational calculation of the most optimal 
action (Luhmann 1979: 88). In discerning trust from confidence, it is more important 
“whether or not the possibility of disappointment depends on your own previous 
behaviour” (Luhmann 1988: 98). Consequently, this makes differentiating between 
trust and confidence much more subjective –and therefore perhaps also more 
diffuse- than Giddens presumes. It could therefore well be that only after an 
interaction turned out wrong an actor would become aware of the fact that she had 
placed trust in that person, because, looking back, she would hold herself responsible 
for getting involved.  
On the other hand, disappointment can also lead to external attribution, in 
which case we would speak of confidence. Consequently, also Luhmann 
acknowledges that this analytic distinction in fact can become complicated because a 
relation based on trust can quickly turn into confidence and vice versa. However, 
unlike Giddens, he merely confirms this interlocking without explicating it.  
 
 
3.3 Trust: The interaction between system trust, interpersonal trust, and 
familiarity in late modernity 
The final part of this chapter will be dedicated to the interaction between system 
trust, interpersonal trust, and familiarity in late modernity. First, we will look into the 
ways in which interpersonal interactions are still part of overall system trust. Next, 
we will address the role of familiarity for trust in late modernity by analysing basic 
trust as an important pillar for familiarity and by discerning the overlap and 
differences between familiarity and the Umwelt. 
 
3.3.1 Facework commitments in abstract systems: the air traffic case 
Interpersonal, trustworthy interactions form a necessary condition for stable system 
trust to occur. Where Luhmann merely focuses on the workings of the abstract 
system, Giddens argues that facework commitments –the interaction with the 
operators- at the access points of abstract systems are an important aspect of system 
trust. Access points are the places were the laypeople or users meet the 
75 
 
representatives –not necessarily the experts- of the abstract systems. They form “the 
meeting ground of facework and faceless commitments” (Giddens 1990: 83). 
Although, not all abstract systems presuppose interactions between laypeople and 
representatives or operators of the system, most of the abstract systems do involve at 
a certain moment in time an interaction between both parties. In addition to new 
knowledge that can be spread by media and other sources, trust towards abstract 
systems is, therefore, strongly influenced by the experiences people have at access 
points. These facework commitments at access points are the interpersonal 
interactions that co-shape trust in systems. 
 
System trust and interpersonal trust are not part of a zero-sum game. It is not the 
case that more system trust necessarily entails less interpersonal trust or the other 
way around (Luhmann 1988: 99). On the contrary, a social evolution bringing forth 
increasingly complex societies requires not only more confidence in systems but, in 
order to seize opportunities and chances, more trust in other partners as well (idem).  
“So it is not to be expected that scientific and technological development 
will bring  events under control, substituting mastery over things for 
trust as a social mechanism  and thus making it unnecessary. 
Instead, one should expect trust to be increasingly in  demand as a 
means of enduring the complexity of the future which technology will 
generate” (Luhmann 1979: 15-16).  
As Luhmann foresees, the arrival of increasingly complex technological systems in 
late modernity, not only provides human beings with a new repertoire, new 
possibilities to interact, communicate and create their artificial world they lack on 
natural grounds, these systems also produce new complexities, new uncertainties 
human beings have to relate to. 
To illustrate the importance of trustworthy facework interactions at access 
points, I will fall back on a personal experience I had when I took an airplane to fly 
from The Netherlands to Canada, attending a conference there. One should know that 
I am afraid of flying, and it is especially on these occasions, where existential 
uncertainties are apparent and the act of giving trust is no longer latent but 
transforms into an intentional and conscious act, one increasingly becomes aware of 
the trust we all put into these expert systems on a daily basis.  
76 
 
First, there is some general knowledge I try to bear in mind when boarding for 
the flight. I know that statistically, flying is much safer than the car trip that brought 
me to the airport17. Nevertheless, the anxiety I am feeling now and that was absent in 
the car tries to convince me otherwise.  
Second, I know that the company I am flying with is a trustworthy company. 
KLM has an excellent track record of successful flights executed by professional pilots 
with well-kept planes.  
Finally, I know that a lot of other, well-educated and rational people whom I 
trust travel by plane without giving it a second thought. So, why shouldn’t I? Trust in 
abstract systems is often based on the fact that others trust and make use of that 
abstract system too. Because, as a layperson, I am not able to check all the detailed 
workings of the plane, I have to depend on the experts and control mechanisms of the 
system. Their trustworthiness, however, I also deduce to a certain level from the way 
in which others value their functioning.  
Despite all these reassuring thoughts, I still hesitate to get on the plane. I then 
find myself carefully observing the flight attendants. How do they behave? Do they 
look nervous? What are they talking about? I see that they are laughing and are 
helping passengers to find their seat. They look competent in their blue uniforms. 
Nothing seems to be out of the ordinary.  
“At access points”, Giddens (1990: 85) explains, “the facework 
commitments which tie lay actors into trust relations ordinarily involve 
displays of manifest trustworthiness and integrity, coupled with an 
attitude of ‘business-as-usual’, or unflappability.”  
Encouraging, a flight attendant smiles at me and welcomes me on board. I let myself 
be willingly directed to my seat, and then put on the seat belt and wait for the safety 
instructions. When all is done and the plane takes off, I still keep my eyes on the 
crew. When they retrieve to their seats, they shut the curtains between their staff 
cabin and the passengers’ section, blocking my view. I feel the anxiety returning. Is 
there something I should not see? Something that might prove that my trust was in 
 
                                                   
17
 At least if one takes into account the statistics on death per kilometre. The death per journey statistic 
is in favor of the car!  
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fact unjustified?  
Elaborating on Goffman’s (1959) notions of frontstage (the passenger’s 
section) and backstage (the staff cabin), Giddens (1990: 86-87) explains that 
controlling these two areas is part of the essence of professionalism.  
First, the work experts do might require great mental concentration. Not being 
disturbed can therefore be essential to the success of their actions.  
Second, even experts can get things wrong. Showing this to laypeople may 
lower their trust, even if the mistake of the expert does not negatively influence the 
outcome.  
Finally, contingency always remains a relevant aspect of the functioning of 
abstract systems. Elements of hazard and luck can enter the performance of the 
representative of the system. In general, however, a representative or expert prefers 
to conceal how these elements might come into play, because, being in control is part 
of a trustworthy performance. 
All in all, it becomes clear that interpersonal trust and system trust are 
connected. Although, I was aware that the real storage of trust was located in the air 
traffic system that is behind the cabin crew, rather than in the cabin crew itself (if the 
plane malfunctioned or the pilot became unwell, they probably would not have been 
able to stop the inevitable, tragic event of a crash), they nonetheless are an essential 
part of the overall trust that I put into the system when I fastened my seatbelt.  
Statistical knowledge lacks the reassuring smile I needed to get on board of 
that plane. Trust in abstract systems provides the security we need to cope with a 
radically open future, but it cannot offer us the intimacy we experience in personal 
trust relations. Giddens (1990: 115) claims that:  
“This is one of the main reasons why individuals at access points normally 
go to great pains to show themselves trustworthy: they provide the link 
between personal and system trust”. 
System trust, just as interpersonal trust, has to be learned. It is established in cycles 
of positive experiences with the system at hand and partly rests on the perception 
that others trust the system as well. The impossibility of backing out of abstract 
systems makes that it almost never becomes a subject of public debate. “One can only 
feel unhappy and complain about it” (Luhmann 1988: 103). Its latent character even 
helps maintain its integrity because laypeople are not in the position to control the 
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detailed functioning of a system anyway (Luhmann 1979: 57). They depend on the 
expert whose job it is to control the system.  
For Luhmann, control mechanisms should be built into the system and made 
explicit that “trust in the ability of systems to function includes trust in the ability of 
their internal controls to function” (Luhmann 1979: 57-58). This focus on internal 
controls may partly explain why Luhmann does not pay much attention to the 
facework interactions at the access points of these systems, while with Giddens we, 
nonetheless, might add that these controls can also be partly external when it is the 
function of the representative to perform certain safety measures.  
For example, it is the task of the cabin crew to check if the doors are properly 
closed and all the hand luggage is safely put away. By showing these actions to the 
passengers –or the audience in Goffman’s terms- they carry out the message that 
safety is an important aspect of flying. Next to well-functioning internal control 
mechanisms, this external and visible control might add to the trust put in abstract 
systems by laymen.  
 
3.3.2 Basic trust and familiarity 
Trust –whether it takes the form of interpersonal trust or system trust- can only take 
place in a familiar world. This familiar world –also referred to as the “lifeworld”- is 
the un-reflected background of beliefs and meanings against which the world is 
perceived. We can only get to know and deal with the unfamiliar or the unexpected in 
a familiar way (Luhmann 1988). The unfamiliar therefore does not necessarily 
impose a problem upon trust as long as actors are able to engage in a process of 
familiarization (Möllering 2006).  
Also, in late modernity, familiarity remains a necessary condition for trust, 
interpersonal trust and system trust alike. In general, human beings do not question 
their own identity or that of the others around them. They presuppose the continuity 
of their environment and they believe that others experience this environment in a 
more or less similar way. Even philosophers whose core business revolves around 
rather uncomfortable questions such as “do I really exist?”, “what is identity?” or 
“what is it like to be human (or a bat)?” do not seem to doubt their daily actions. This 
basic ‘taken-for-granted’ character of the world is a necessary ground for trust to 
occur (see 2.2.6).  
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Giddens (1991: 36) speaks of ontological security to denote in fact the same 
familiarity, which he, more specifically, relates to the “bracketing” inherent in the 
natural attitude in everyday life. Ontological security, therefore, also refers to the 
deep-rooted belief people generally have in the continuity of their self-identity and 
the consistency of the world around them (Giddens 1990: 92). This ontological 
security or familiarity is grounded on the acquiring of basic trust or elementary trust 
in early-childhood.
18
  
Next to getting familiar with the way the world works (every morning the sun 
rises, things fall down and not up, when the ball rolls under the table it has not 
vanished but is merely out of sight), as a child we also develop a basic trust by 
interacting with parents, siblings and close family (Harris 2012). Infants learn they 
can rely upon others. In the nourishing relation with their parents, they form a sense 
of self, which will hopefully become the stable basis from which they can interact and 
build relations with others outside their family.  
The developing of a self or an identity is closely connected to the distance 
infants increasingly experience in the interactions with their parents. They have to 
learn that the absence of their parents, for example when their parents leave them at 
the daycare facility, does not mean that they have left them for good or that the love 
between them has vanished. Trust, again, means bridging the gap with an unknown 
future. And in this early stage in human life, the bridging of this gap is mainly focused 
on coping with the increasing distance between parents and children; it is in fact 
about the blocking off the  
“existential anxieties which, if they were allowed to concretise, might 
become a source of continuing emotional and behavioural anguish 
throughout life” (Giddens 1990: 97).  
 
                                                   
18
 Next to basic trust, Giddens also speaks of elementary trust. Misztal (1996: 91) remarks that 
although he uses the two concepts interchangeably, based on the context in which both concepts are 
adopted, basic trust seems to be connected to ontological security and elementary trust is associated 
with the predictability of everyday life. I am not going into the underlying nuances and will connect 
both concepts to the covering idea of familiarity. 
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That a disruption in the development of basic trust may eventually lead to people 
living in an unfamiliar world instead of a familiar world becomes clear when we, for 
example, look at the devastating case of Savannah. This Dutch toddler was severely 
abused by her mother, Sonja de J., causing her death in September 2004. This tragic 
case led to a wide public outcry and stricter rules in the youth care system (Keymolen 
and Prins 2011; Prins and Keymolen 2011; Keymolen and Broeders 2013).  
In a book chapter, appropriately called Tragic Parenthood, De Mul (2014a) 
argues that the responsibility we often presume all parents feel towards their children 
–a responsibility belonging to the ontological structure of man as it were- in fact 
needs to “ ‘be activated’ in relation to certain experiences” (de Mul 2014a: 188). 
External stimuli are needed “to develop this inborn capacity” (idem). Likewise, we 
can claim that ontological security, or in a broader sense familiarity, which presence 
is a necessary precondition for human beings to thrive, can only be activated by 
developing basic trust in early life. 
During the trial, it turned out that Sonja de J., the mother of Savannah, had 
gone through a very traumatizing childhood herself, most probably destroying her 
ability to feel a deep-rooted sense of responsibility towards Savannah. We might also 
say that it deprived her of the possibility to develop basic trust. In the violent relation 
with her parents, there was little room for security and feelings of reciprocity. The 
absence of basic trust results in a world which does not bracket out existential fears 
or risks but, on the contrary, reinforces them. Sonja de J.’s statements throughout the 
trial outlined a world in which the normal state of affairs is not one of setting aside 
uncertainties and doubts, but of presupposing animosity and distrust as the 
fundamental ground of every interaction. Her world is not a shared or common sense 
world. It is not a place of continuity but of disruption. The world she was familiar 
with was unfortunately not a familiar world reigned by normality, but one reigned by 
abnormality. 
It would go too far to completely ascribe Sonja de J.’s deviant behavior –as it 
was referred to in the media- to her traumatic childhood inducing this defective basic 
trust. Fortunately, not all abused children grow up to kill their children. However, the 
case of Savannah does illustrate that developing basic trust is an important condition 
to activate ontological security and to, consequently, live in a familiar world. 
Moreover, a sense of ontological security is necessary to be able to place trust in 
persons and systems later on in life. Anticipating the next chapter on trust in and 
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through digital technologies:  
“Trust in the reliability of nonhuman objects, it follows from this analysis, 
is based upon a more primitive faith in the reliability and nurturance of 
human individuals” (Giddens 1990: 97). 
 
3.3.3 Distinction and overlap between the familiar world and the Umwelt 
Interestingly, Giddens (1991: 126-133) –with a reference to Goffman (1967)- speaks of 
an Umwelt as a protective cocoon that encloses human beings with an environment 
they perceive as normal and uneventful. As we have seen in the previous chapter (see 
2.5.2), the Umwelt is associated with the environment animals inhabit. Animals 
perceive their environment always in line with their Funktionkreis, their ability to 
react on the gathered information. This balance between information and action 
makes that the animal world indeed can be seen as a world reigned by normality, 
more or less similar to the familiar world of human beings. In both worlds, actions 
are mostly un-reflected, based more on routines and successful behavioral patterns 
than on conscious decision-making. Without such a sense of normality, it would 
become more difficult to have confidence in the continuity of our self-identity and of 
the world around us. In addition, the ability to plan for the future would diminish, 
weakening overall trust (Misztal 2001).  
 
However tempting it is to equate the Umwelt with the familiar world, the difference 
between both environments is nevertheless so fundamental that using them 
interchangeably rather obscures the meaning of the familiar world than elucidate it.  
First, the familiar world of human beings includes more than the mere 
physical immediate environment, as is the case in the Umwelt. Giddens, therefore, 
alters the original idea of the Umwelt by adding that for human beings the Umwelt 
also includes the perception of high-consequence risks over “indefinite spans of time 
and space” (Giddens 1991: 127). The information animals derive from their 
environment is always in line with their range of action. All this information, 
therefore, is only displayed in and important to the present, to the ‘here-and-now’. 
Animals cannot reflect upon the possible consequences of their actions in the future. 
This makes that they do not know trust, at least, not in the manner as we have 
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described it: to act as if the future is certain. For animals there is no need to trust, 
simply because they are not consciously aware of the future and the uncertainties it 
may bring forth. This might make the animal Umwelt a familiar world but also a non-
reflected one (see chapter 8).  
In the familiar world of human beings, however, the uncertainties of the future 
always shine through, even more so in late modern society where high consequence 
risks are part of everyday life. The most fundamental difference between the animal 
Umwelt and the familiar world of human beings, therefore, is that the Umwelt cannot 
be shattered, -there is no world beyond the familiar world, so to say- where the 
human familiar world, on the opposite, always remains a world ‘under-construction’.  
The Umwelt is the only world animals live in. They are only aware of the ‘here-
and-now’. “Animals do not give meaning to the world but bear a meaning” (Lijmbach 
2002: 106 with reference to Buytendijk 1939). Human beings tend to forget that the 
routines they follow and the rules that are set in society in fact are social constructs 
and not natural laws. From this perspective, the familiar world of human beings is 
also an un-reflected world. The third anthropological law of Plessner captures this 
human urge to live as if the world is a well-ordered place, by speaking of a utopian 
standpoint people strive for. There is, however, always the possibility of questioning 
routines and changing them. A life-changing event –getting married or giving birth to 
a child- can shake someone’s familiar world to its foundations. By reducing the 
familiar world to an Umwelt, one runs the risk of losing sight of its man-made 
character. It always remains in close connection to the complex world, which it filters 
in order to neutralise fundamental uncertainties. It is in fact the interplay between 
the familiar world and the open and complex world, which is always shining through 
that brings the need for trust into human life.  
 
3.3.4 Familiarity contested in late modern society 
Not only a problematic development of basic trust might negatively influence the 
robustness of the familiar world, but also on the macro level there are changes related 
to modernity, which weaken familiarity.  
The conditions for familiarity have fundamentally changed since the arrival of 
the printing press (Giddens 1991; Seligman 1997) and in its wake recent, digital 
technologies (Castells 1999, 1996; Turkle 2011, 1995, 1984). Our current, complex 
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society faces the problem that we are now able to collect and store more information 
than any person would ever be capable of coming to know. This brings us in the 
awkward position of simultaneously having a lot of knowledge and knowing that 
there is so much more information with which we will always be unfamiliar as well. 
While others may find themselves in the position to utilize the information we do not 
grasp, we might have access to information others do not have. Everyone is an expert 
as well as a layperson, because diversification has made it virtually impossible to 
become an expert in all domains. In modern society, everyone has to deal with a 
multitude of systems and of most of them we can only grasp in a superficial way their 
technicalities.  
More knowledge present in society, therefore, does not necessarily entail more 
shared knowledge. While in general, it is still widely accepted that we all perceive –
phenomenological speaking- the world more or less in a similar way, we increasingly 
become aware of the different epistemic contexts in which these perceptions are 
interpreted. This reflexivity, as Giddens calls it, puts pressure on familiarity because 
it questions the “taken-for-granted” aspect of the familiar world.  
 
Also the earlier mentioned separation of time and space, characteristic for modern 
society may cause difficulties for the firmness of the familiar world. Although all 
human interaction is in a way mediated, the mediating workings of for example the 
television or newspaper may generate a so-called “reality inversion”: the real object, 
then, seems less ‘real’ than the representation of that same object (Giddens 1991: 27). 
Events happening at a distance may well enter daily life in a very “real” manner, 
thereby affecting the familiar world.
19
 Especially media, such as television and the 
Internet, make us aware that the place we are living is not the one and only 
community, but merely just one of the many possible communities we could be living 
in. These other “localities” become the “generalized everywhere” serving as mirrors to 
view and value our own everyday life (Meyrowitz 2005). Place and familiarity are no 
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 It has to be noted that although it is true that global processes –such as the capitalist market-, 
structure our local life, it is too big of a claim to state that in everyday life we are constantly aware of 
this global influences- instigating what Thomlinson (1994) refers to as a “phenomenology of the 
global”. Rather it is the continuous interaction with distance events and actions, which transform the 
familiar world. 
84 
 
longer indissolubly attached to each other. This does not necessarily lead to 
alienation from the local context, but it is more closely related to the “integration 
within globalised ‘communities’ of shared experience” (Giddens 1991: 141).  
 
Finally, because of the arrival of system trust, the nature of interpersonal trust –
which is in fact the main level for familiarity to develop - has changed. It is not so 
much that system trust has replaced interpersonal trust; rather, it has transformed it. 
What we experience as being personal is indissolubly intertwined with the abstract 
systems on which modern society relies.  
Where in pre-modern times basic trust between persons was integrated in 
relations in the community, family relations, and friendships, in late modernity 
through the disembedding and re-combining working of systems, people are able to 
keep in touch with others all over the world. There is, therefore, no use to 
differentiate between the detached character of systems and the intimate character of 
interpersonal relations. Trust is no longer self-evidently based on personal ties in 
one’s local community. Rather, interpersonal trust becomes “a project, to be ‘worked 
at’ by the parties involved, and demands the opening out of the individual to the 
other” (Giddens 1990: 121). Trust no longer is pre-given, but involves a “mutual 
process of self-disclosure” (idem).  
 
As a consequence from the transformation of self-evident to active trust
20
 (also see 
Möllering 2006), familiarity loses its more given nature and becomes something that 
has to be worked at as well. It has to be noted that interpersonal trust always is 
“active” (also see Adams 2004). As we have seen in the previous chapter, trust can be 
seen as a leap of faith in which actors set aside uncertainties and act as if the future is 
certain. This always implies an effort, from both trustor and trustee. Active trust, as 
Giddens describes it, therefore, should be more valued as an intensification of the 
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 Active trust refers back to the concept of suspension and the bridging of the hiatus, which was 
discussed in chapter 1. While these elements are always closely related to trust, we could say that in 
modern society, where familiarity and ontological security are increasingly difficult to attain, trust 
between persons becomes more active in order to be able to bridge the hiatus and suspend the 
insecurity brought forth by high-consequence risks. Möllering (2006), building on –amongst others- 
Giddens, elaborates active trust to make it one of the keystones of his conceptual framework. 
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active aspect of interpersonal trust than a radical different form of interpersonal 
trust. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Where in the previous chapter we have focused on the preconditions for trust and the 
manner in which trust is related to the human condition, in this chapter we have 
added a layer to this ontological perspective by taking into account the socio-
historical context in which trust occurs. More specifically, I have shown how trust and 
related concepts such as familiarity and confidence have altered in late modernity. 
  
First and foremost, there is the dominant presence of system trust. Increasingly, it 
has become necessary to put trust in systems in order to go about everyday life. As we 
have seen, complexity is inherent in human life. The uncertainty brought forth by the 
fact that human beings are aware that the future is capricious and that others have 
the freedom to act in unanticipated ways brings trust as a strategy to cope with this 
complexity in the realm of human life. The arrival of late modernity characterized by 
globalization, the decline of religious beliefs and fate, and the presence of low 
probability/high consequence risks, has conspicuously shaped this complexity. 
Where in traditional society, interpersonal trust and familiarity sufficed to cope with 
the uncertainties at hand, system trust becomes a necessary filter to deal with the 
complexity of late modern society. Systems, which we cannot fully understand or 
control, from money, politics, to the educational system and healthcare, are set in 
place to neutralize the complexity inherent in human life in the modern era.  
Interestingly, the development of system trust did not in any way force out 
interpersonal trust. On the one hand there is the development of facework 
commitments at the access points of systems to smoothen the trust put in systems, on 
the other hand the active characteristic of trust – which was always there, because 
trust always entails an act of suspension - becomes more radical and transforms trust 
into something that has to be invested in and worked on. Trust between persons 
becomes “a project” (see Giddens 1991; Giddens 1990; Giddens and Pierson 1998).  
Also the familiar world, which we have seen is a necessary precondition for any 
form of trust to thrive, keeps being important in modern society, although, its pre-
given character is slightly eroding. The ontological security, which is one of the pillars 
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of a familiar world, might be pressured by the presence of a multitude of frames of 
interpretation in modern society, diminishing the ground for a shared perspective on 
everyday life. Additionally, the more active character of interpersonal trust, another 
important point of support for the familiar world, reduces its taken-for-granted 
character.  
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4 
The Internet: A familiar world? 
 
 
All interactions are mediated interactions. In late modernity, these forms of 
mediations are increasingly being shaped by large, technical, and often opaque 
systems. In the previous chapter, a few of these dominant systems – such as the 
political system and the financial system - passed in review. We also looked deeper 
into one specific system –the air traffic case- to illustrate how system trust comes 
about.  
However, we have not yet dived into the specific workings of probably the most 
dominant technological system of our time: the Internet. The Internet as a system 
will be the main focus of this chapter. 
 
There were several reasons for postponing this endeavour. First, although the 
Internet surely shares some key characteristics with the earlier-mentioned systems in 
late modernity, it also differs from these systems in such fundamental ways that it 
would be fictitious to approach it in a similar fashion.  
The arrival of the Internet has been judged to have a disruptive effect on a 
wide range of domains in everyday life so that we could truly speak of a revolution, 
bringing about the need for new narratives and concepts to capture this fundamental 
upheaval. Some speak of the Network Society (Castells 1996; van Dijk 2012), the 
Information Age (Castells 1999), Hyperhistory (Floridi 2015b), or the Networked 
Era (van den Berg and Keymolen 2013) to mark the fundamental shift in the way 
human life is being organized nowadays.  
The Internet is considered to be a critical infrastructure just as water and 
electricity are, vital to society as a whole and to everyday life (Lewis 2006). Moreover, 
the Internet has become the enabler of all sorts of transactions: from financial 
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transactions such as online banking, to physical transactions like controlling 
engineering plants and flood-control dams. It has been adapted in a wide range of 
processes, knotting different formerly separate infrastructures together (Luiijf et al. 
2003.) by “what are known as ‘supervisory control and data acquisition’ or SCADA 
systems” (Singer and Friedman 2014: 15), fundamentally changing their modus 
operandi. All in all, dealing with the Internet as just another system in late modernity 
would be misleading. Such an analysis would not do justice to the impact it has on 
everyday life and on the way it shapes trust. 
 
A second reason for not immediately diving into cyberspace is that the intrinsic 
elusiveness of trust has lead me to look for ‘family resemblances’ of trust-related 
concepts first, instead of grounding the analysis on an already existing, all-
encompassing definition of what trust might be. This strategy provided me with a 
family of connected concepts of trust: interpersonal trust, system trust or confidence, 
familiar world, and the reduction of complexity. We can now employ these concepts 
to investigate trust in relation to the Internet. As trust can only thrive in a familiar 
world, the central question of this chapter will be:  
 
  ‘Can the Internet function as a familiar world?’ 
 
In other words, is the Internet designed and organized in such a way that it facilitates 
shared expectations, that it enables a common view on the online reality? In order for 
trust to be a fruitful way of dealing with complexity, there already has to be set in 
place an environment in which the most rudimentary forms of complexity have been 
reduced. Trust is a strong force to deal with complexity, but it cannot carry it all. 
Therefore, the Internet has to function in such a way that it to some extent is 
predictable and reliable. If users have to cope with too much fundamental insecurity, 
for example if they have to make sure that protocols are still set in place, if certificates 
are genuine, or if they doubt that their e-mail is been compromised, then trust 
becomes pressured and more difficult to give.  
As a way of analysing the Internet and its role as a familiar world, I have –
inspired by the layered design of the Internet itself which will be discussed in section 
4.2- chosen to focus on four cornerstones of the current Internet, which are crucial to 
our understanding of trust mediated by Internet technology: context, construction, 
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curation, and codification. Of these, curation, codification, and construction will be 
central to this chapter
21
. Curation refers to the key actors who govern and steer the 
Internet. Codification refers to the rules and regulations put forth by these curators. 
Construction, in this chapter, refers to the design of the Internet as a system, an 
infrastructure on which applications can be built. In the next chapter, where the focus 
will shift from the macro to the micro level, construction will primarily concern the 
design of smart artefacts and services. Context -the phenomenological experience of 
users on the micro-level- will then be the main point of departure. 
 
In this chapter we will start with a short history of the Internet. In that section, I will 
focus on the role trust has played in the collaboration of the developers of the 
Internet. Their trust-based approach conspicuously contributed to some of the 
essential characteristics of the construction of the Internet. Next, I will look into the 
functioning of the Internet and, more specifically, I will concentrate on its layered 
structure. I will show how this technical structure has influenced Internet scholars in 
the social and political sciences to conceptualize the Internet in a layered manner as 
well. Finally, I will retake the history of the Internet, now focussing on the shift from 
an open to a controlled Internet and the way in which curators such as governments 
and private companies contribute to the familiar world online as well as jeopardize 
trust online because of their conflicting interests. 
 
 
4.1 A short history of the Internet 
In the introduction of this chapter, I conveniently spoke about the Internet as if it is a 
conspicuous, clearly defined object. However, the opposite is in fact the case. In 
general, the average user –including myself- is well able to operate and navigate the 
Internet, but hardly ever do we comprehend its technical functioning.  
In this section, we will therefore first take a short dive into the history of the 
Internet and analyse some key design concepts of the Internet: layering, 
decentralized design, TCP/IP, and HTTP. Moreover, we will differentiate between the 
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 Context -the contextual, phenomenological experience of users- will be the main focus of the next 
chapter.  
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Internet as an infrastructure and the World Wide Web as an application, focussing 
on the way in which the trust-based approach to develop both the Internet and the 
World Wide Web has had a significant impact on their workings. 
 
Although we nowadays make use of the Internet as if it has always been there, just as 
we have become used to having tap water and the ubiquitous availability of 
electricity, it in fact is a fairly new invention. Leonard Kleinrock (2010), one of the 
founding fathers of packet-switched networks –which, as we will see later, became 
the design backbone of the Internet- discerned “two threads” emerging in the late 
1950s and coming together in the early 1960s that led to the early development of the 
Internet.  
On the one hand, there was the academic research thread, mainly localised at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) where Kleinrock wrote his PhD on a 
mathematical theory of packet switching for dynamic resource sharing and 
subsequently at the university of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) where he started 
working after finishing his PhD research.  
On the other hand, there was the creation of the defence organization called 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)
22
. J.C.R. Licklider, the first director of 
the Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) of ARPA, envisioned how 
“networking computers could support social interaction, and provide networked 
access to programs and data” (Kleinrock 2010: 28). ARPA wanted to connect its 
defence investigators to the few large and very expensive computers that were spread 
around the country, enabling them to “...share each other’s hardware, software and 
applications in a cost-effective fashion” (idem: 29). Packet-switch network theory as 
developed by Kleinrock laid the technical foundation for this endeavour. 
Independently, around that same time, other researchers such as Paul Baran at Rand 
(U.S.A.) and Donald Davies and Roger Scantlebury from the UK also worked on 
related subjects (see Abbate 1999). 
The ARPAnet kicked off with, as its first node, the computer of UCLA where 
Kleinrock was in charge. Soon, three other institutes and partners of the ARPAnet 
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 The agency has changed its name to Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1971, 
then back to ARPA in 1993, and back to DARPA in 1996. I refer to it as ARPA, its original name. 
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followed: the University of California at Santa Barbara, the Stanford Research 
Institute, and the University of Utah. In her book Inventing The Internet, Abbet 
(1999) describes how especially two approaches, one about the content, the other 
about the process, were perceived to be essential and eventually successful aspects of 
the ARPANET, namely: layering and an informal and decentralized management 
style. 
First, layering is a way of computer programming where the programme 
consists of separately functioning components. Interaction between layers has to 
follow certain rules; consequently, a designer of one layer does not have to fully 
understand the workings of the other layers, only their interaction. Moreover, layers 
can be designed and modified separately, as long as the designers agree to use shared 
interfaces. Consequently, layering is a programming strategy which enables to work 
with systems that, when taken as a whole, are rather complex. Abbet (1999: 51) 
concludes: 
“Thus, layering has both technical and social implications: it makes the 
technical complexity of the system more manageable, and it allows the 
system to be designed and built in a decentralized way.” 
Second, the participants in the ARPANET project worked together on an informal 
basis. They trusted each other to do their best and this management style was praised 
not only by the contractors but by an external consultant who evaluated the project as 
well. Abbet (1999: 55-56) quoted the report, which stated that the ARPANET had: 
“ ‘... been handled in a rather informal fashion with a great deal of 
autonomy and an indefinite division of responsibilities among the 
organizations that address the various elements of this function’. The 
report continued: ‘Personal contacts, telephone conversations, and 
understandings are relied upon for day to day operation. This 
environment is a natural outcome of the progressive R&D atmosphere 
that was necessary for the development and implementation of the 
network concept.’” 
 
This trust-based approach, valuing the autonomy and expertise of the scientists 
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involved, and the layering approach together have had a significant impact on the 
way in which the ARPANET and, subsequently, the Internet has evolved.  
For instance, it made it possible for the participants to incorporate their own 
values into the design of the network. Some found it important that the network 
ensured a quick response as if one was interacting with a local device and not with a 
computer on the other side of the country. Others, such as Kleinrock, insisted that 
there would be measurement software installed to monitor the performance of the 
network (Abbate 1999: 56). Although there were clear conflicts of interest between 
the participants, the “dominant paradigm remained one of collaboration” (idem: 72).  
 
After the connection between the first four nodes had been established in 1969, the 
ARPANET project subsequently focused on the linking of other networks. The 
‘internetworking’ project led by Vincent Cerf and Robert Kahn took off in the 1970s 
(Naughton 2012: 45). Together with their colleagues coming from both academia and 
government, they wrote the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP), often simply referred to as the Internet protocol: a universal language for 
computer networks.  
“It would allow applications to run over an internetwork while hiding the 
differences between network protocols by using a uniform internetwork 
protocol” (Kleinrock 2010: 34).  
All kinds of devices and networks –from personal computers to the network of 
governmental departments- would be able to connect and share information. The 
challenge of connecting all these different devices –even taking into account the 
possibility of connecting devices that still had to be invented!- directed the founders 
to develop an internet that was open, minimalist, and neutral between applications 
(Goldsmith and Wu 2008: 23).  
The Internet design is open because it accepts almost any device that wants to 
join. It is minimalist because the requirements to join are low. No internal changes to 
the network have to be made in order to connect. Basically, if a device or network can 
run the Internet protocol it can join. The internet is neutral between applications 
because it does not matter whether one wants to send e-mail, movies, or any other 
kind of application through the network, all will be treated alike. 
On January 1 1983, the ARPANET made the transition to TCP/IP. This 
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changeover was carefully prepared and went very smoothly, resulting in a 
distribution of buttons saying “I survived the TCP/IP transition” (Leiner et al. 2009: 
7). Moreover, the transition to TCP/IP enabled the ARPANET to be split into a 
“MILNET supporting operational requirements and an ARPANET supporting 
research needs” (idem). 
All in all, this transition marks the start of the Internet as we know it 
(Naughton 2012: 45). Within a couple of years after the transition, the Internet was a 
widely used technological system for researchers and developers and, moreover, it 
started to become used for computer communications by other communities as well 
(Leiner et al. 2009: 8). 
 
4.1.1  The World Wide Web 
It was then Tim Berners-Lee, who came up with what later turned out to be the most 
successful application of the Internet, the World Wide Web, entered the stage. 
Berners-Lee was triggered by the problem of sharing and creating multimedia 
content. Up until then, it was only possible to share texts, however, the rise of 
personal computers, which were largely image-oriented, brought along the question 
of sharing data other than merely texts.  
Again, a trust-based working environment facilitated Tim Berners-Lee’s 
invention. He worked at CERN, the European high-energy physics laboratory in 
Geneva. That one of the most important Internet applications ever has been 
developed at this institute that actually focuses on physics rather than on computer 
science has everything to do with the freedom given to Berners-Lee and his team. It 
was not so much that CERN put a lot of support or means into the Web project, but 
they did not stopped it from growing either. His boss Mike Sendall wrote on the web 
project proposal “vague but exciting” and gave it the space to develop (Naughton 
2012: 53). It was this trust in the abilities and cleverness of the scientists which 
facilitated the rather quick development. Within a couple of months, Berners-Lee had 
a working version of the Web. Three criteria lay at the foundation of the documenting 
system Berners-Lee developed (idem: 52).  
First, the system should be decentralized. “In Berners-Lee’s vision, the Web 
would create ‘a pool of human knowledge’ that would be easy to access” (Abbate 
1999: 215). Just as the ARPANET of his colleagues at ARPA, the system should 
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accommodate diverse computer technologies. Berners-Lee built his new application 
on top of the TCP/IP protocol, which also ran on the computer systems of CERN. 
Together with his team, he designed the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) to enable 
the transfer of information between Web browsers and Web servers. 
Second, central to the system was the idea of hypertext. Hypertext basically 
means that documents must be able to hold internal links to other documents. With 
hypertext it is no longer necessary to present information in a linear way. This idea of 
hypertext was central to the hacker counterculture of the 1960s and 70s. Berners-Lee 
added to this idea of hypertext the use of multimedia, in order to build a ‘world wide 
web’ of information (Abbate 1999: 214).  
The third design requirement was that it would have to become possible for 
this system to link and connect documents across the worldwide Internet. This global 
aspect of Berners-Lee’s system made it particularly important to also develop a 
uniform way of identifying the information one wanted to access. He therefore 
created the Uniform Resource Locator (URL), which is a standard address format to 
specify both the type of application protocol and the address of the computer that has 
the requested information (idem: 215). Important to note is that, again in line with 
the design philosophy of the ARPANET, the URL could refer to a variety of protocols, 
not just HTTP. As a consequence, it became possible not only to refer to existing 
content residing on older Internet services, but also to enable connections to content 
running on new protocols. 
On August 1st, 1991, Berners-Lee and his team released all their info 
concerning the World Wide Web onto the Internet and subsequently in 1993, they 
made sure that CERN provided a certification that the computer technology and 
program code was in the public domain, for anyone to use, alter, and improve. As 
Lessig (2001) pointed out, openness of code is an important feature to keep a 
platform neutral. It enables tinkering and makes sure that “users are not held 
hostage” (idem: 54). Just as the decentralized design of the Internet itself reflected 
trust in the users to find their own solutions, so does open code. All in all,  
“[a]n open code platform keeps a platform honest. And honest, neutral 
platforms build trust in developers” (Lessig 2001: 54).  
 
95 
 
It was the Web which made the Internet popular, supported by on the one hand the 
wide-spread access to the internet –provided by privatization- and on the other by 
the technical means for individual users to run the web software –provided by 
personal computers (Abbate 1999: 215). 
“[The Web] solidified the Internet’s traditions of decentralization, open 
architecture, and active user participation, putting in place a radically 
decentralized system of information sharing... The Web’s exciting 
multimedia format and the seemingly endless stream of new features 
offered by entrepreneurial companies put the Web at the center of public 
attention in the late 1990s. By which time ‘the Internet’ and ‘the Web’ had 
become synonymous to many people” (Abbate 1999: 217-218). 
 
 
4.2  The Internet as a layered infrastructure 
The layered design approach of the scientists involved in developing the ARPANET –
which eventually evolved into the Internet- turned out to be influential beyond its 
own domain. In the following section, I will briefly describe the layered and 
decentralized design of the Internet and look into the way in which this particular set-
up has an important impact on the way in which the Internet is being conceptualized 
in other research domains. Moreover, I will give a concise overview of some 
influential adaptations of the layered model and take into account some of its weak 
spots. I will show how these layered models have also served as a point of reference 
for the development of my own conceptual lens consisting of the “4 Cs”: context, 
construction, codification, and curation.  
 
The multi-layered construction of the Internet has found its way in a wide range of 
academic disciplines which focus on the Internet, such as the philosophy of 
technology, law and ICT, Internet Governance Studies, etc.,... (for an overview see: 
Broeders 2014: 18). Depending on the research focus, the number of layers and level 
of detail in the analysis of the layers may differ and vary. However, most scholars 
agree that the Internet has a physical layer (idem). Sea cables, servers, and modems 
are all necessary, physical components for the basic existence of the Internet (for an 
analysis of this physical layer of the internet see: Blum 2012). Next to this physical 
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layer (infrastructure), at least two more layers have to be added: the layer of 
transport and operations (software code) and the layer of application services 
(content) (van Dijk 2012: 51). These three layers are central to all computer networks. 
Subsequently, these three basic layers can be subdivided in seven more-detailed 
layers, following the Open System Interconnection Model, which most network 
engineers refer to as the OSI Reference Model (See Table 1).  
The OSI model is the standard model for conceptualizing computer networks. 
It describes how “…different applications and protocols interact on network-aware 
devices” (Briscoe 2000: 13). When a message from an application running on device 
A has to be sent to an application running on device B, this message has to descend 
from the application layer, all the way down to the physical layer and go up again to 
be delivered to the receiving application. The application layer, where the process 
starts, is the only part of the process a user actually sees and it in fact is only a small 
portion of what the application does to prepare the message before it can be sent over 
the network (Gralla 2007).  
The Internet is, partly thanks to the work of Leonard Kleinrock, a ‘packet-
switched network’. On the Internet, there is no straight, unbroken connection 
between the sender and the receiver, in contrast to, for example, a traditional 
telephone line, which is dedicated to just one contact after a connection has been 
made. “ [I]nstead, when information is sent, it is broken into small packets, sent over 
many different routes at the same time, and then reassembled at the receiving end” 
(Gralla 2007: 13). 
The TCP/IP protocol, the universal language for computer networks, which is 
central to the functioning of the Internet, can also be found in the OSI Model, on 
layer four and three respectively. Essentially, the function of TCP is to break up 
“every piece of information and message into pieces called packets, deliver those 
packets to the proper destinations, and then reassemble the packets into their 
original form”, where IP “is responsible for ensuring the packets are sent to the right 
destination” (Gralla 2007: 19).  
At the physical layer, the packets are encoded into the medium that will carry 
them and that sends the package to that medium. Finally, at the receiving node, “the 
layered process that sent the message on its way is reversed” (Gralla 2007: 15). 
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Table 1 Seven technical O.S.I. network layers enabling network use (adapted from 
van Dijk 2012: 52) 
 
 
Nature Network Layer Function 
Content 7. Application Enables the use of the content of 
applications (telephone 
conversation, Internet exchange, 
broadcasting, etc.) determining the 
identity and availability of 
communication partners and 
synchronizing communication 
Software code 6. Presentation Formats and encrypts data of 
applications using a different data 
language in order to be readable 
across networks. 
 5. Session Controls sessions (‘dialogues’) 
between different computers or 
hosts. 
 4. Transport Reliable transmission of data 
between end-users. Control of data 
streams.  
E.g. TCP (Transmission Control 
Protocol). 
 3. Network Path determination and addressing 
of data (packages) between 
different networks.  
E.g. Internet Protocol (IP4, IP6, 
IPsec). 
Infrastructure 2. Data link Physical addressing between 
multiple devices and a transmission 
medium. 
 1. Physical Electrical and physical 
specifications for devices and for 
the connection between devices 
and transmission media. 
 
 
 
As the OSI Model is the standard way of conceptualizing computer networks, it 
became -often in a slimmed-down tripartite form of physical infrastructure, code, 
and content- the starting point for other conceptualizations of the Internet. Because 
the OSI Model and other derived conceptualizations primarily focus on what happens 
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behind the interface, scholars in the broad domain of social sciences interested in the 
interactions of actors with and on the Internet have added different layers to this 
model, making it more fitting for their research.  
For example, Deibert et al. (2012b) in their study on cyber warfare in the 2008 
Russia-Georgia War, differentiate between cyberspace and Internet. In line with the 
current definition of the US Department of Defence, they define cyberspace as:  
“a global domain within the information environment consisting of the 
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, 
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, 
and embedded processors and controllers” (Deibert et al. 2012b: 5).  
Two aspects are important: first, this definition confirms the close connection 
between the physical and informational domain. Second, it presents cyberspace as 
the covering realm of all information structures, including but not limited to the 
Internet. Next to the physical infrastructure level and the code level, which we know 
from the OSI model, they have added two other levels: the regulatory level and the 
level of ideas. The regulatory level includes the norms, rules, laws and principles, 
which govern cyberspace. The level of ideas is the sphere “through which videos, 
images, sounds, and text circulate”. In the context of cyber warfare, Deibert et al 
(2012b: 6) refer to the standing practice of governments to “generate information 
effects” on this level. But more generally one could say that in the interaction between 
users and content, all sorts of new, meaningful information can emerge. The level of 
ideas, therefore, is not restricted to the domain of cyber warfare.  
DeNardis (2012) takes the technical infrastructure of the Internet as her 
starting point for analysing how Internet governance is not just about maintaining 
the technical backbone of the Internet but also revolves around arrangements of 
power. Though the “complex technical architecture beneath the layer of applications 
and content” may be out of view for the average user, its “design and administration 
internalize the political and economic values that ultimately influence the extent of 
online freedom and innovation” (Denardis 2012: 721). By looking further than the 
visible layers of the Internet, Denardis uncovers the power struggles taking place on 
the technical layers below and to analyse how they have an impact on the Internet 
experience of the average user. 
And finally, Schermer and Lodder (2014: 3-6) not only present a layered 
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conceptualization of the Internet as a communication system
23
 but also develop a 
layered perspective on the services that are offered through the Internet. They show 
how actors on different levels are involved in governing and facilitating the Internet.  
 
4.2.1 Critique 
It has to be noted that there has also been some critique on the use of the OSI Model 
and related technical models to analyse the Internet. For example, Jonathan Zittrain 
(2008) convincingly argues that an analysis of the Internet which primarily focuses 
on the literal network itself does not sufficiently take into account the effect of the 
endpoints–this can be a laptop, smartphone, tablet or any other internet-based 
device- and, consequently, on the experience of the users. As we will see in the next 
chapter, the way in which endpoints or applications are designed –as open or 
closed/tethered devices- may even fundamentally shape the organization of the 
network itself. It has to be stressed that the endpoints are not included in the OSI 
Model. Although Zittrain (2008: 8) does not deny that an analysis of the network 
itself is important, a too stringent focus on the network may obscure “the reality that 
people’s experiences with the Internet are shaped at least as much by the devices they 
use to access it”24.  
 
In a fashion similar to the scholars above and taking into account the critique of 
Zittrain, the conceptualization of the Internet in this book is based on a layered 
approach. Instead of perceiving the Internet as a homogeneous system and 
consequently missing out on the different actors (material, individual, and 
organizational alike), it focuses on four levels of the Internet, in order to take into 
account those aspects of the Internet which dominantly influence the formation of 
 
                                                   
23
 Schermer and Lodder make use of the TCP/IP model as described in the RFC1122, which is related 
to the OSI model. However, the former model focuses more than the OSI model on the transport layer. 
The transport level roughly corresponds with layer 4 of the OSI model. 
24
 Preceding the next chapter, Zittrain’s emphasis on the importance of including in the analysis the 
devices which are used to access the Internet is in line with the focus of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) and the current Philosophy of Technology on the role of artefacts in the way users 
interact in and perceive the online world. 
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trust. As already presented earlier in this book, I conveniently called them ‘the 4 Cs’: 
construction, context, curation, and codification. It becomes clear now that some of 
these levels overlap with some of the levels or layers as described and used by other 
scholars.  
For example, the regulatory level as articulated by Deibert shows some 
resemblance with the level of codification as they both refer to the norms, laws, and 
regulations steering the Internet and interaction online. The level of curation is more 
or less in line with Denardis’ idea of arrangements of power because both take into 
account the influence of different stakeholders in cyberspace.  
However, in some aspects, levels also differ. For example, in this chapter, 
which focuses on the Internet as a system, construction chiefly refers to the layered 
design of the Internet as described above. However, in the next chapter that revolves 
around the user’s experience of the Internet through smart artefacts, the focus will 
shift to the micro-level. Then, I will mostly take into account the design of the 
artefacts themselves.  
By focussing on this micro-level in the next chapter, taking into account the 
phenomenological experience of users or, to put it differently, the context in which 
the interaction with and through their devices takes place, a new layer is being added 
to the conceptual models described above. By including context as one of the 
important cornerstones of the conceptualization of the Internet and taking into 
account the construction of the smart devices and services mediating these 
interactions, Zittrain’s objections that the individual experience of the Internet is too 
important to be left out of the analysis are met. 
 
All in all, looking at the way in which the Internet as a technical infrastructure has 
been built, trust turned out to be one of its key characteristics. In its early days, the 
Internet was a familiar world. The trust-based collaboration of the developers of the 
Internet is reflected in the design of the system itself. The open and decentralized 
architecture of the Internet expresses confidence in the ability of users to solve 
problems and innovate. Moreover, it is an acknowledgement of the unexpected, of 
the creativity inherent in human life. The founding fathers of the Internet knew that 
they could not know what the possible purposes of the Internet would be. Therefore, 
instead of aiming at control, they chose trust as their dominant strategy to deal with 
complexity. As a result, they ensured the freedom to create and innovate (also see 
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Lessig 2001).  
 
 
4.3 A new online reality 
As a way of ending this chapter and simultaneously introducing the following one, we 
will recapture the evolution of the Internet, focussing now on how the dominant 
Internet ideologies have changed over the years and how the Internet itself has lost 
some of its innocence along the way.  
Where the early Internet (phase of the Open Commons 1960-2000) was 
grounded on trust and the design was set up in an open and decentralized manner 
bringing forth a familiar world, this strategy for handling the complexity 
accompanying the Internet increasingly became contested with the 
commercialization of the Internet in the 1990s (Deibert et al. 2012a).  
Instigated by the widespread use of personal computers, the Internet entered 
the home and opened up a new space for governments, citizens, companies, and 
customers all over the world. New companies and services found their way online and 
also governments entered the scene. Although the latter were rather late to catch up 
on the important developments that were taking place online, from 2000 on, 
governments regained their place and asserted a more dominant position in 
cyberspace (also see: van Eeten and Mueller 2013: 722)
25
.  
This interplay of new actors online brought forth three fundamental changes 
to the early Internet that have had a major impact on the current establishment of 
trust online and the idea of the Internet as a familiar world.  
First, the initial tech community no longer is in charge of the Internet 
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 Security-expert Bruce Schneier (in Gasser et al. 2013: 11) suggests that this delayed picking up of the 
Internet by the government is related to the functioning of technology in general. He claims 
“technology magnifies power in general, but the rates of adoption are different.” Those who are not 
organized and distributed (early-adapters, geeks, hackers, criminals, etc.) can make use of new 
technologies faster. However, when institutionalized powers come to grips with the new technology, 
they can make use of it more effectively and, therefore, establish and even expand their influence 
through the new medium. To put it differently, it takes more time for states to adapt to new 
technologies, but when they succeed, their initial position of power is consolidated or even increased. 
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infrastructure. It is now up to a heterogeneous group of actors –states, companies, 
NGOs, civil society- to work together and maintain the Internet as a familiar world, a 
background against which trustworthy action can develop.  
Second, these actors not only maintain the Internet, they also steer and mould 
it to cater their own needs. Looking after their own interests may conflict with their 
function to ensure the familiarity and stability of the infrastructure of the Internet. 
Third, online information intermediaries such as Google and Facebook 
increasingly mediate the online experience of users. This mediation pre-sorts the 
actions and interactions of users in ways opaque for the users. The role of these 
intermediaries will be addressed in more depth in the next chapter. 
These three key changes have a fundamental impact on the way in which the 
Internet currently functions as a familiar world and on the way in which users 
experience the Internet and build trust (context level).  
Where in the initial stage of the Open Commons, interpersonal trust was the 
fundament for building and interacting online, in the subsequent stages of increasing 
commercialisation and regulation the open character and trust-based interactions 
become more and more pressured. How this shift from an open to a controlled 
Internet influences the experience and actions of Internet users (context level) will be 
the focal point of the next chapter. 
 
4.3.1 The phase of the open commons 
As we saw in section 4.1, the designers of the ARPANET and later the Internet, 
collaborated on a personal, rather informal basis. There was no detailed plan laid out 
and they tackled problems as they came. If there would be no consensus on how to 
solve a problem or on which direction to take, they mostly just discussed the issue up 
until one of them was able to convince most of the other parties involved. In the 
words of one of the designers of the early Internet, Dave Clark: “We reject: kings, 
presidents, and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running code” 
(Goldsmith and Wu 2008: 24). This open way of working had as a consequence that 
the designers were able to translate their own values into the design. In other words, 
the design of the Internet reflected their motives. The legal scholar, Jonathan Zittrain 
(2008: 28) noted that the creators of the Internet: 
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 “...had little concern for controlling the network or its users’ behavior. 
The network’s design was publicly available and freely shared from the 
earliest moments of its development. [....] Energy spent running the 
network was seen as a burden rather than a boon. Keeping options open 
for later network use and growth was seen as sensible, and abuse of the 
network by those joining it without an explicit approval process was of 
little worry since the people using it were the very people designing it.” 
This design approach presupposes two fundamental assumptions, which Zittrain 
(2008: 31) refers to as the procrastination principle and the trust-your-neighbour 
approach. The former refers to the belief that other users can address most problems 
occurring in a network. In other words, the designers did not aim at foreseeing and 
fixing all the problems that might occur when using the network. This would 
presuppose a vast amount of control which not only would cost them a lot of time and 
money, it would, even more importantly, conflict with their aim of developing an 
open network to which artefacts, not yet even invented, could connect without a great 
deal of effort. After all, too much control would hinder innovation and the generative 
quality of the network itself. They therefore trusted that other users could come up 
with working solutions as well. Consequently, the robustness of the network partly 
depended on the actors using the network.  
This brings us to the latter assumption, the trust-your-neighbour approach, 
which refers to the belief that the users were competent enough and with good 
intentions not to deliberately hinder the functioning of the network. Trust between 
the developers as well as trust in and between the other users, all belonging to the 
same tech community, was essential to the functioning of the Internet in its early 
days. 
From a trust perspective we can say that the designers chose trust over control 
as the dominant strategy to deal with complexity online. They had no intention to 
monitor exactly what the users online were doing or what kind of content travelled 
over the network. Striving for simplicity, by no means easy to attain, allowed them to 
prioritize connectivity over security. Instead of installing a variety of safety measures 
that would probably strengthen the security of the network but also conflict with their 
aim to create an open network, the designers chose to let the safety issues be taken 
care of at the end points, so on the level of the users, and not in the network itself. 
Building their network on trust made it possible to really focus on the functionality of 
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it. It allowed them to develop a network that was open to anyone who wanted to join 
and any device that wanted to connect, to treat all data in the same manner and to be 
sent from anyone to anyone (Zittrain 2008: 32).  
 
Goldsmith and Wu (2008) in their explanation of the Internet design made a 
connection to the zeitgeist of the 1960s and 1970s. Although the creators of the 
Internet were not explicitly engaged in political activism, their design did reflect the 
growing belief that there could be governance “liberated from national or physical 
identity” (idem: 16). Goldsmith and Wu (2008: 23) found that the designers “built 
strains of American libertarianism, and even 1960s idealism, into this universal 
language of the Internet.” They developed a global network, which reflected distrust 
for “centralized control” (idem). Consequently, the Internet is probably the first 
information-related innovation that resulted in a technology almost everybody can 
access, making use of a multitude of devices on a neutral net (Zittrain 2008; Wu 
2011). All in all, there was the general conviction that the arrival of the Internet would 
enable a shift from national, governmental power to a more bottom-up, self-
regulating domain –often referred to as “cyberspace”- standing apart from the 
physical world, which was also called “meatspace”.  
 
When at the end of the 1980s and even more in the first part of the 1990s the Internet 
increasingly became populated by individual users (users not aligned with a research 
or governmental defence organisation), these values of openness, decentralization, 
and self-regulation put into the system by the creators, still remained the basic 
assumptions for interaction online. Deibert et al (2012a) refer to this phase as “The 
Open Commons”26 27 by which they emphasize the separate status of the Internet as a 
domain where people were able to govern themselves. The Internet was addressed as 
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 For Deibert et al (2012) the Open Commons phase starts already in the 1960s and ends in 2000. 
They do not make a distinction between the early design phases where ARPA was developed and 
subsequently the phase where the Internet became known and used also by non-academic actors. 
Because the values central to the Open Commons perspective are by and large in line and, even more 
so, depending on the values of the designers of the Internet, it is for the purpose of this chapter not 
necessary to make a strict distinction on the matter.  
27
 The Open Commons is also referred to as the Digital Commons or the Open Internet Perspective. 
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a “fresh start” for democracy, free from traditional governmental intrusion. The 
possibility for collective action was valued as its main democratizing force. By making 
use of blogs, online communities, and cheap technologies, it became possible to 
support a real global civil society. The Internet was a place where people could 
experiment with their identity (Turkle 1984), find like-minded people (Rheingold 
1993), and hope to form the “first truly liberated communities in human history” 
(Goldsmith and Wu 2008: 16). It was also the time that Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) started off, probably up until today one of the most influential 
Internet NGOs. This non-profit organization, founded in 1990, sees its goal as to 
defend civil liberties in the digital world, such as free speech online, user privacy and 
innovation. It defends the values held dear by the designers of the Internet and its 
early-adopters. John Perry Barlow (1996), one of the founders of the EFF, posted his 
“Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” online in which he declared: 
“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, 
I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I 
ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You 
have no sovereignty where we gather. [...] 
 
You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use 
this claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these problems 
don't exist. Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will 
identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own 
Social Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of 
our world, not yours. Our world is different. 
Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, 
arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a 
world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies 
live. 
We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice 
accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth. 
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her 
beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence 
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 or conformity. [...] ” 
Looking at the Declaration, it appears that there was a utopian belief that in 
cyberspace it would be possible to interact without a top-down government imposing 
rules and regulations. Instead, the inhabitants of cyberspace would, from the bottom-
up, built their own society, solve their own issues and install –if at all necessary - 
their own rules and regulations. The trust-based approach the designers of the 
Internet had chosen for their collaboration and which consequently allowed for the 
open design of the network, was seemingly adopted by most members of the online 
community.  
Where in the previous chapter, we analysed the arrival of system trust or 
confidence in late modernity, enabling people to interact with abstract systems and 
strangers, in the open commons phase of the Internet, the dominant view is that 
cyberspace is grounded on interpersonal trust. This belief in a self-regulating 
cyberspace presupposes a return to the local, pre-nation state ideal where interaction 
is dominantly based on interpersonal fundaments such as reputation, shared norms 
and values, third party trust, and strong ties. It is revealing that probably the largest 
technological system of our time brings along the existential longing for a pre-
modern manner of interaction and society building. Botsman and Rogers
28
 (2010: 
xiii-xiv), two contemporary advocates of the ‘online commons’ formulate it as 
follows: 
 “Online exchanges mimic the close ties once formed through face-to-face 
exchanges in villages, but on a much larger and unconfined scale. In other 
words, technology is reinventing old forms of trust”. 
In chapter seven, on the role of trust on the platform Airbnb, I will argue that this 
belief turns out to be mistakenly utopian nowadays. Although interpersonal trust, 
beyond any doubt, is still an important strategy to reduce complexity in the online 
environment, it is also fundamentally mediated. The technology itself, but also key 
actors involved such as the company Airbnb and different regulators, have an impact 
on the way in which trust is being established. Interpersonal trust online is not just 
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 Also see chapter 7. 
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about you and me (context), but about you, me and the other three Cs involved (code, 
curation, and codification). 
 
4.3.2 Denied, controlled, contested
29
 
The open commons perspective is definitely still an important and influential 
normative perspective. Key authors, such as Tapscott (2006), Chesbrough (2006), 
Benkler (2006, 2011), and Bauwens (2012) write extensively on collective action, 
online community building, open innovation, and the digital commons
30
. Also on a 
micro-level, concepts underpinning the open commons perspective are still 
dominant. The average user experiences online interactions as being merely 
facilitated and not presorted by the technology involved. The Internet, as for example 
the movement of collaborative consumption proclaims, enables users to gather and 
collaborate on interpersonal grounds without being steered by governments or 
companies.  
However, although the open commons perspective is still alive and kicking as a 
normative perspective, as a descriptive perspective of how the Internet –including all 
the layers behind the visible application layer- functions, it has lost its strength 
(Deibert et al. 2012a). The arrival of major actors such as governments, companies, 
and non-profit organisations has fundamentally changed the character of the 
Internet. The initial idea of the founders of the Internet, that self-regulation and trust 
in the users of the network would be sufficient to develop a robust Internet, had to 
make way for a balancing act of different state and non state-actors that are 
governing the Internet, which has been referred to as the multi-stakeholder model 
(also see: Schermer and Lodder 2014: 16). International institutions, government 
agencies, and governments, but also ISPs, search engines, social media platforms, 
and web hosting companies all regulate a substantial part of the Internet. An often-
cited definition of this Internet governance, coming from the report of the Working 
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 Deibert et al (2012) make a stricter distinction between the phases of Access Denied, Access 
Controlled, and Access Contested. 
30
 In chapter 7, we will focus on trust in the domain of Collaborative Consumption, a new way of doing 
business, facilitated by the Internet. Collaborative Consumption can be seen as a practical application 
of the Open Commons. 
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Group (2005: 4) on Internet Governance states: 
“Internet governance is the development and application by governments, 
the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared 
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes 
that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.” 
Instead of the initial, rather homogeneous tech community who developed the 
Internet, now all these different curators have become responsible for developing 
standards, protocols, and Internet policy, maintaining a stable Internet environment 
(for an overview of the actors in internet governance also see: van Eeten and Mueller 
2013; Mueller 2010; Simonelis 2005). To function as a trustworthy technology, the 
Internet has to have a ‘taken-for-granted’ character to its users.  
For example, the Internet should not transform from a packet-switched 
network to a centralized network overnight, nor should users suddenly have to type 
all the digits of the IP address in order to go to a website. Such uncertainties could 
have devastating consequences for the overall confidence people have in the 
functioning of the Internet (or in the Web, for that matter). If users had to decide 
every time they use an online service or make use of an application on their 
smartphone, whether or not to trust the underpinning infrastructure of the Internet, 
the costs would simply become too high. People would be overwhelmed by the 
uncertainty of such a complex and unstable environment and probably reject it as a 
valuable means of interaction. For trust to take place on the interpersonal level –or 
between a user and an organisation-, the environment, whether or not online, should 
be familiar first, that is, stable and predictable.  
In general, the Internet user is not consciously aware of the presence or 
functioning of these stakeholders. It is often only when the Internet connection is 
down that a user thinks of the Internet Service Provider. Or only when one needs 
more space for a personal website, the webhosting company comes into mind.   
The so-called content intermediaries (Denardis 2014: 153-172) however, are 
the exception to the rule. They offer the platforms where users can share their photos 
(Instagram), post messages (Twitter), interact with friends (Facebook) and upload 
and watch movies (YouTube). In general, users are more personally involved with 
these companies than they are with their ISP or web-hosting company. Everyone 
recognizes the typical white webpage with the search bar in the middle as being the 
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start page of Google. And the bluish “thumbs up” of Facebook is hard to avoid when 
going online. We know how these companies look like and we use their services on a 
daily basis. All large content intermediaries (Google, Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, 
etc.) are in the top ten of most-visited websites. Google heads this list with 1, 100 000 
000 unique visitors a month
31
. 
Although these content intermediaries, just like the other technical actors 
working in the background, contribute to a familiar world online, they do this on a 
different level. Where ISPs and hosting companies mostly add to the accessibility and 
technical stability of the familiar world, the platforms, on the other hand, mediate 
our experience of the familiar world online. The way information intermediaries 
choose to design their interfaces and enable functionalities, co-shape the actions and 
interactions of users online. This will be the focal point of the next chapter. 
 
It is not in the scope of this book to judge the sustainability or the success of this 
stakeholder model. Where these Internet governance actors succeed to develop 
protocols and procedures, ensuring the stable functioning of the Internet 
infrastructure, they contribute to the familiar world online, a necessary condition for 
trust to be established.  
The way these actors govern the Internet partially moulds the online 
environment in which trust is being established and influences the way users put 
trust in the Internet as such. In other words, to understand how trust is developed 
between users online, between users and companies online, and between users and 
governments online, one has to take into account how these actors shape the familiar 
world of the Internet. In line with political philosopher Langdon Winner’s (1980)32 
“artefacts have politics”, we can say that there is a politics of the Internet as well. 
These actors –although out of sight for the average user- have become active players 
in the Internet environment. Or as DeNardis (2014: 7) puts it:  
“The complex institutional and technical scaffolding of Internet 
Governance is somewhat behind the scenes and not visible to users in the 
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 http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/most-popular-websites, accessed on Sept 22 2014.  
32
 The ideas of Langdon Winner will be discussed more in depth in the following chapter. 
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same way applications and content are visible. Although these 
technologies lie beneath content, they nevertheless instantiate political 
and cultural tensions… Bringing infrastructures of Internet to the 
foreground reveals the politics of this architecture”.  
For most stakeholders their role online does not end with the governance of the 
Internet. These different actors, besides their task to maintain the Internet 
infrastructure, also make use of the Internet to pursue their own interests, which 
certainly does not always neatly align with their responsibility for a stable Internet 
environment and, therefore, may even put the familiarity of the online world in 
jeopardy.  
Increasingly, a shift from “governance of the internet to governance using the 
internet” (Broeders 2015: 4) occurs which has an impact on the Internet’s functioning 
as a familiar world. These curators not only maintain the Internet but also steer it in 
certain directions, based on their political or business motives and ideologies. Their 
choices bear values and are influenced by economic and political forces. They are 
crucial for the way the Internet develops and hence for the way trust is established in 
and through Internet technology.  
The 2009 revolution in Iran, often referred to as the Twitter Revolution due to 
the use and coverage of the events through Twitter, is a prime example thereof. 
Where at first, it seemed that Twitter and other information intermediaries chiefly 
played an important role in organizing the resistance against President Ahmadinejad, 
these intermediaries turned out to be also excellent tools in the hands of the Iranian 
authorities to search and find the activists and, in their view, enemies of the state 
(Morozov 2011: 1-5).  
Another example: March 2014, with the elections around the corner, the 
Turkish government simply blocked Twitter, and shortly after wiretapped recordings, 
damaging the government’s reputation, were leaked on the medium. Amnesty 
International condemned this action as: “a blunt attack on Turkey’s citizens’ right to 
share and receive information”33. Previous to the blocking of Twitter, Erdogan was 
clear on the matter:  
 
                                                   
33
 https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/03/turkey-pre-election-twitter-shutdown-brings-
internet-freedom-new-low/. Accessed 15 May 2015. 
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“We are determined on the issue, regardless of what the world may say”… 
“We won't allow the people to be devoured by YouTube, Facebook or 
others. Whatever steps need to be taken we will take them without 
wavering” (quoted in Rawlinson 2014). 
What these two examples illustrate is that while the average user may experience the 
Internet as an open and neutral infrastructure, it actually is being strictly monitored 
and controlled.  
 
In his book Black Code: Surveillance, privacy, and the dark side of the internet, 
Deibert (2013) points out how we all increasingly rely on technology of which we 
actually know little about. That is where the “black” in the title of the book stands for. 
It refers to “that which is hidden, obscured from the view of the average user” (idem: 
6).  
 Deibert shows that not only are cybercrime manoeuvres beyond the average 
user’s awareness, but also private companies and governments operate under the 
radar. In the name of security and effectiveness the latter increasingly aim and 
succeed at controlling citizens, while steering clear of democratic control. The 
Snowden revelations on the functioning of the National Security Agency (NSA) in 
2013 demonstrated that the modus operandi of this American governmental agency 
is on bad terms with the core aspects of the rule of law. The law, for example, does not 
seem to restrain government officials working for government agencies like the NSA 
to ensure that values like freedom and autonomy central to a democratic state are 
safeguarded. Sufficient control on the functioning of such security agencies is lacking. 
It becomes difficult to speak of a liberal democracy when it is permitted to 
“indiscriminately listen in on, watch, or otherwise collect everything we do and say 
online” (Deibert 2013: xiv).  
Moreover, governments do not operate alone; often they delegate their 
surveillance activities to the information intermediaries. Google, Twitter, Facebook, 
Apple, Microsoft and others have all been pressured to block or remove content. A 
vast amount of these government requests are not accompanied by a court order and 
the receiving companies are generally not allowed to go into details about it, again 
side-stepping the checks and balances central to the rule of law.  
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It has to be noted that measures taken by governments and information 
intermediaries to control the online world can stem from the best intentions. A 
controlled environment is often also a more secure environment. One could therefore 
advocate that controlling the Internet and intervening online makes this online world 
more predictable, therefore, less complex. As a result, it might even become easier for 
the average user to establish trust, even when this means that the initial idea of the 
founders of the Internet that the infrastructure should remain open and neutral has 
to be abandoned. 
However, one has to remember that for trust to thrive a delicate balance needs 
to be established between a stable and predictable environment on the one hand and 
an environment which allows for freedom to act and developing new thoughts and 
initiatives on the other. If we have 100% security –which is unlikely ever to happen, 
but perhaps 80% is just as significant- trust will become redundant, as we would 
know how things would end up. Insecurity must be brought back to a bearable level 
in order for trust to be established, but when this leads to a world that is not just 
familiar but completely ruled and controlled, trust loses its meaning (see chapter 8). 
Also Nissenbaum (2004) warns against the seemingly self-evident move to 
strive for more security as it may endanger trust and the worthwhile practices it 
facilitates. Nissenbaum discerns three security mechanisms: access control, 
transparency of identity, and surveillance.  
The first refers to passwords, firewalls, and other measures to ensure that only 
those actors who are allowed to enter –clients, citizens, members-, do enter and those 
who are not allowed –hackers, spies, criminals- are blocked.  
The second mechanism is about making actors more identifiable. Where in the 
early days of the Internet, if you were technically able to connect you could go online, 
nowadays it has become increasingly necessary to give at least some of your 
credentials in order to go online or make use of a service. Even if a user does not 
willingly provide personal data, all sorts of cryptographic and profiling techniques are 
used to authenticate users. The basic idea is that if your identity is known you will 
think twice before acting malicious, as you can be held accountable for your deeds.  
The third mechanism is based on the idea that monitoring actions and 
behaviour online can prevent bad things from happening or at least could help to 
quickly and easily find the wrongdoers.  
Nissenbaum is clear on the fact that for specific actions online such as banking 
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or e-commerce, high security is necessary. However, this should not be a permit to 
strive for overall security in a way that it narrows down freedom, which is nurtured by 
trust to develop –amongst others- innovative, creative, or political practices. 
 
Preliminary to the next chapter, it is not only the way in which governments together 
with private companies are policing the Internet which is threatening the open 
character of the Internet, but also the way in which users in general access that 
Internet is increasingly becoming sorted. In 2010, Chris Anderson and Michael Wolff 
(2010) wrote the influential article “The Web is Dead. Long Live the Internet” in tech-
magazine Wired. In that article, they describe how users turn their back on the open 
World Wide Web –the Internet’s most important application- in exchange for sleeker, 
but also more controlled services providing us with personalized information, 
tailored to our needs, sometimes even before we have become aware of those needs
34
.  
People do not search for the latest news on the Web, they just open their 
personalized news app. They do not look for like-minded people on the Web, but go 
directly to the walled garden called Facebook. And even when Internet users do end 
up on the World Wide Web, the top 10 Web sites account for the vast majority of 
pageviews.
35
 Moreover, while users are under the impression that they are 
anonymously surfing the Web and that nobody is really interested in their online 
activities (Benoist 2008: 168), almost 80% of the most frequently-visited websites 
use tracking technology to gather information on their visitors (Angwin 2010).  
On top of that, when entering the World Wide Web, almost all users make use 
of what Wu (2011) coined: “the master switch”, better known as Google. To find 
information and to connect with other people we dominantly make use of Google’s 
search engine. As a consequence, Google has a very important say in what we believe 
to be important information and what is not. Or as Wu (2011:281) puts it: “whatever 
shows up on the first page of a Google search is what matters in forming our sense of 
any reality; the rest doesn’t.”  
 
                                                   
34
 Chapter 8 on personalization will focus on the influence of online personalization on trust and the 
familiar world online. 
35
 According to Compete, a web analytics company, cited in Anderson and Wolff (2010) the top 10 Web 
sites accounted for 75 percent of the pageviews in 2010. 
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According to Anderson and Wolff (2010) this gradual transition from “the 
wide-open Web” to an Internet colonized by “semiclosed platforms” does not mean 
that users reject the idea of the Web, rather it is just that these semiclosed platforms 
work better. In addition, semiclosed platforms in general do not only perform better 
and are more secure, they are also more easily controlled and therefore more easily 
monetized. All in all, semiclosed platforms make an excellent basis for companies to 
develop their services and consequently they steer innovation in the direction of these 
platforms.  
 
The arrival of semiclosed platforms is closely related to the devices we use to access 
the Internet. For a long time, the personal computer was the one and only way to 
access the Internet. However, increasingly we make use of smartphones, 
smartwatches, tablets, and other devices to go online. These artefacts and more 
specifically their interfaces lead us to connect to the Internet in a different way than 
we were used to. Browsing the Internet on an iPhone is much less convenient than 
directly going to the designated app. Google maps on your phone is much more 
handy than on your desktop when trying to find your way back to the hotel. 
Moreover, artefacts increasingly are online even without our active intervention. The 
Internet of Things, which will be discussed more at length in the next chapter, 
represents the trend to connect all artefacts to the Internet, from refrigerators and 
cars to coffee machines. Through their connections these artefacts do not just remain 
updated, but when they are also so-called ‘smart’ they can learn from their 
interactions with users and pre-sort the interaction to cater the needs and wishes of 
their users. This is all fully automated.  
All in all, artefacts running on Internet technology are just as the earlier-
mentioned semiclosed platforms designed in a way that chooses control over 
openness. In his book The Future of the Internet and how to stop it, Zittrain (2008) 
warns for the advance of what he calls “tethered devices”, devices which bundle 
hardware and software and which are controlled by the companies that sell them. In 
contrast to the values of openness, creativity and trust in the users to come up with 
their own ideas and solutions, users are becoming more and more dependent on the 
companies from whom they buy their devices. These devices are already completely 
programmed, the company remotely updates them, and users cannot break them 
open without losing their guarantee.  
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Although users pay a lot for their iPhones and other devices, these artefacts 
never truly become theirs, because even after they have left the Apple Store or other 
retailer, the devices remain connected and under remote control of the 
manufacturers who have the power to change the workings of the device (see also 
Deibert 2013: 229). The freedom central to the early Internet has to make way for 
user-friendliness and fashionable designs. In the next chapter we will look deeper 
into this new ontology of Internet-mediated artefacts, but for now it is enough to see 
that the devices we use to connect to the Internet are not neutral artefacts but 
important physical points of control which may endanger the openness of the 
Internet. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
What all these studies on control on the Internet show, whether they focus on 
governments policing the Internet, companies involved in surveillance practices, or 
tethered devices enabling control over their users, is that the commons are not built 
in a vacuum but in an online environment in which free access to the online world 
becomes more and more contested (Deibert et al. 2012; Morozov 2011). The open 
commons perspective is no longer an adequate description of the state of the Internet 
today; rather, its principles became something in need of protection. In the words of 
Deibert et al. (2012a: 8): 
“The core elements of an open commons have now become the 
touchstones for a set of constitutive principles to be shored up and 
defended, as opposed to assumed away as invincible. Perhaps ironically, 
what were once assumed to be the immutable laws of a powerful 
technological environment are now potentially fragile species in a 
threatened ecosystem.” 
From a trust perspective, we can frame this shift to a controlled Internet as a familiar 
world coming under pressure. Trust can only flourish in a familiar world. A familiar 
world is the shared background of un-explicated norms and values against which we 
all interact. It consists of uncontested basic beliefs held by all actors, for example, 
that in general all actors perceive the world in a similar way and that they will act in 
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line with their social roles.  
Dominant actors governing the Internet -governments, companies, and NGOs- 
contribute to the familiar world online by providing stability through political, 
societal as well as technical measures. However, at the same time they also pursue 
their individual interests, striving for more control of the Internet and its users. This 
double-sidedness should be acknowledged as an important aspect of the analysis of 
trust mediated by Internet technologies.  
In this quest for more control, the curators of the Internet may destabilize the 
familiar world online. Interactions become sorted in a way users are not aware of nor 
have consented to, which –when they do find out- can have a devastating effect on 
the trust placed in the Internet as such, as well as in the actors who operate on the 
Internet.  
With the arrival of a variety of new actors online, all with their own –often 
conflicting- interests, the familiar world online is no longer a self-evident, stable 
background. This does not mean that on an interpersonal level people cannot 
cooperate based on trust, but that online trust can easily be shattered by external 
influences.  
 
This brings us to the core challenge of understanding and analysing trust mediated by 
Internet technologies. How to relate the power of the Internet to connect people and 
enable them to develop interactions based on interpersonal trust with the unstable 
familiar background shaped by the often conflicting interests of major players such as 
governments and companies? In other words, how do interpersonal trust and system 
trust come together in an environment mediated by Internet technologies? 
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5 
Trust in context: a theory of mediation.  
 
At the heart of this book lies my wonder about the ostensibly effortless way in which 
people interact online. They do not seem to doubt if the people they are interacting 
with are genuine nor do they seem to be bothered by the fact that the screen they are 
looking at and projecting themselves into is in fact an artificial world, consisting of 
bits and bytes. Even negative reports on the actions of governments and companies 
online do not really seem to hinder their online activity (yet)
36
. People using the 
Internet do not seem to be disturbed by the fact that an online interaction is a truly 
mediated interaction, enabled by networked and smart artefacts such as 
smartphones and tablets, steering and pre-sorting their experience. A paradox of 
trust seems to occur: although we are aware to a certain extent that there are risks 
when we make use of these artefacts, we act as if there are none.  
Where we normally are tempted to try to solve paradoxes, in the second 
chapter, revolving around the ontological question if and why trust is a necessary 
aspect of human life, we saw that this paradox in fact lays at the centre of the concept 
of trust itself. To trust is to act as if the future is certain, as if uncertainties do not 
matter for the outcome of our interaction. It is the function of trust to enable us to act 
despite our uncertainty about the future and the way in which others might act. Trust 
is not about resolving uncertainties, but about accepting them. Trust provides us with 
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 It has to be noted that the Snowden-revelations concerning the practices of the NSA certainly did 
have (and still have) an impact on for example the US information technology industry, for example: 
“…foreign countries both react to protect their citizens’ privacy and use the trust outage as a means to 
advance local competitors” (Richards and King 2014: 415). However, judging by their behavior, 
‘average users’ seem to be less disturbed. 
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the fiction we need to face reality. 
In the third chapter, we looked at trust through a broader, sociological lens 
and took into account its historical context. In modernity, the arrival of large systems 
in society such as the banking system, political systems, and global corporate systems 
altered the character of trust. Trust is no longer predominantly a part of interpersonal 
interactions, but increasingly also becomes a strategy to deal with uncertainties in 
interactions between persons and systems. In times where interactions increasingly 
gain a global and impersonal character, interpersonal trust had to make way for 
confidence or system trust. 
 In the fourth chapter, we delved into the Internet, the most dominant 
technological system of our time, and analysed the way in which the Internet was 
designed. Trust was not only a key factor in the cooperation between the founding 
fathers of the Internet, but it also found its way into the design itself. The 
construction of the Internet leant on openness and trust in the ability of the users to 
deal with problems themselves rather than aiming at anticipating all possible 
problems by securing and closing the network.  
Due to the ambivalent role of the current curators of the Internet, this familiar 
world online is under pressure. Governments, companies, and actors from civil 
society on the one hand add to the stability of the familiar world online by producing 
and maintaining the protocols and technical standards, but on the other hand, when 
they pursue their own interest, they may endanger the stable and shared background 
against which trust can thrive.  
 
Each chapter has provided important building blocks for understanding how trust 
online is established. In the second chapter, I determined the function of trust on the 
ontological level and discerned a family of concepts, which help us to understand the 
fuzzy concept trust turns out to be: interpersonal trust, confidence, system trust, a 
familiar world, and the reduction of complexity. I took into account the more socio-
historical developments by looking at system trust in the third chapter. In the fourth 
chapter, I analysed the workings of the Internet itself and the challenges it might pose 
for the familiar world online.  
 
In contrast to the fourth chapter, which approached the Internet as a technical 
system (construction), in this chapter, I will descend to the micro-level and focus on 
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the personal experience of users (context) mediated by networked artefacts.  
I will take a contextual approach by taking up the thread of Plessner’s three 
anthropological laws, based on the eccentric positionality of human beings. Central to 
Plessner’s philosophical anthropology is that human beings, in their most 
fundamental form as living nature, should always be understood as being in 
interaction with their environment. Consequently, I will analyse how this interaction 
in the current networked era takes shape and which challenges this poses to trust.  
 
 
5.1 Human beings, technology, and environment 
As we have seen in the second chapter, one of the fundamental principles for 
Plessner’s philosophical anthropology is the interaction between living nature and its 
environment. Whether one looks at plants, animals or human beings, their existence 
can only be understood if one takes into account their positionality; the way in which 
they actively uphold their boundaries and regulate the boundary traffic between them 
and their environment.  
Focussing on human beings, characterized by their eccentric positionality, I 
discerned a first and second hiatus (in the second chapter of this book). The first 
hiatus all living nature has in common. By upholding their own boundaries, living 
things have an inner and outer side. Consequently, there is a hiatus between them 
and the environment. This hiatus or double aspectivity as Plessner calls it, brings 
forth the complexity that all living nature, including human beings, has to process. 
The second hiatus, however, is reserved for human beings who not only experience a 
distance between themselves and their environment, but also between themselves 
and their centre of experience. It is this second hiatus, which is unique for human 
beings and grounds their eccentric positionality that brings forth the radical 
complexity trust has to reduce.  
Notwithstanding this second hiatus and the complexity it brings forth, human 
beings nevertheless remain, like animals, central creatures, living in the here and 
now, residing more often in a state of action than in a state of reflection, longing for 
the wholeness of the central position, which –as we will see later in this chapter- 
guides their interaction with technologies.  
Plessner captures the eccentric positionality in three anthropological laws or 
principles. First, human beings are artificial by nature. This points at the ontological 
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necessity to replenish and anchor their lives by creating artefacts (ranging from 
language to smart artefacts). Human beings can only live the life they create first. 
Technology is therefore an artificial answer to a natural need.  
Second, there is the principle of mediated immediacy. It refers to the way in 
which human beings experience the world. Because they need artefacts –and culture 
more generally - to shape their lives and assign themselves a place in the world, all 
experience is in fact mediated through these artefacts. However, although these 
experiences are always mediated, they are nevertheless experienced as being direct. 
 Third, there is the principle of the utopian standpoint. It refers to man’s 
awareness of the triviality (Nichtigkeit) or contingency of his existence and that of the 
world around him. Although he is not able to find a final ground, a certainty, which 
will undo his eccentric positionality, there is always this driving force present to reach 
a wilful balance between himself and the environment.  
 
5.1.1 Mediating technology 
If trust is a positive attitude towards the future, a strategy to enable human beings to 
deal with the complexity of human life brought forth by the double hiatus lying at the 
heart of their existence, similarly, technology is a material strategy to cope with the 
same complexity. The interaction between human beings and their environment is 
strongly influenced by the technologies or artefacts human beings make use of. With 
the first anthropological law of being “artificial by nature”, Plessner (1975) underlines 
this indissoluble intertwining of human beings and their artefacts. The way in which 
artefacts currently ‘mediate’ these interactions will be the focal point of this chapter. 
 
Human beings need technologies to handle the ontological distance they experience 
in their interaction with others, the world around them, and in themselves. We need 
clothes to shield our sensitive skin, we need houses and cities to find shelter against 
the power of the elements, we need culture to meaningfully shape our lives, we need 
language and books to share our thoughts and nowadays, we need Internet 
technology to mould every piece of our daily life. Weibel (1992) stated that in the end 
all technologies are in fact tele-technologies. Technologies all aim at bridging a gap, a 
distance, and this distance lays between you and me, us and the world, or, more 
closely, in our relation towards ourselves.  
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One important aspect of this need to develop artefacts to bridge the hiatus is 
that although human beings create these artefacts, they do not completely control 
them. Artefacts gain their own weight, evoking events that were not foreseen nor 
intended. So although we need technologies to build our home, our so-called familiar 
world, the stability we seek can only be of a temporary nature because the same 
technologies also bring forth new complexity we need to reduce. 
 
5.1.2 The relation of human beings and technology: instrumentalism, 
determinism, and constructionism. 
The observation that human beings need some sort of technology to exist is rather 
uncontroversial. From the palaeontologist who confronted with possible ancient 
human remains goes looking for some kind of artefact in the vicinity to determine the 
origin, to the economist who sees technological innovation as the dominant driving 
force for human development, all acknowledge the importance of technology for 
human life, even in its most rudimentary form. 
 
Although the connection between humanity and technology is rather uncontested, the 
way in which this dependency emerges certainly is open to debate. Currently, three 
dominant positions on the man-technology relation are generally discerned: 
instrumentalism, determinism, and constructionism
37
.  
In short, instrumentalism is the stance that technology is merely a neutral 
vehicle for the aims and intentions of their human users. Technology is nothing more 
but also nothing less than applied science. It is a value-neutral instrument; as a 
consequence, it is up to the user to decide how it is being employed. A current 
example of such an instrumental view on technology can be found with the USA-
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 Another very informative way of discerning the dominant perspectives on technology has been 
described by De Mul (2002). He contrasts instrumentalism with a substantial perspective on 
technology. Instrumentalism refers to the perspective where technology is a neutral instrument, the 
starting points of the substantial perspective are that technology steers and pre-sorts our actions. This 
substantial perspective knows two sub-positions: on the one hand technological determinism, which 
refers to the autonomous force of technology, on the other hand constructivism, which presupposes 
that actors inscribe meaning in technology after which this technology steers our actions.  
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based National Rifle Association (NRA). Their slogan “guns don’t kill people, people 
do” emphasizes that in the act of shooting the main actor is the human shooter. The 
gun solely functions as the enabler of this shooting behaviour. The focus therefore lies 
on the human being and not on the technology. It is people who act –or shoot-, and 
the device by which this action is made possible is only of a secondary importance 
(also see: Latour 1994).  
 
A second important position is called technological determinism or determinism in 
brief. This perspective on technology assigns technology as the driving force for 
human life and development. Technology is the instigator of all human action. Who 
human beings are is shaped partly by the technologies they use and which surround 
them. In the determinist perspective, technology and human beings oppose each 
other. Technology is then the dominant, autonomous force steering human life. 
Determinism comes in two flavours: an optimistic and a pessimistic one. 
People who adhere to the former, such as the technologist Kevin Kelly (2010), see the 
leading role for technology as a good thing. In his book “What Technology Wants” 
Kelly argues that history has shown that technological development always brings 
along more good than evil and that by giving way to technology –by listening to ‘what 
technology wants’- a prosperous future lays ahead of us.  
More pessimistic perspectives on the impact of technology on human life can 
be found with the classical philosophers of technology, such as Martin Heidegger 
(2010), Herbert Marcuse (2009 [1964]), and Jacques Ellul (1990). They all worried 
about the technological rationality imposed on human beings by technology, pushing 
aside human autonomy and dignity. Not only did technology determine the 
organization of society and the way we live and work, but also on an even more 
fundamental, ontological level it pre-sorted the way human beings experienced the 
world and themselves. For Heidegger, one of the biggest threats human beings face 
because of the dominant force of technology is the occurrence of a restriction in our 
way of thinking; a restriction which means that we can only understand our being in 
technological terms (Dreyfus 2009: 27). Marcuse (2009 [1964]), from a more 
political perspective, warns that this dominant position of technology will lead to one-
dimensional men who will completely conform to prevailing technological demands.  
 
What both instrumentalism and determinism have in common is that they 
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presuppose a clear and impenetrable distinction between object and subject, between 
human beings and the outer world (also see: Verbeek 2011b). In the instrumentalist 
perspective, the outer world and the material objects within that world are at the 
disposal and under the control of human beings. In the determinist perspective, 
human beings are steered and controlled by the outer world, constantly threatening 
their freedom (negative reading) or coming to bloom (positive reading)
38
.  
 
Since the 1980’s, especially as a reaction to the deterministic stance of classical 
philosophers of technology such as Heidegger and Ellul, a third perspective on 
technology was developed called constructionism.  
Constructionism refers to a number of schools such as Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT), ‘mutual shaping’ approaches, Actor Network Theory (ANT), and 
the Social Shaping of Technologies (SST) (also see: van den Berg 2009: 29-30).
39
 
SCOT is one of the most dominant approaches and can be described best as strong 
social constructivism as it sees social actors and social practices as the core 
explanatory force of technology (see for example: Bijker 1995; Bijker and Law 1992; 
Bijker 2001). I will make use of some of the key concepts of SCOT to analyse how 
being artificial by nature takes shape in the networked era (section 5.3).  
 
                                                   
38
 Plessner (1975) aims at thinking beyond this modernist subject-object dualism. In the second 
chapter of the Stages he goes to great lengths to show that the division between res cogitans and res 
extensa, famously proclaimed by Descartes, is not that fundamental as it is generally put forward. 
Rather than falling for one of the two possible poles –the material world or the world of the mind- he 
shows that human beings, being first and foremost living nature, have both and should only be 
understood as being both. He speaks of human beings as psychophysical indifferent unions, with an 
inner world and an outer world. Instead of a schism, lying at the roots of its existence as with 
Descartes, Plessner speaks of a hiatus that constantly is being bridged in the experience. The inner 
world cannot be understood without a necessary detour along the outside world. Likewise, the outside 
world comes to human beings mediated by the inner world. Human beings should always be 
understood as being in interaction with their environment, which they shape and are simultaneously 
shaped by.  
39
 It has to be said that although all these different schools share the proposition that technology 
always gains its meaning in a specific socio-historical setting and simultaneously also shapes the social 
actions in which it is used, they also differ in fundamental ways (methodology, focus, theoretical 
background). Unfortunately, it is not in the scope of this thesis to address these differences.  
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Social shaping approaches are a form of mild social constructivism as they 
are –in contrast to SCOT- “willing to attribute properties and effects to technology” 
(Brey 2009: 101). Instead of merely looking at the social actors, they take into 
account the interdependency of social actors and artefacts. Nevertheless, in the end 
social shaping studies explain these technological properties still by referring to social 
practices.  
ANT goes a step further than the social shaping approach, abolishing the 
divide between social and technological actors all together. In this perspective, 
artefacts can have agency and therefore invoke potentially unforeseen consequences. 
De Mul (2002) refers to this kind of approach, where there is effectively room for 
taking into account the influence of both social and technological actor, as 
technological interactionism. ANT will be the starting point for a case study into the 
innovation of hotel keys in the next chapter. 
 
Together and in close connection with these schools, the philosophy of technology 
also took an empirical turn towards “a more practical, contextual interpretation of 
artefacts and machines” (Kaplan 2009: 1). This contextual approach becomes 
particularly conspicuous in the postphenomenological school and other related 
empirical-based theories of mediation where the central presupposition is that 
human beings shape their environment and, simultaneously, are being shaped by 
their environment.           
 This focus on the interplay or mediation of human beings and technology, is 
also the most related to Plessner’s fundamental assumption of the interrelatedness of 
human beings and their environment. Because of his attention to the way in which 
living nature and its environment are closely connected to each other and how, for 
human beings, culture, language, and especially technology play an important 
mediating role in these interactions, Plessner actually anticipated the current 
theories of mediation (Kockelkoren 2014: 327).  
 
 
5.2 The networked era 
Although it is always difficult to interpret one’s own epoch, there is some compelling 
evidence suggesting that we currently live in a period of time that is fundamentally 
different from earlier times (van den Berg and Keymolen 2013).  
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In our article (van den Berg and Keymolen 2013), we referred to the current 
timeframe as the networked era because of the arrival of ICTs, and especially of the 
Internet as the network of networks which have fundamentally changed –and are still 
changing- the prevailing way we live, interact, and communicate. We chiefly focused 
on the new, radical nearness of technology, which arises due to the technological 
developments of our current time.  
Where in the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, technology 
was being perceived as consisting of large, opaque, and dominant systems –think of 
the highway system, airports, and electricity infrastructure-, this perspective shifted 
due to the arrival of consumer electronics after the Second World War. Technologies 
were not just something happening ‘out there’, but increasingly took up a central 
place in the home and in the office –think of washing machines, vacuum cleaners, 
and PCs-.  
With the arrival of ICTs, this tendency of technology to become an integral 
part of everyday life, to become radical near, by not merely entering the intimate 
sphere of the home but of our body as well, becomes very conspicuous.  
On a similar note, Floridi (2015b) speaks of hyperhistory
40
 -instead of the 
networked era- to discern a society that fundamentally rests on ICTs and data 
processing powers. One of the most important characteristics he discerns is that in 
this ICT-empowered society, it is no longer us who is processing data, ICTs are doing 
it for us. He writes (idem: 52): 
“in hyperhistory, there are ICTs, they record, transmit and, above all, 
process data, increasingly autonomously, and human societies become 
vitally dependent on them and on information as a fundamental 
resource.” 
Our current western society is in a state of hyperhistory, not because of the mere 
presence of ICT, but because our facilities and organization of society crucially hinge 
 
                                                   
40
 For Floridi (2015: 52), hyperhistory does not refer to a specific period in time. It does not say 
anything about when and where people live but how people live. Hyperhistory refers to a dominant 
way of organizing society. 
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on the working of these ICTs. Or, as Floridi
41
 puts it: “[w]ho lives by the digit, dies by 
the digit”. Only a society that relies on ICTs for its most fundamental functioning can 
become vulnerable through these same ICTs. 
 
In their collaborative research, The Onlife Initiative
42
 (2015) speaks then of a 
“Hyperconnected Era” which, to a large extent, pinpoints at the same changes Van 
Den Berg and I listed. These scholars, chaired by Floridi, conclude (2015: 44-45) that 
the rapid and fundamental changes brought forth by the ubiquitous presence of ICTs 
instigates the need to rethink or, even better, “reengineer” our conceptual toolbox.  
They discern four major transformations (Floridi 2015b: 2) which cause the 
need for such a reengineering. First, there is the blurring of the distinction between 
reality and virtuality. Second, they depict also a blurring of distinction between 
human, machine and nature. Third and fourth, The Onlife Initiative also foresees the 
impact of the transformation of information scarcity to information abundance and 
of the shift from stand-alone things to the functioning in processes and networks 
(idem).  
 
In the following paragraphs, I will illustrate these transformations leading to the 
networked era by briefly looking at some key technological developments, revolving 
around smart artefacts, ambient intelligence, Big Data, and the Internet of Things. 
 
5.2.1 Smart artefacts 
An important change instigated by the Internet is the arrival of networked artefacts. 
Increasingly, the Internet becomes part of the ontological structure of a wide range of 
artefacts we use in everyday life, surpassing its function of a mere infrastructure, as 
analysed in the previous chapter. 
The innovation of networking artefacts is often referred to as the Internet of 
Things. The Internet of Things is characterized by the fact that artefacts become 
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 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=riT-ew7n7RU, accessed 8 July 2015. 
42
 The Onlife Initiative consists of a group of influential scholars coming from diverse backgrounds 
such as philosophy, law, computer science, and ethics.  
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embedded in networks of information often invisible to the user. Mere physical 
objects become what is been framed as smart by adding a computational component 
to them, bridging the gap between the physical world and the online world (Kopetz 
2011: 308).  
A prominent example of this evolution is the smartphone, formerly known as 
the telephone. Because of the added possibility to connect to the Internet, the usage 
and meaning of the smartphone differs radically from its offline predecessors. Calling 
someone is no longer the primary function of the smartphone. Because of the services 
that can be offered through the Internet connection, people use their smartphone to 
chat, book a place for the holidays (see chapter 7), open their hotel door (see chapter 
6), post messages on their timeline, check the weather, etc. That the dissemination of 
the smartphone is by no means merely an instrumental change, but also has an 
impact on our self-perception, social interaction, and society as a whole has been 
extensively researched (see for example: Pariser 2011; Turkle 2011; boyd 2014). 
The introduction of smart artefacts, such as the smartphone, has partly 
instigated the merging of the online and the offline realm. Increasingly, devices 
mediate the way in which we perceive the world around us. We literally find our way 
in the city by making use of handy navigator apps. We also use apps to add layers of 
information to our environment, creating an augmented reality. Friendships and 
relations –in bygone days located in the offline world- now also thrive online. On 
social media platforms, users post pictures, report on their daily activities, and 
engage in discussions, adding a new online layer of activity to their relations. As 
described previously, the separate online sphere where people would be freed of the 
offline meddling of governments, companies, and other unlike-minded people seems 
to be definitely finished in the networked era. We truly have become ‘onlife’ creatures 
(The-Online-Initiative 2015), living in a world, which is both online and offline at the 
same time
43
. 
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 Following the colonization of the Internet by governments and companies, the introduction of these 
smart objects seems to have been the death blow for the independent cyberspace that was once so 
forcefully defended by Barlow and other online utopians. Meat space and cyberspace have merged. 
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5.2.2 New kinds of services 
The ‘smartness’ of these networked artefacts does not solely depend on their ability to 
offer a wider range of services. Also the kind of services they offer is conspicuously 
different from their non-networked counterparts and can be characterized as 
dominantly personalized, pro-active, and persuasive.  
 
Personalization of services is the aim to offer the user not a general service but to 
tailor it to his or her specific needs. To enable personalization, companies, 
governments, and other service providers make use of algorithms to automatically 
mine databases loaded with all kinds of data to look for correlations that may indicate 
something about the preferences of a user.  
A simple example of personalization is the weather app on your phone, which, 
based on your geo-location data, provides you with weather info of your current 
location and not just with general predictions for the whole country. A more excessive 
example of personalization is online price-differentiation based on the devices you 
use to access the Internet
44
.  
In chapter 8, we will delve deeper into personalization by looking at the impact 
of the personalized interface on trust. For now it is enough to understand that 
personalization brings along fundamental questions about for example the 
ontological status of an artefact, but also has an impact on the familiar world which is 
necessary for trust to thrive. 
 
Closely connected to personalization is the pro-active character of the networked 
artefacts. It is not just the aim to deliver services in a personalized manner; these 
services should also precede the request of the user. Based on all this collected and 
mined information, it becomes possible to predict what a user needs and as a result 
present him or her with these services, even before the request has been explicitly 
made.  
An example of such a pro-active service, that at least all users of the search 
engine Google are acquainted with, is the famous Google search bar. When you type 
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 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577488822667325882, accessed 10 
March 2015. 
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in a search query, the search engine automatically –based on your search history 
combined with that of millions of others- tries to complete your words in order to 
provide you as fast as possible with the relevant results.  
 
5.2.3 Ambient intelligence 
Also in ‘the real world’, networked artefacts are increasingly being designed to display 
pro-active behaviour. A hotel room that projects artwork by your favourite artist on 
the wall and puts on your favourite heavy metal record, the refrigerator which 
automatically orders your groceries when you need them or the thermostat which 
adjusts the temperature to the preferences of the person who enters - these are all 
examples of what has been referred to as the ambient intelligence vision. In this 
vision, technology becomes 
“invisible, embedded in our natural surroundings, present whenever we 
need it, enabled by simple and effortless interactions, attuned to all our 
senses, adaptive to users and context and autonomously acting” (Lindwer 
et al. 2003:1 cited in van den Berg 2009: 59).  
In line with the observation that objects are becoming pro-active, Van den Berg 
speaks of anticipative artefacts (van den Berg 2009: 70-71). Next to being embedded, 
context-aware, personalized and adaptive, these networked artefacts anticipate the 
need of the user (idem). This means that, as van den Berg (2009: 71) argues, 
“…systems will be given a large responsibility in managing and maintaining a user’s 
information sphere”. It will be up to the pro-active networked artefacts to:  
“…decide what information is relevant, useful and even meaningful for the 
user in his current situation; the responsibility of finding, filtering and 
processing this information is removed from the user and placed squarely 
on the shoulders of the technology” (van den Berg 2009: 71). 
Because smart technologies are able to personalize their services to the profile of the 
user and even anticipate his or her needs, smart technologies can also become 
persuasive. Persuasive technologies are able to “explicitly influence the behaviour of 
users in specific directions, effectively persuading people to behave differently” 
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(Verbeek 2011b: 19).  
An ‘old school’ example of persuasive technology is given by Bruno Latour 
(1990) who shows that hotel keys, intentionally made heavier by a weighty keychain, 
persuade the guest in a material, non-verbal way to return them to the hotel 
reception. Instead of the hotel owner explicitly stating that the keys have to be 
returned, this request is partly delegated to the keys themselves. The design of the 
keys indirectly persuades the guests to display the desired behaviour. In the next 
chapter, this influential notion by Latour will be updated by looking at the current 
version of the hotel key, namely the rfid key card and the digital key.  
In the networked era, persuasive technology can particularly be found in the 
domains of healthcare and personal development. Health coaches in the form of apps 
on the phone or tablet help users to act –and persist in acting- in a healthier way. For 
example, the 7 Minute Workout App
45
 not only shows you which fitness exercises you 
have to do to get in shape, it also sends you a notification if you haven’t done your 
daily exercise yet. You can support friends who also use the app to keep them 
motivated. Another app like RoomForThought
46
 sends a push message once a day to 
let you take a break and take a picture for which you only have three seconds in order 
to capture your life. It is an app that persuades you to stop and relax for a moment, 
escaping the hecticness of everyday life. 
 
5.2.4 Big Data 
All these devices and apps can only function if they are fed enough data. Only by the 
automated analysis of sets of data, often referred to as Big Data, looking for 
correlations based on which predictions can be made, can smart devices deliver their 
services (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). A wide range of different data, 
ranging from information on people, sensors, to (online) behaviour, -are mined by 
algorithms for insight, leading to what has been called data-driven decision making. 
Because data is often re-used and combined, it becomes increasingly difficult for the 
average user to understand how the collection and mining of data takes place 
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 https://7minuteworkout.jnj.com/, accessed 07 December 2015. 
46
 http://www.roomforthought.nl, accessed 25 February 2015. 
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(Richards and King 2013; Hildebrandt 2011b). Although the innovations in the 
domain of Big Data are promising, Richards and King (2014) argue that the 
secondary use of information we deem to be confidential may damage the trust we 
have in the institutions we share this information with (also see Keymolen 2014b).  
 
5.2.5 Intimate technology 
Technology is not only being woven into the very fabric of our homes, offices, and 
public spaces (ambient technology) and the objects we use daily (smart artefacts), 
but technology also becomes an integral part of our bodies; think of neuro-enhancers 
and implants such as bionic ears, pacemakers and new steel joints. In the near future 
it should become possible to directly connect brains to the Internet or to see in 
infrared. Important steps taken in the domain of molecular medical science will lead 
to new ‘bio-sensors’ curing –and even preventing- diseases and handicaps such as 
sickle cell anaemia and deafness. Because technology increasingly becomes part of 
our bodies and integrated in our environment, it has been characterized as intimate 
technology (van Est et al. 2014).  
This new ‘nearness’ of the technology is not merely conspicuous for the 
relation of man and technology but also for the technology itself. The above-
mentioned innovations are partly spurred by the converging of formerly separate 
technologies such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and 
cognitive science.  
In their book Life As A Construction Box, Swierstra et al. (2009: 10) explain 
how the converging of these technologies lead to a whole new holistic self-perception 
because of the control we gain over the “building blocks” of living as well as non-
living nature. Technologies are used to enhance the body not by adding components 
to it on the outside –such as a pair of glasses or a wheel chair- but by transforming 
the body from within; consequently making it increasingly more difficult to 
determine where the technology stops and the body begins.  
 
 
5.3 Artificial by nature in the networked era 
As a result of this radical nearness of technology in the networked era, the principle 
of being “artificial by nature” becomes increasingly topical. There is not just the 
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general interplay of human beings and their artefacts and how they are mutually 
shaped in this interaction. In some instances, for example when people receive 
implants to help them see or when they take certain medication to enhance their 
moral behaviour (Specker et al. 2014), even an actual merging of the human and 
technology takes place resulting in a new enhanced entity.  
Peter-Paul Verbeek (2011b: 144) introduces the cyborg relation to emphasize 
how the presence of such a new entity “physically alters the human” because of this 
kind of absorbing association with technology. Although de Mul (2003: 254) is rightly 
claiming that “human beings always have been cyborgs” because culture and 
technology are not mere “instruments of survival” but form an “ontic necessity”, this 
cyborg-intertwining becomes particularly real in the networked era where the 
division between human beings and technology is no longer clear and the body 
increasingly consists of organic and non-organic components. 
 
Through the lens of Plessner’s first anthropological law, being ‘artificial by nature’, I 
will now first look into the openness or ‘multistability’ of artefacts and the way in 
which humans construct the meaning of artefacts. Subsequently, I will concentrate 
on the other side of the equation by focusing on the way in which artefacts invite 
human beings to use them in a certain fashion and how artefacts steer interactions. 
I will discern the ‘own weight’ of artefacts in the networked era.  
It has to be noted that in fact human and artefact are simultaneously 
constituted in their interaction. The meaning of an artefact comes about in the way it 
is taken on by a human being; the identity of a human being is shaped by the artefacts 
he or she uses. It is certainly not the case that one precedes the other, which would 
lead us back to the stance of instrumentalism or determinism. It is therefore only to 
ensure a clear analysis that both sides are addressed separately here.  
 
5.3.1 The openness of artefacts in the networked era 
For Plessner (1975), who sees artefacts as an ontic necessity, the openness of artefacts 
is crucial for the way in which human beings live in their environment. The world of 
human beings is not given but has to be built first; as a result, the contingency and 
subsequent openness of their artefacts is a fundamental aspect of their ‘being-in-the-
world’. It is typical for human beings that they can use artefacts in different contexts, 
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shaping their environment over and over again. The American philosopher of 
technology, Don Ihde (1990)
47
, refers to this openness of artefacts with the concept of 
“multistability”. Although human beings experience their world often as stable and 
governed by rules as strict as if they were natural laws, contingency, nevertheless, 
always shines through. The openness of artefacts can be negatively framed as a 
burden, causing instability in human life. However, it can just as well be defined as a 
change, instigating new and fruitful practices or, in other words, innovation. The 
openness of artefacts is closely connected to the kind of creativity only humans seem 
to demonstrate.  
For example, the elderly man who likes to sit comfortably when reading his 
newspaper on a sunny afternoon can experience armrests on the benches in the park 
as an extra luxury. For the homeless man wandering around at night, looking for a 
place to sleep, these same armrests hinder him from using the bench as a resting 
place, because they divide it in separate places to sit, making it impossible for him to 
stretch out and get some rest.  
The way we perceive artefacts can also change over time. In the early days of 
mobile telephones, my mother hid away in the car when she wanted to use her cell 
phone. Back then, calling in public was perceived as improper. This attitude towards 
calling in public spaces has completely changed over the years, notwithstanding the 
fact that it still can be quite annoying when done too loudly in public transport. 
Taking it even a step a further, where the mobile phone was introduced as ‘a 
mobile way of calling’, users unexpectedly started to use their phone to text rather 
than to call. Texting was initially added to the phone as a funny gimmick. However, it 
turned out to be a game-changer in social life. Besides that it solved the earlier-
mentioned problem of inappropriate calling in public all together, it also brought 
forth new ways of interaction, had an impact on language, and simultaneously 
introduced a new problem as texting dragged people into conversations elsewhere, 
creating an “absent presence” (Gergen 1991). 
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 Don Ihde stands in the postphenomenological tradition, which I have assigned to the general 
domain of constructionism because also central to this stance in philosophy is the fundamental idea of 
the mutual shaping relation of human beings and artefacts.  
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All in all, users may “domesticate”’ (Silverstone and Hirsch 1992; Frissen 
2004) their artefacts, meaning that technologies are ‘tamed’ or appropriated to fit the 
context and experience of the user. As we have seen with the example of texting, the 
meaning of the artefacts changed (the mobile phone is no longer primarily a ‘calling 
device’, but also a ‘texting device’), as well as the materiality of the phone. Because 
people increasingly used the phone to text, telephone companies changed their 
design of the device, interpreting the mobile phone in a new manner. 
 
The fundamental openness of artefacts and the possibility to read different meanings 
into them can of course only be understood by looking at who is attaching certain 
meanings to the artefact.  
In the social construction of technology approach (SCOT), which also falls into 
the domain of constructionism
48
, relevant social groups are the starting point for 
analysing the workings of technology in society (Bijker 2001: 26). By looking, as it 
were, through the eyes of different social groups, for example, users, developers, 
policy-makers etc., it becomes possible to map the “interpretative flexibility” of 
artefacts. Interpretative flexibility refers to the malleability or “social dimension” of 
the design of artefacts (Bijker 1995: 76). When the meaning attached to a certain 
artefact is stabilized, consequently guiding the interaction with the artefact in a 
homogenous way, the identity of an artefact can become more obdurate and fixed. 
When the interpretative flexibility of an artefact diminishes, Bijker speaks of 
stabilization and closure. One can speak of closure when “[c]onsensus among the 
different relevant social groups about the dominant meaning of an artefact emerges 
and the ‘pluralism of artefacts’ decreases” (Bijker 1995: 86). Stabilization refers to a 
similar development towards a fixed identity of an artefact but then within a social 
group (idem: 87). When a technology is stabilized, it becomes a black box and its 
“properties come to determine the way that the technology functions in society” (Brey 
2009: 101). 
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 Brey has shown that the approaches in constructionism -he speaks of constructivism- may have 
interesting perspectives to add to the philosophy of technology. Their focus on technological change 
and more specifically on the development phase of technology may “…provide a potentially fruitful 
basis for normative and evaluative philosophical analyses of technology and its impacts” (Brey 2009: 
108). 
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Fuglslang (2001), influenced by the concept of the product life cycle, discerns 
three phases in the innovation of a technology to ground this development from 
openness to closure, and sometimes, back again. 
The first is the phase of flexibility, which refers to the “initial stage of 
technological innovation” (idem: 44). In this phase the interpretative flexibility often 
is extensive. The second phase is the phase of momentum (idem). In this phase, the 
public generally has accepted the artefact. They have invested time and money in it 
and the crucial decisions have been made. Now it becomes more a question of fine-
tuning the artefact. The final phase is the phase of diffusion (idem: 45). In this phase 
the artefact is finalized and “is diffused to consumer industries”. Users domesticated 
it, making it fit their user context. There is a matter of closure and stability. At that 
moment, however, a “reversed product life cycle” may also occur (idem: 45). Artefacts 
integrated in user practices may lead to new innovations. Remember the example of 
the mobile phone; when people increasingly interpreted their mobile phone as a 
texting device rather than a calling device, this led to new materializations of the 
artefact. The design of the phone was adapted by adding easy-to-use keyboards, 
mobile dictionaries, and automated typing suggestions. 
 
When we now apply this perspective of openness to smart artefacts and Internet 
applications in general, some interesting observations can be made, relevant to our 
analysis of trust. 
First, although the initial openness of the Internet is still available for anyone 
who is able to code and develop his or her own applications, when it comes to regular 
consumer products, the room for users to shape and adapt their smart artefacts is 
rather limited.  
It is true that users domesticate artefacts to give them a proper place in social 
interaction and social interaction changes to absorb new artefacts. It is also true that 
often some superficial changes can be made in the set-up of the interface, changing 
some preferences in the programme or tweaking the design of the artefact by adding 
gadgets such as colourful sleeves. This, however, does not affect the more 
fundamental working of the smart artefact itself. For example, one can personalize 
one’s Facebook and Twitter profile with a background picture, one can share movies 
on Youtube and pictures on Instagram but one cannot influence the settings for 
sharing data beyond what is provided by the curators of the platform. Or as Deibert 
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(2013: 229) puts it: 
“the experimentation that is encouraged actually operates on these 
shallow planes. On deeper, more fundamental levels, it is strictly 
controlled”. 
It is not exceptional for artefacts in the diffusion stage to have gained a certain 
stabilized identity and use, bringing forth a “take it or leave it” option for users (also 
see Bijker 2001: 29). A bike, to re-use the example of Bijker’s (1995) often-cited 
research in the development of the bicycle, is difficult to imagine in a way different 
than what we are used to it now. Although users may still alter and domesticate their 
bicycles, this often only happens in rudimentary ways; for example, by adding 
components such as a speedometer, flags, and stickers. It seldom touches upon the 
‘essence’ of the bicycle. Borrowing the concepts of SCOT, when it comes to the 
development of the bicycle, there is closure. Amongst the different social groups there 
is a shared and defined image of what a bicycle is for, how it should be used, and what 
it should look like.  
 
However, when we look at smart artefacts this closure does not seem to arrive. 
Because smart artefacts have a networked ontology, they never leave the phase of 
flexibility. Or, to put it more precisely, the phase of flexibility and the phase of 
diffusion converge. By definition, smart artefacts reside in a never-ending beta-stage 
(also see de Mul 2002: 38). The stage of developing and designing smart artefacts 
and applications does not end with the user taking the smart device home from the 
shop or with the downloading and installing of a new application. The smart artefacts 
and applications persist in the sphere of influence of the curators, remaining 
therefore open to their interpretation. In other words, while for the average users the 
interpretative flexibility of the smart artefact is rather small, for the curator behind 
the artefact the interpretative flexibility remains extensive. The data curators can 
collect through the smart artefacts is a source for endless innovation or –more 
pessimistically- for an endless function creep. This continuous reinterpreting of the 
artefact may disturb the relation users have with their smart devices and services and 
consequently impact the trust vested in the artefact. 
There are legions of examples of such disturbances. Facebook changing their 
design of the timeline caused public outcry amongst users. Or Whatsapp adding 
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check marks behind messages, the blue colour indicating a message has been read, 
also set off a storm of complaints. But because in the interaction between user and 
smart artefact the interpretative flexibility, the openness to develop alternative uses, 
is rather small, this disturbance in the established stability of the artefact leaves the 
user with no other option than to choose between “exit, voice, or loyalty” 
(Hirschmann 1970). Where sometimes opting for “voice” -letting those in power 
know of your discontent- may help to alter the situation (e.g. Whatsapp added the 
possibility to disable the blue check marks after public outcry), users are generally left 
to choose between “exit” –quitting the service- or “loyalty” –sticking to the service. 
However, because some information intermediaries such as Google, Facebook, and 
Linkedin provide services that increasingly become a necessary condition to function 
in Western society, the option to “exit” may come at a very high price. 
 
To avoid any suspicion, I am not advocating a technological determinist perspective 
here, denying that users have a say in the way in which artefacts are embedded in a 
user context or are ascribed meaning in social life. However, I do contest the idea that 
the inherent and undeniable openness of artefacts is accessible to or can be played 
with by all actors involved. Moreover, looking at the ideal-typical appearance of smart 
artefacts, it is not far-fetched to conclude that when it comes to the smart artefacts 
and services targeting large consumer populations, there is a tendency to locate more 
flexibility in the interaction between curator and smart artefact than in the 
interaction between user and smart artefact
49
.  
 
5.3.2 Artefacts’ own weight in the networked era 
While in the previous section I looked into the way in which human beings ascribe 
meaning to an artefact and adapt it to their personal user context, I will now 
approach the concept of being ‘artificial by nature’ from the other side of the 
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 It has to be noted, however, that there of course will be counter examples of devices and applications 
in the networked era where this difference in interpretative flexibility between the two relations are 
different or even not existent at all. One always has to take into account the actual use and setup of an 
interaction to establish the openness and hardness of the artefact. We will therefore be looking at some 
in-depth cases in the following chapters. 
138 
 
spectrum and look at the way in which artefacts steer users in certain directions. 
Although human beings are the creators of artefacts, as these are an ontic necessity 
for the existence of human beings, humans do not completely control these artefacts. 
Producing artefacts is only half of the job (Plessner 1975: 321).  
Artefacts also bring forth unintended consequences. Artefacts gain, as Plessner 
describes, their own weight. They are not mere neutral instruments, the 
materialization of the creative urge of human beings, but they can steer the 
interaction of human beings with and within their environment in unforeseen ways. 
Human beings have to discover this weight in order to relate to their artefacts in a 
meaningful way. 
 
Don Ihde (1990) speaks of “technological intentionality” to refer to the way in which 
artefacts steer our actions and interactions. Although it is not impossible to use 
artefacts differently, they do invite users to adopt them in specific ways. He writes: 
“Technologies, by providing a framework for action, do form intentionalities and 
inclinations within which use-patterns take dominant shape” (Ihde 1990: 143).  
Verbeek (2011b: 107) makes an informative distinction between different 
forms of invitations or “forms of mediation”. Artefacts can force users to act in certain 
ways. For example, you need to agree to the terms and conditions of a website in 
order to make use of the service. Then the room to manoeuvre for users is rather low 
or non-existent. Artefacts can also persuade users to act in certain ways. For example, 
a smart meter providing feedback on energy use stimulates users in a transparent 
way to alter their behaviour. Or artefacts can seduce users to act or refrain from 
acting. For instance, the Facebook app on a smartphone can be used to maintain 
intimate relations with the people one loves. It is, however, designed and set up in 
such a way that it rather stimulates and pre-sorts users to share information beyond 
this group of family and close friends. So, although it is not impossible to use it for 
the former goal, the way the artefact –in this case the Facebook app- is designed to 
stimulate alternative uses.  
 
Madeline Akrich introduced the concept of “script” to refer to the way in which the –
sometimes implicit- presuppositions of developers and designers concerning the 
envisioned users and user-context, would find its way in the design of the artefact. 
She writes:  
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“Designers […] define actors with specific tastes, competences, motives, 
aspirations, political prejudices, and the rest, and they assume that 
morality, technology, science, and economy will evolve in particular ways. 
A large part of the work of innovators is that of ‘inscribing’ this vision (of 
prediction about) the world in the technical content of a new object” 
(Akrich 1992: 208). 
Although it is difficult to say something meaningful about technological intentionality 
in general, when looking at the networked era and especially taking into account the 
above-sketched trends of data gathering and data analytics (Big Data), it can be 
argued that from a user’s perspective, a vast amount of the smart artefacts used today 
persuade and even force users to produce and share data. Even when it is not the 
primary aim of an artefact, gathering data often becomes an important by-product. 
Where data gathering is first a means to an end, it often turns into an end, causing a 
data-function creep.  
For example, it is not the primary goal of a smart energy meter at home to 
produce data but to regulate as efficiently as possible your energy use. However in 
order to perform well, it does need to crunch a lot of data. Next to the data of other 
users, it needs to process data on the behaviour and preferences of the people living 
in the house in order to adapt, in this case, the central heating. Moreover, the usual 
business model of companies behind these kinds of technologies is not merely to 
enable efficient energy use and to add to a sustainable environment. More often, the 
gathering of data is also used for other goals such as improving the user experience 
and the services provided. Sometimes, these data are also shared with or sold to other 
companies, for example to provide personalized advertisements.  
 
5.3.3 The political weight of artefacts 
Whether or not deliberately, the values and presuppositions of designers find their 
way into the design, consequently steering the use of the artefacts in certain 
directions. The political philosopher Langdon Winner (1980) argues that artefacts 
may also evoke political consequences, bringing forth certain power relations. He 
makes use of several examples of practices mediated by technological artefacts to 
analyse such political ramifications.  
One of Winners’ particular starting points is that artefacts are by no means 
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neutral but the carriers of political power. Having the capability to inscribe political 
views into artefacts is, in a society where technology is fundamental for its 
functioning, a very powerful skill.  
In his article, Winner carefully moves from examples of intended political 
working of artefacts to unintended political working of artefacts. The most-cited 
example of an intended political artefact he analyses is that of the ‘bridges of Moses’. 
In this example he describes how Moses, the architect of some bridges to Jones Beach 
in New York, designed the bridges in such a way that only cars could make use of 
them. Because of the low-hanging overpasses, busses were kept away from the beach 
and consequently, the poor, Afro-American citizens predominantly using this 
transport were too. Put differently, the architect deliberately designed the bridges in a 
way that became the carrier of his racist vision, encompassing “purposes far beyond 
their immediate use” (Winner 1980: 125). 
This example aroused some heated debate amongst scholars (Joerges 1999a, 
1999b; Woolgar and Cooper 1999), even refuting the analysis that these bridges were 
the only way to get to Jones Beach or arguing that Moses was no more racist than his 
contemporaries (also see: Verbeek 2011b: 44).  
However, the own weight of artefacts does not limit itself to the way in which 
artefacts, deliberately inscribed by their developers, invite users to engage with them 
in a specific practice or, in the case of the bridges of Moses, how they exclude people. 
Winner also shows how, unintentionally, differently-abled people are excluded from 
public spaces because these are designed with able-people in mind. On a similar note, 
he analyses the introduction of an automated tomato harvester that caused a 
disadvantage for small farmer companies, completely rearranging this agriculture 
sector as a result. Without a preconceived opinion, designers can invent an artefact 
that, when introduced in society, provokes changes that were not foreseen nor 
desired. 
 
Subsequently, in his article Winners focuses on inherently political technologies. 
These are technological artefacts, which also bring forth unintended political 
consequences, just as the tomato harvester did, but with that crucial difference that 
for these technologies there are not that many feasible design alternatives. A bridge 
does not have to have low-hanging overpasses to function as a bridge nor do public 
spaces stop being public spaces when they are designed in a way that makes them 
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accessible to disabled people. It is not hard to imagine a bridge or a public space, 
designed differently, which still carries out its tasks but without the above-mentioned 
unwanted consequences. Other technological systems, such as a nuclear plant, or a 
laboratory in which people work with dangerous chemicals, lack this flexibility. To 
choose such a technology means “to choose unalterably a particular form of political 
life” (Winner 1980: 6).  
Winner makes a distinction between a strong and a weak version of this claim 
concerning inherently political artefacts. In the strong version, “the adoption of a 
given technical system actually requires the creation and maintenance of a particular 
set of social conditions as the operating environment of that system” (Winner 1980: 
7). The weak version holds that “a given kind of technology is strongly compatible 
with, but does not strictly require, social and political relationships of a particular 
stripe” (idem: 7). Both versions can be relevant to an artefact, meaning that it may 
happen that some aspects of an artefact or a technological system are rather 
impossible to change if one wants to have a functioning device or system while other 
aspects, although they strongly lean towards a certain setting, can nonetheless be 
altered.  
Winner notes that what counts as a “practical necessity” and, therefore, is 
impossible to adapt is not merely an empirical question. He claims that often the 
argument that ‘it cannot be done in any other way’ unjustly overrules other 
arguments. He writes (Winner 1980: 9):  
“to say that some technologies are inherently political is to say that certain 
widely accepted reasons of practical necessity – especially the need to 
maintain crucial technological systems as smoothly working entities – 
have tended to eclipse other sorts of moral and political reasoning.”  
It certainly is not the case that Winner here suddenly takes a deterministic approach, 
as the classical philosophers of technology do. Actually, he opposes their view, 
because such a deterministic perspective hinders the possibility of holding people 
accountable for the political consequences they bring forth through their artefacts. 
Rather, he shows that the openness or “multistability” as Ihde refers to it, is not the 
same for all artefacts. Some artefacts lend themselves better to being mould by users 
or society than others. As a result, the decision of whether or not to introduce such a 
technology is crucial as the possibilities to adjust it when it is in use are limited. With 
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his analysis, Ihde therefore also criticizes an all too strong belief in the social power to 
shape the meaning and use of artefacts, which can sometimes be found in the SCOT 
studies. Not all artefacts are sensitive to the influence of social actors and not all 
social actors are able to influence the way in which artefacts find their way in daily 
life. As Winner (2001: 15) writes: 
“The smart people are those able to ‘re-engineer’ their organizations and 
careers by liquidating older roles, relationships, and institutions in 
response to technical and economical necessities that loom ahead. The 
less proactive to these conditions are doomed to suffer as the new 
technical order crashes in on them.” 
All in all, with Winner’s analysis of the political consequences of artefacts it becomes 
clear that artefacts’ own weight can take different forms. Artefacts not only steer 
users in a certain direction because of the presuppositions inscribed into the artefacts 
by the designers, intentionally or otherwise. Winner (1980: 10) adds also the option 
that “intractable properties of certain kinds of technology are strongly, perhaps 
unavoidably, linked to particular institutionalized patterns of power and authority.”  
 
         
5.4 Artificial by nature in the networked era: some challenges for trust  
In the section on being artificial by nature in the networked era, I analysed the way in 
which both the openness and own weight of smart artefacts generally take shape. 
While on the one hand it is clear that smart artefacts are characterized by openness, 
even conspicuously so, because their networked construction makes it possible to 
easily adapt and mould them to fit different contexts, they on the other hand also 
leave their undeniable mark on the social context. Artefacts’ own weight does not only 
become visible in the way in which they are the carrier of intentions of designers and 
companies but also in the relations of power and control they inherently bring forth.  
We can now already perceive that being artificial by nature in the networked 
era brings along some specific challenges for trust. In theory, the networked character 
of smart artefacts pre-eminently makes it possible for users to adapt them to fit their 
own situation and to cater to their personal needs, making the artefacts easier to 
control and therefore lowering the barrier to trust. However, because in practice this 
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openness is reserved for curators of the artefacts, the predictability of how these 
artefacts are functioning is under scrutiny. Trust, a way to act as if the future is 
certain, becomes more difficult when no closure occurs and the phase of flexibility 
and diffusion collide.  
It has to be noted that when these adaptations of smart artefacts take place 
beyond the user’s awareness, for example privacy settings being changed without a 
clear notification, a breach of trust doesn’t necessarily need to occur immediately. 
However, when a user does become aware of it and the imposed change does not fit 
the meaning that the user initially had attached to the artefact, the discrepancy 
between what the artefact was and what it has become may cause new complexity 
that trust cannot neutralize. It therefore can be argued that because an interruption 
in the interaction with the artefact may lead to a user questioning the use of the 
artefact or may even lead to the user’s decision to quit the service all together, 
curators will generally go to great lengths to ensure that changes in the artefact or 
service are unobtrusive in nature.  
As we have seen, personalization is one of these changes that often occur with 
smart artefacts. Anticipating chapter 8 on the personalized bubble caused by online 
profiling, one of the intriguing questions nowadays is how trust might be impacted 
because of the personalization of the interface, often taking place beyond the user’s 
awareness. Trust can only thrive in a familiar world structured by shared norms and 
values. These shared norms and values are not absolute. They fluctuate, change, and 
evolve in and through our interactions. What if this background online is no longer a 
shared but an individualized one, no longer reflecting shared norms and values but 
first and foremost personalized ones? How well will people be able to deal with other 
norms and values if the possibility to fruitfully confront their own values with those of 
others diminishes online? What if, in a never-ending feedback loop, they are 
presented with the affirmation of their own beliefs? 
 
On the other hand, also chances for developing trust may rise. If a user does perceive 
the changes made by a curator as being in line with his or her own interests, this may 
add to trust vested in the company or designer as well as in the artefact itself. As 
Luhmann already wrote, trust becomes especially apparent when it is put to the test. 
It is in times of increasing complexity that trust not only becomes evidently 
important but that one can also determine how robust the invested trust actually is.  
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5.5 Mediated immediacy in the networked era 
Where in the previous section we looked at the way in which artefacts and human 
beings constitute each other, we now, with the focus on the second anthropological 
law “mediated immediacy”, dive into the way in which human beings experience 
artefacts and the world mediated through those artefacts.  
The eccentric positionality of human beings, characterized by the double 
hiatus, brings forth that human beings do not have direct access to the world around 
them. Their world is never given, but always has to be built first. Artefacts mediate 
the interaction between human beings and their environment. An artefact is, so to 
say, the missing link between human beings and their environment. It restores the 
imbalance human beings experience through their positionality; it makes direct what 
is indirect by nature. Human beings are, because of their eccentricity, aware of the 
fact that their knowledge, their language, and their tools occupy a fundamental place 
between them and their environment. Because human beings can, from a distance as 
it were, relate to themselves and understand that it is them who are cognizant of and 
interacting in the world, they have to cope with the indirect and mediated character 
of their interactions. In other words, human beings are aware of the fact that their 
world is always a mediated world. 
 
Although human beings are eccentric, they simultaneously are also centric. They are 
both animal and human beings. This shows itself in the fact that although all 
interactions are mediated and therefore indirect, human beings experience these 
interactions often as direct, just as animals do.
50
 Plessner “borrows Husserl’s idea of 
the intentionality of consciousness” (Kockelkoren 2014: 324) to understand the 
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 On logical grounds, this might seem implausible, because: how can a relation be simultaneously 
immediate and mediated? Although this apparent contradiction might lead to the belief that a human 
being can relate in two different ways to its environment –directly and indirectly- this is a 
misrepresentation. Because human beings are both animal and human, both centric and eccentric, 
their interaction is simultaneously direct and indirect and cannot be understood otherwise (see 
Plessner 1975: 325-326). 
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directedness of all living nature towards their environment. What human beings in 
their interaction perceive comes to them as being direct and real. Artefacts are being 
incorporated in the perceptions and interactions of human beings and move to the 
background of their attention when they interact with the world around them, with 
others, or relate to themselves.  
With this perspective on the mediated relation between human beings and 
their environment, Plessner is a predecessor of the current stance in the philosophy 
of technology called postphenomenology (Ihde 1990; Verbeek 2000; Verbeek 2011b, 
2011a). Central to this perspective is the idea of relationality between human beings 
and their environment (Ihde 1990). Human beings are always directed towards their 
world, they shape it and give it meaning. Simultaneously, the world ‘carries’ and 
‘supports’ human beings, making them who they are. All in all, human beings and 
their world constitute each other. This continuous interaction makes human beings 
and their world inherently “interrelated” (Verbeek 2000: 279). The 
postphenomenological framework conceptualizes the mediating role of artefacts. 
Borrowing some of the central concepts of this framework, I will now look into the 
way in which the mediated immediate experience in the networked era unfolds. 
 
5.5.1 Ready-to-hand smart artefacts 
Although mediated, human beings experience their interactions generally as direct. 
Heidegger has conceptualized in a very informative manner this ‘forgetfulness’ by 
describing technologies or more specific tools as being “ready-to-hand” 
(Zuhandenheit). Artefacts that are “ready-to-hand” are not the object of experience 
but the means of experience
51. As such they “withdraw” as it were from the attention 
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 It has to be noted that Ihde (1993) in his conceptualization of the relations of mediation puts 
Heidegger’s “ready-to hand” on the same level as his embodiment relation. Although the similarities 
are clear –in both cases the technology withdraws from the attention of the user- opening up the world 
in a certain way to human beings, I approach, in line with Plessner’s anthropological law of mediated 
immediacy Heidegger’s “ready-to hand” in a broader manner. Experiencing an interaction as direct, 
even when it is in fact mediated, does not limit itself to embodiment relations, but can also occur in 
other mediation relations. To be absorbed in an interaction, ‘forgetting’ the artificiality of it, is inherent 
in the eccentric positionality of human beings.  
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of human beings in order for them to function as they are supposed to. Artefacts 
direct our attention and action towards a certain practice, which Ihde (1993) refers to 
as the technological intentionality of artefacts. Artefacts come with a certain purpose, 
a said functionality, which invites users to adopt them in a certain way. However, it is 
not just that when artefacts work smoothly, they facilitate a certain practice. They 
also “shape what it means to be a human being, by opening new ways of being-in-the-
world” (Kiran and Verbeek 2010: 422). Artefacts are context-dependent, meaning 
that their meaning is derived from the situation in which they are put to work. 
Simultaneously, artefacts-in-use also bring forth a kind of coherence in the 
environment. The objects surrounding the interaction with the artefact gain a certain 
implicit meaning because of the interaction with the artefact. A familiar world is 
constituted around the artefact. 
For example, when I am working on my computer –let us presume I am 
drafting my doctoral thesis-, I become absorbed by it; forgetting the computer as 
such. I am not really consciously aware of the screen or the typing I undertake; I read 
myself as it were into the text; I am present with the text and the computer 
withdraws. This all changes instantly, when the computer crashes and the screen 
turns black. Heidegger claims that especially when an artefact malfunctions, instead 
of being mediated our attention becomes directed towards the device itself. We 
suddenly are aware of its presence. The artefact is then “present-at-hand” 
(Vorhandenheit). Moreover, all the other objects that were included in my actions 
while typing the doctoral thesis suddenly seem to lose their self-evident presence as a 
result of the malfunctioning of the computer. The coffee I was drinking, the radio that 
was playing in the background, the chocolates I was eating - all these actions were 
connected to working on the computer and now come to stand on their own. The 
familiar world attached to working on the computer has been shattered. The 
confidence put in the computer has not necessarily vanished, but its implicit 
character has. Once more, the computer has to be rebooted and fit in to the user-
context to regain my confidence.  
All in all, we can conclude that if the intentionality of the user aligns with the 
intentionality of the artefact, the mediated and therefore indirect character of the 
interaction moves to the background. Users then experience their interaction as 
direct. As long as the computer functions, I perceive the text of my doctoral thesis on 
the screen in front of me as direct.  
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For an artefact to become the object of our attention, instead of the means of 
our experience, it, luckily, does not necessarily need to break down first. Taking into 
account the fact that smart artefacts never leave the realm of design, therefore, 
staying malleable, shifts in identity of smart artefacts may also instigate such a 
detached position, directing the attention to the device as an object. Updates affecting 
the design of the interface or the usage of programs may initially put me in a relation 
to the computer and the programs itself, rather than that they mediate my 
interactions. Changes in the working of the computer may disturb the familiar world 
carrying my interactions and the confidence I have vested in the device. This may be a 
chance to renew my confidence in the device, but it may also be a threat as changes to 
the device may hinder my interaction with it and makes the complexity, which I 
wanted to make bearable by an act of trust, sensible. In the end, it may turn out that 
my trust in the device was unjustified. This may lead to withdrawing myself from the 
device entirely. 
 
5.5.2 The design of ready-to-hand smart artefacts 
For an artefact to be ‘forgotten’ or to be “ready-to-hand”, it helps if it is designed in 
such a way that it is easy to use. Smart artefacts such as mobile phones, smart energy 
meters, and tablets in general are developed with much attention to user-friendliness. 
Interfaces are designed in such a way that complex scripts and algorithms do their 
work out of sight of the user. The device itself can be easily controlled by 
straightforwardly clicking through a menu of presented options. Often, this last step 
is not even necessary as the default setting of the artefact enables direct use.  
Also the hardware remains out of reach for the user. The products of Apple, 
characterized by their slick and clean black or white design, are a prime example of 
this unburdening design philosophy. Smart artefacts are first and foremost designed 
to deliver personalized and sometimes even pro-active services and certainly not to 
burden their users with difficult usage questions. The whole idea behind personalized 
and pro-active services is exactly that the needs of users are catered in such a fluent 
and inconspicuous way that users are not even aware of the fact that these actions are 
taking place. Therefore, beyond actually interacting with the smart device or service, 
not much other input is expected from the user.  
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The flexibility for users to interpret these devices differently than intended by 
the designers is rather limited as the software as well as the hardware is difficult to 
penetrate. Generally, smart artefacts are designed in such a way that they are easy to 
use and difficult to tweak. As a result, the design of smart artefacts invites human 
beings to approach these devices in a mere functionalistic, dual way: “Do or do they 
not function properly?”  
This lack of possibilities to relate oneself to artefacts is criticized by the 
philosopher of technology Albert Borgmann (1987, 2000, 2009), who sees such 
unburdening and sealed artefacts as hindering a more profound and engaging 
relation with artefacts and, consequently, with the world these artefacts open up for 
human beings. Such devices instigate “paradigmatic consumption” which “attenuates 
human engagement with material reality” (Borgmann 2000: 419). As we will see 
more extensively later, such a functionalistic attitude towards artefacts may have 
significant consequences for trust because it limits its scope.  
 
5.5.3 Relations of mediations in the networked era 
The way in which smart artefacts mediate interactions or open up the world for 
human beings can take different forms. At first sight, when we think about going 
online on our computer or making use of an app on our smartphone, it may seem as if 
we find ourselves in what Ihde has coined a hermeneutic relation. To illustrate what 
he means with a hermeneutic relation, Ihde (1990: 84-85) refers to the use of a 
thermometer
52
. When I am inside, I can read the thermometer and know how cold it 
is outside. I do not have a direct sensory perception, but I can read myself into the 
situation of feeling the temperature outside by looking at the display of the 
thermometer. The thermometer does not so much open up our view on the world, as 
that it represents reality. The thermometer is not transparent but opaque and the 
user has to master certain skills (in this case reading and comprehending the 
Fahrenheit scale) in order to interact with the device. It is not through but by 
(Verbeek 2000: 142) the thermometer’s ability to make clear in a sensible way what 
the temperature is, the world becomes meaningful to the user. The thermometer is 
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 In chapter 8, I will look deeper into the different relations Ihde discerns. 
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my “object of perception”, however, simultaneously it is “referring beyond itself to 
what is not immediately seen” (Ihde 1990: 82).  
Likewise, when I check my Facebook timeline on my computer, the computer 
is my “object of perception”, however, simultaneously it is “referring beyond itself to 
what is not immediately seen” (idem). The interface of the computer represents the 
online world to me. It represents in a sensible way the bits and bytes which I cannot 
perceive with the naked eye. Through the interface of the computer, I am able to read 
myself into the online world without actually being there.  
However, reading the temperature on the thermometer and consequently 
having access to a specific aspect of the world is something fundamentally different 
from me looking at the online interface of my computer, which is not referring to a 
specific aspect of the world, but it is referring to a completely different reality! The 
online world includes bits and bytes (technical level), references to virtual contexts 
(my Facebook timeline), and the offline world (the pictures of my friends represent 
real persons, the information I find on Google shapes my experience of the ‘offline’ 
world). The interface, which enables me to read myself into the online context, is 
simultaneously an integral part of this context.  
In contrast to the thermometer that represents the world and therefore is 
under the influence of a specific aspect of that world (if it gets warmer, the 
temperature I read on the display will be higher), the interface representing the 
online world is influenced by a myriad of actors. The developers and companies 
behind the virtual contexts, the self-learning algorithms, other users, and, of course 
me as a user are constantly shaping and reshaping the online context.
53
 The 
networked ontology of smart artefacts increasingly involves actors beyond the mere 
users. 
 The online environment in which I read myself into through the interface has 
an immersive character (also see Verbeek 2015: 219). I get deeply engaged with the 
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 It has to be emphasized that the influence of the interface on my experience of the world is not 
limited to the online context. In the networked era, the idea of a separated cyberspace and meat world 
is completely redundant. The way in which smart devices deliver services –from the way in which I 
retrieve information online, keep in touch with friend and colleagues, read the news and do my 
groceries- inherently shapes my interactions in and experiences of the world.  
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online service or the interaction with others through an online platform while smart 
algorithms constantly monitor my actions and –for example by profiling activities- 
simultaneously adapt and personalize my interface.  
Taking into account these differences between a “traditional” hermeneutic 
relation and the characteristics of an interaction with a smart device, we need to 
broaden Ihde’ framework. When analysing these interactions with smart artefacts 
and services, we encounter hermeneutic aspects as well as immersive aspects, 
leading to what I refer to as an immersive hermeneutic relation. Through the 
interface we read ourselves into the online context, while simultaneously this context 
is pro-actively engaging with us in visible, but often also in invisible ways.  
 
5.5.4 Immersive hermeneutic relations 
It is generally accepted that with technological mediation some aspects of reality are 
highlighted while others move to the background. This in fact is essentially what 
mediation is about. Mediation always entails a transformation. If there would be no 
difference in the experience of the world with or without a mediating artefact, the 
artefact would be futile.  
To make it more concrete, in its mediating activity the thermometer directs my 
attention to the temperature outside, it represents the world in a specific way, namely 
as a world where it is cold. This representation of the world steers my behaviour in 
certain ways because now I will wear a winter coat, a scarf, and a pair of gloves when I 
leave the house. The thermometer does not say anything about the time of day, 
whether or not it is snowing or if there are a lot of people on the street. Because they 
focus on specific aspects of the world, leaving out others, mediating technologies 
direct our attention and help to shape what we think of as being real. They mould 
reality. 
 
Just as in the interaction with ‘traditional artefacts’ like the thermometer, with smart 
artefacts, some aspects of the world are emphasized while others are hidden from 
sight. However, the transformation smart artefacts bring forth has a fundamentally 
different character. 
Smart artefacts and online services draw heavily on personalization. As we 
have seen, in the networked era, services are tailored to cater to the specific needs of 
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individuals. The mediation by smart artefacts, therefore, is increasingly becoming 
personalized. Consequently, what is shown and hidden from sight for one person can 
be completely different for somebody else.  
While it is true that people may act differently and in unique ways upon the 
thermometer being below freezing point –some will want to go outside and enjoy the 
cold, others will directly walk to the canals to check the ice, others (like me) will turn 
on the central heating and stay inside- the thermometer itself will display the same 
temperature to all people. However, online the temperature fluctuates depending on 
who is looking and who has enough technical savvy. If smart artefacts mediate our 
interactions and therefore help us to shape reality, reality increasingly becomes 
individualized. 
 
A final important aspect of the mediation of smart artefacts is that they not only 
mediate the experience of users and the –augmented- world but also of the curators 
perceiving the users. Through the use of smart devices and online services, users are 
increasingly becoming visible to the curators of the smart artefacts. Without looking 
at specific artefacts or services, it can be expected that smart artefacts of which at 
least partly the business model depends on monetizing data, represent, through data 
mining, the user for the curators behind the artefact. This visibility is often translated 
in profiles that are used to optimize and adapt the functioning of the device. Data 
may, under certain conditions, also be shared with or sold to third parties.  
Although users become visible to the curators, this relation of mediation is 
often invisible to the users themselves. Although users are, to a certain extent, aware 
of the connection they have through their smart devices with these curators, they do 
not have a clear idea of the profoundness and scope of it. The directedness human 
beings experience makes that they ‘forget’ the mediation of their interaction; a 
mediation of which, in the case of smart artefacts, curators are indissolubly taking 
part.  
With a reference to the anthropological laws of Plessner, I identify this relation 
of users and curators as the relation of invisible visibility. Users become increasingly 
visible in for them an invisible way through their use of smart artefacts. This extra 
relation of mediation enabled by smart artefacts obviously brings forth questions of 
privacy and accountability, but as we will see in the following paragraphs, also 
challenges for trust. 
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5.6 Mediated immediacy in the networked era: some challenges for trust  
In the previous section on mediated immediacy, I focussed on the way in which 
human beings experience the world around them mediated through the artefacts they 
use. Artefacts, when they function properly and perform in a way that is aligned with 
the expectations of the user, withdraw from attention. Through their artefacts, 
human beings are directed to the world; human beings are always present in their 
world. 
 
5.6.1 Designed for confidence 
From a perspective of trust, we could say that when people experience their 
environment in a direct manner, “forgetting” as it were the mediating workings of 
their smart devices, they are in a state of confidence, of system trust. Users presume 
that the smart artefacts work as they were intended to. As users in general do not 
have in-depth knowledge about the functioning of the device, they put confidence in 
the expertise of others and rely on them developing well-thought-out devices. 
Confidence often thrives on a sense of “everyone does it, so why can’t I?”. Without 
confidence working in the background, it would be impossible to get around in the 
networked era. The information systems and smart devices, increasingly taking up a 
central role in everyday life, would lose all their attractiveness if users had to 
completely understand them or had to consciously take into account all the possible 
complexity these devices bring forth. Interpersonal trust could never reduce the 
complexity inherent in smart devices. In general when using smart artefacts, users 
are therefore in a state of confidence. 
 
The design of smart devices adds to this state of confidence. Smart devices are 
generally developed in such a way that they are easy to use and do not ask much 
technical understanding of the user. The user knowing how to handle the device does 
not necessarily imply that he or she also knows exactly how the device works.  
As we have seen in the previous section, if the device itself becomes the object 
of attention and is being evaluated, this often happens in a dual manner: “does or 
does it not work?” 
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When it functions properly, the artefact or service is taken for granted and is 
not questioned. As a result, confidence in the artefact again facilitates a smooth 
interaction. If the device unexpectedly does not function, as it should –and 
confidence, therefore, seems misplaced- the reason for the device to malfunction is 
ascribed to external causes. If the problem can be solved, the reasons for 
malfunctioning are accepted by the user, and possible damages are low, then 
confidence will be restored.  
 
Although the dual “does it or does it not work” approach is not wrong –a well-
functioning device is one of the most important conditions for system trust to be 
established- it sometimes is too narrow an approach. It may hinder questions about 
the design of the artefact and how that design relates to the interest of users. Merely 
focussing on its functionality, we may lose sight of the mediating qualities of the 
device; the way in which the device opens up the (online) world.  
 
5.6.2 A personalized familiar world 
The personalized way of mediating the world by smart devices may result in a world, 
which is very familiar to the individual but lacks the common ground, the implicitly 
shared norms and values that are needed to create a world where trust can thrive. The 
actions of others are one of the main sources of complexity human beings have to 
deal with. If human beings increasingly perceive the world as reflecting their initial 
beliefs and are not confronted with different perspectives, personalized mediation 
may lead to a moral bubble instead of a familiar world. If everyone lives in his or her 
personalized familiar world instead of in a shared familiar world, this may hinder 
fluent interactions with others, as trust becomes more demanding to give. If a shared 
familiar world declines, the complexity which trust has to reduce becomes larger. The 
hiatus inherent to human life therefore widens.  
 
A second challenge for trust is the new relation of mediation between curators and 
users as a consequence of the networked ontology of smart artefacts. The 
directedness of human beings towards their environment together with the design of 
smart artefacts focussing on user-friendliness and efficiency makes that for users the 
presence of curators is not self-evident. The influence and power of curators goes 
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beyond the actual experience mediated by the smart artefact. Data collected through 
the smart artefact is not only used to adapt and optimize the functioning of the device 
or service itself, but may also serve other goals such as targeted advertisements on 
other websites and services, pro-active services and price-differentiation.  
The invisibility of these actions makes it rather difficult to escape the state of 
confidence and actively engage with the question if curators are trustworthy and if 
the actions they undertake are in line with the interests of the users. As we have seen 
in chapter 3, confidence or system trust is first and foremost about not personally 
looking for certainty but about relying on the experts who do know the functioning of 
the system and are able to let it work as it is supposed to. However, in the networked 
era, the expertise of curators is not merely active in a certain, limited domain or 
system like it was the case in the air traffic example. The influence of curators reaches 
beyond the mere artefact they develop and maintain. Consequently, it is unclear what 
this confidence users put in curators is worth, as users often do not oversee the 
curator’s actions that move beyond the mere curation of the artefact.  
First, to have confidence or trust in something or someone, one has to be 
aware that one is in a relation of uncertainty and in a dependent position. One has to 
know that there is something at stake. These conditions do not seem to be met in the 
relation of mediation between curators and users due to the invisibility of their 
relation. Second, not only is the relation as such invisible to the user, the 
consequences of the relation, which have an impact beyond the mere mediated 
experience by the smart artefact, are also difficult to perceive. How can a user come to 
know that a price is higher for her because she uses a Macintosh computer instead of 
a Dell device? How can a user oversee the impact on her life because data brokers 
have collected and sold her data to an insurance company? In these situations, 
Dewandere (2015: 212-213) speaks of a risk of “reality theft”. Personalization 
threatens the idea that reality is a shared reality where some fundamental aspects are 
generally the same for everyone. 
In line with Heidegger, an answer could be: it only becomes obvious when it 
has been done in a completely wrong way; when personalization malfunctions. When 
I do not want to book a plane ticket but I receive wrongly targeted advertisements 
about cheap tickets wherever I go online, at such moments, I may become aware of 
the fact that I am being tracked. However, who can I hold accountable? Which 
curator or curators are influencing my perception of the world beyond the mediation 
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of the smart artefact they control? Moreover, where such badly targeted 
advertisements definitely will annoy me and perhaps will make me a bit suspicious, 
they may also wrongly hush me because if they function this improperly, what harm 
can they do? Unfortunately, badly working personalization does not say much about 
algorithms that do work excellently, as we are not aware of the latter. The mal-
functioning services are not representative of those who do work properly. 
All in all, to be in a trust relation, system trust or interpersonal trust alike, 
there has to be some understanding of the relation one is in; one has to know there is 
something at stake. For the relation of mediation of curators and users, the awareness 
of users seems to be lacking due to the invisible character of the relation. 
Consequently, when users put confidence in a smart device, this confidence should be 
understood as confidence in the mediating function of the smart device and not 
necessarily as confidence in the actions of the curators going beyond this mediated 
experience. 
 
 
5.7 Utopian standpoint 
The final anthropological law Plessner describes is the law of the “utopian 
standpoint”. The contingency of human life and the awareness human beings have of 
it leaves them with a feeling of triviality. They have to bear the thought that their 
choices could have been different and, therefore, that their lives could have been 
different. Because of their eccentricity, human beings are homeless by nature. They 
can only live the life they make for themselves. While they on the one hand 
experience their life through and through as their own, a life no one else can lead for 
them, on the other hand they see the smallness of it.  
The law of the utopian standpoint actually refers to the inner drive all human 
beings have to strive for that utopian goal of a home, a native soil, a place where their 
interactions with others, the world around them, and themselves is no longer broken 
but gains a direct character. The utopian standpoint refers to the desire of human 
beings not to bridge but to overcome the three-fold distance in them, between them, 
and between them and the world.  
A dominant manner of coping with this contingency inherent in human life, 
Plessner localizes in religion. Although, the face of religion changes over time and can 
take on a different shape in different cultural settings, its core, namely, to provide a 
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certainty, a final ground which human beings lack for ontological reasons, remains 
essential. To be able to hold on to the belief that there is a meaning to life which is 
pre-given and not has to be made first provides a certainty which nature does not 
provide. 
When Luhmann analysed trust, he came up with three related concepts: 
confidence, trust, and faith. Where the first two both were an affirmation of 
contingency –confidence in an implicit way and trust in an explicit way- faith is a 
denial of contingency. It is not to act as if the future is certain but to believe that it is 
certain. The utopian standpoint in its most extreme variant, as a fundamentalist 
conviction, with no room for doubt or wonder, excludes trust and in fact is in 
contradiction with the eccentric organisation of human life.  
Similar to the previous anthropological laws, Plessner however also 
emphasizes the paradoxical character of this utopian standpoint. Naturally deprived 
of a final ground, human beings turn to a God to ensure their self-made home of a 
solid fundament. Simultaneously, however, their eccentric positionality also leads 
them to doubt the existence of such a divine creature. While it is true that the ability 
to believe in a higher power may reduce complexity inherent in human life, the 
fundament provided by religion remains shaky due to the eccentric positionality of 
human beings. Again, complexity can be reduced but not diminished. On a similar 
note, De Mul (2014b: 459) interprets this paradox as the “tragic” nature of human 
beings. The coming together of “necessity and freedom, brute contingency and 
significance,” (idem) is simultaneously the burden and the splendid chance human 
beings have to relate to.  
 
5.7.1 A utopian standpoint in the networked era 
It can be argued that especially in late-modern Western society the place of God has 
increasingly been occupied by technology (de Mul 2003). Every new technological 
innovation is accompanied by promises to help human beings overcome the three-
fold ontological distance they experience, provide them with complete mastery over 
things, and solve a myriad of other societal problems.  
Also in the networked era, such high expectations are abundant. Big Data 
applications in the health domain should make it possible to personalize and 
therefore optimize treatments, pro-actively functioning smart artefacts and smart 
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services should solve problems even before users are aware of them, ambient 
environments will bend to cater to the needs of their inhabitants. All in all, the 
friction that could be experienced because of the mediated character of the 
interaction may vanish because of the introduction of smooth-operating and pro-
active smart and networked technologies. The interplay between technology and 
human beings in the networked area is increasingly gaining a fluent, almost natural 
character. The invisibility of their functioning feeds the longing of people to live in 
an environment enabled by smart technologies without the interference of those 
technologies. Human beings actually want the transformation without the 
mediation. Ihde (1993: 75) speaks revealingly about a “doubled desire” of human 
beings, which:  
“on one side, is a wish for total transparency, total embodiment, for the 
technology to truly "become me." Were this possible, it would be 
equivalent to there being no technology, for total transparency would be 
my body and senses; I desire the face-to-face that I would experience 
without the technology. But that is only one side of the desire. The other 
side is the desire to have the power, the transformation that the 
technology makes available” (Ihde 1993: 75). 
However, as we have now repeatedly seen, technology is never neutral. It always co-
shapes the situation. Consequently, human beings may long for the outcome provided 
by technology; the mediating workings of that same technology cannot be erased.  
 
Also the Internet itself has been acknowledged to hold such utopian promises (see 
chapter 4). The potential to connect people whole over the world, to make the world 
“flat” (Friedman 2005), to ensure self-government (Rheingold 1993), and total access 
to information are just a few of the aspirations surrounding the Internet.  
The developers and early adapters of the Internet upheld similar beliefs. They 
claimed that the Internet would make nation state-based governments redundant, 
enable self-regulation, and restore freedom and autonomy. Moreover, online people 
would no longer be bound to the material world with its restricting laws –natural and 
social alike- and the limits of their body. On the Internet, people could truly become 
themselves, experimenting with their identity because “all they see are your words” 
(Turkle 1995: 184).  
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Also the availability of information through the Internet instigates the belief of 
godlike omnipotence and omniscience. Complexity inherent in human life suddenly 
seems to become something solvable if we would just be able to collect, connect, and 
use all the information to predict, and if necessary, prevent a certain state in the 
future from happening. Although, with Luhmann, we have already seen that 
technology used to reduce complexity always brings forth new complexity, 
Dewandere (2015: 198) rightfully observes: 
“In scientific terms, contingency is just another name for ‘epistemic 
failure’, a not-yet-known. By denoting contingency with the term 
uncertainty, i.e., as a negative, certainty is made the norm or the ideal”. 
 
 
5.8 Utopian standpoint: Challenges for trust in the networked era 
At the heart of the anthropological law of the utopian standpoint lies the 
confrontation human beings have with their own contingency. Although human 
beings experience that they are at the steering wheel of their life, simultaneously they 
are also confronted with the triviality of it. Their ontological homelessness cannot be 
shaken off; they always take it with them wherever they go.  
In religion, Plessner sees a fundamental strategy human beings apply to deal 
with this confrontation. In late-modern western society, religion increasingly has to 
make way for technology. The high expectations surrounding technological 
innovations, as for example advocated by the open Internet movement, reflect the 
utopian desire to transform the world through technology without actually taking into 
account this technology.  
 
5.8.1 Faith in technology 
A first challenge the utopian standpoint imposes on trust is its inclination to move 
towards faith. If the utopian standpoint loses its paradoxical character and, 
consequently, the openness inherent in the eccentric positionality diminishes, trust or 
confidence is no longer possible. To trust or to have confidence is to accept 
contingency and the possibility that things may turn out differently than expected. 
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However, faith is a denial of contingency. To believe is to be sure about what the 
world is and how it should and will look like.  
Similarly, if one is completely dedicated to technology, owning this technology 
as if it is an integral part of one’s being, one may lose sight of the unintended and 
sometimes unwanted side effects it may cause. A utopian belief in technology is a 
longing for the transformations it brings forth without taking into account the new 
complexity that also arises with every device or service that is used. The changes may 
be small and even invisible to the naked eye, but all artefacts influence the context in 
which they are put to work. To surrender to technology is to give up the critical 
stance towards technology, as well as to others and ourselves. This critical stance 
human beings are able to take because of their eccentric positionality, may be 
sometimes experienced as a burden because it deprives human beings from a direct 
and uncomplicated interaction. However, it is also the starting point of new ideas, 
creativity, and innovation. A strong utopian belief in technology may at first sight 
seem attractive, however, it comes at a high price. 
 
5.8.2 Interpersonal system trust 
A second challenge, which is a direct consequence of an overly-embracing faith in 
technology, is the belief that Internet technology will create a global community 
where ‘traditional values’ such as reciprocity, reputation, interpersonal trust, and 
thick social ties will, just as in pre-modern times, be leading in the interactions of 
users. As a result, top-down regulation, such as provided by states in legislation and 
by commercial actors in contracts, would increasingly become redundant. In the 
networked era, especially information intermediaries such as Facebook, AirBnB, 
Twitter, and Uber create platforms, which enable interactions between persons by 
pro-actively facilitating easy-connection and information exchange. They set up an 
environment where people can present themselves and get to know each other based 
on social cues such as pictures, shared history, and known reputation brought 
together in so-called profiles. In these environments, system trust as discussed in 
chapter 3 might seem to be no longer necessary as people, just as in pre-modern 
times, can act based on interpersonal trust.  
While it is true that through the Internet, the possibility has been created to 
develop relations that are dominantly based on interpersonal trust, the context in 
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which this interaction takes place cannot be left out of the equation. As we have seen, 
information intermediaries, and curators more generally, may influence and steer the 
interaction. Moreover, the technology itself may invite users to display certain 
behaviour. It is not so much that it is impossible to develop interactions, which are 
based on interpersonal trust, through the Internet, however, this interpersonal trust 
has obtained a strongly mediated character. Trust developed for example between 
users of an online platform like AirBnB cannot therefore account for interpersonal 
trust. However, it is not system trust either. Where system trust is about trusting the 
experts behind the system and the employees as contact points of those systems, the 
system in the networked era increasingly moves to the background of the user’s 
experience evoking the idea of seamless and fluently natural interactions. While the 
system is definitely present in its consequences, it is absent in the phenomenological 
experience of users. This development may mistakenly lead users to believe that their 
interaction is interpersonal where it is in fact truly part of a system process. I have 
defined this kind of trust-based interaction as: interpersonal system trust (Keymolen 
2013). People experience their interaction as interpersonal, while there is –often 
unnoticeable in the interaction as such- a mediating system involved. 
 
5.8.3 Solving the problem of contingency 
A final challenge to be faced is the strong belief in predictability in the networked era. 
The collecting and mining of data on a big scale has set in motion a new way of 
approaching reality. The basic belief is that if enough data can be gathered and 
correlations can be found, it will become possible to predict the future almost 
completely. As a consequence, risks do not have to be mitigated anymore, but can be 
prevented from happening at all. The ubiquitous call for Big Data analytics in almost 
all domains of life is the most conspicuous example of this current overall focus.  
If it were true that the future can become something foreseeable, that the 
unknown could be disposed of, then trust would be redundant as there would not be 
any complexity to reduce. The two main sources of complexity, the awareness of 
human beings that a myriad of possible states could become reality in the future and 
that human beings can never completely predict the behaviour of others, would 
simply run dry. Where faith was a denial of contingency, the belief in a calculable 
world even goes a step further. Believing in a completely predictive world is not 
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denying contingency, it is solving the ‘problem’ contingency causes.  
Scholars in Big Data analytics have pointed out that a 100% solid prediction is 
an unfeasible goal. Therefore, contingency can never be completely resolved and 
human beings will always need strategies to deal with the complexity caused by their 
understanding of this contingent world.  
However, in general, human beings are very poor in assessing chances and 
probabilities (Kahneman 2011). What in fact is only likely will quickly become sure 
and proven, especially when the solution comes rolling out of a computer, lacking a 
clear and understandable explanation of how the result was reached. Even if people 
are dealing with probabilities, they often tend to approach the outcome in a dual “yes 
or no” way. This problem is accurately and painfully funnily illustrated in the sitcom 
Little Britain. The character of Carol Beer works in different customer service 
contexts and replies, after typing in the information on the computer, on almost every 
request with the words “computer says no”. Jeroen van den Hoven speaks of 
“artificial authority” to explain the dependence of users on the functioning of 
machines. They can often only read the results produced by the artefact (van den 
Hoven 1998). 
Nissenbaum is wary when we move to a world where safety and certainty are 
the two main goals worth striving. She states: 
“In a world that is complex and rich, the price of safety and certainty is 
limitation. Online as off, (…) the cost of surety –certainty and security- is 
freedom and wide-ranging opportunity” (Nissenbaum 2004: 173-174)  
Also Nicole Dewandere (2015) raises fundamental questions concerning this longing 
for certainty. In her argument against an “omniscience-and-omnipotence” utopia, 
where the main goal is to gain sufficient knowledge and control, Dewandere (2015: 
206), building on the work of Hannah Arendt, warns for a society where “relations 
create no surprise”. Too strong a focus on predictability and control, she argues, may 
hinder the “societal intelligence and resilience” inherent in human life to thrive. It 
leads to approaching people in a mere instrumental way, at the costly price of losing 
the central values of “natality and plurality”, both key concepts in Arendt’s work. 
Natality refers to the ability of human beings to create and to initiate new 
beginnings. So, instead of trying to smoothen all possible problems lying ahead, one 
should have confidence in the ability of human beings to deal with difficulties and 
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unforeseen situations. Plurality is the threefold idea that the human condition is 
defined by equality (people experiencing others as other selves), specificity (the 
uniqueness of human beings), and the reflective nature of identity (in Plessner’s 
terms: human beings’ membership of the Mitwelt). By reducing human beings to a 
data set, focusing on correlation instead of meaning, approaching them in a merely 
functionalistic way, plurality is pressured.  
“Indeed if, together with Arendt, we believe that the purpose of politics is 
freedom, it is high time to endorse and make sense of the world we are 
living in…It is high time for plurality to substitute, or at least complete, 
the other metaphors underlying policy-making, i.e. the invisible hand 
(which encourages the pursuit of one’s own interest, decoupled from all 
forms of empathy towards other selves) or the competitive race (which 
considers others as competitors to be defeated)” (Dewandere 2015: 215).  
 
 
5.9 Conclusion: challenges for trust 
In this chapter, I looked at the contextual layer of trust interactions. Making use of 
the three anthropological laws of Plessner, I analysed the way in which trust and 
smart artefacts are intertwined on the micro-level. An important starting point for 
this analysis is that human beings and their environment are indissolubly connected. 
What human beings are is established in their interaction with the environment. 
Simultaneously, the environment is shaped and gets meaning through the interaction 
of human beings. Currently, its pro-active, persuasive, and connective character 
shapes the environment in the networked era. Artefacts become smart by adding a 
computational component to them, bridging the gap between the material and the 
virtual.  
The three anthropological laws refer to different aspects of the intertwinement 
of human beings and their environment, when adopting them to analyse the current 
interaction of human beings and their environment, they therefore highlight different 
but nonetheless closely connected challenges for trust. The most important ones are 
listed below. 
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5.9.1 Artificial by nature 
-The openness of artefacts to change and adaptation is generally preserved for 
curators and not so much for users. These changes to artefacts may happen with or 
without the awareness of users which –when it does come to the attention- may 
instigate issues of trust in the artefact as well as in the curators behind the artefact.  
-As a result of the difficulty for users to adapt their artefacts, their assessment 
of the artefacts remains in the realm of functionality. Does or does it not function 
properly? This perspective may hinder more fundamental questions about the 
trustworthiness of the services provided and the intentions of the curators behind the 
artefacts. 
-Artefacts may impose codifications, for example through their terms and 
conditions. This may result in certain distributions of power and control, which can 
help to reduce complexity, because it makes the interaction with an artefact more 
predictable. However, it may also destabilize the interaction, when these rules change 
on a regular basis, are set up in incomprehensible ways or do not take into account 
the interests of the user.  
 
5.9.2 Mediated immediacy 
-Through smart artefacts a new relation of mediation becomes possible: 
namely, a relation between curators and users. Facilitated by the networked ontology 
of smart artefacts, the actions of users are made visible to the curators in an often-
invisible way for the users themselves. Again, this may lead to users mistakenly 
assessing only a part of their interaction with smart devices, clouding important 
questions concerning the interests of curators.  
-The tendency to personalize the services delivered by a smart artefact may 
lead to an individualized familiar world, where, for trust to be possible, there is the 
need for a shared familiar world.  
 
5.9.3 Utopian standpoint 
-The utopian belief in the innovations brought forth by smart artefacts may 
lead to a denial of contingency. As a result, the mediating workings of the devices are 
left out of the equation. This may result in the inclination that interactions are 
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interpersonal where online platforms and smart artefacts in fact mediate them.  
 
I have intentionally spoken about ‘challenges for trust’ and not about ‘problems for 
trust’, because the premise that human beings are “artificial by nature” means that in 
the end the way in which artefacts are shaped and designed is not based on natural 
laws which are given and unquestionable. The anthropological laws with their 
paradoxical character, uniting contradicting poles (artificial-natural, mediated-direct, 
utopian-grounded) beautifully illustrate the constantly changing and ambivalent 
character of the interaction of human beings and their environment. Human beings 
are not free in the sense that they can shape their lives without artefacts and beyond 
the influence these artefacts have on their lives, but human beings do have the 
freedom to shape their lives in relation to these powers (see: Verbeek 2011b: 73). 
Verbeek and Kiran (2010) suggest that there are two specific conditions that 
have to be met in order for human beings to “trust themselves to technology”.  
“First, the technology in question needs to leave room to develop an 
explicit relation to its mediating role, rather than being dominating and 
overpowering. And second, human beings need to have the ability to 
‘read’ the mediating roles of the technology, and the skills to ‘appropriate’ 
it in specific ways” (Kiran and Verbeek 2010: 424). 
What I aimed at showing in this chapter is that, taking into account these conditions; 
trust meets some challenges in the networked era. First, the openness necessary to 
shape such a free relation to technology is not the same for all actors. In general 
curators of smart artefacts have more influence in shaping the interaction of users 
and their environment than these users are aware of. Moreover, curators may have 
conflicting interests when their business model is built on monetizing their users’ 
data. So, although smart artefacts do not necessarily need to be developed in such a 
way that they, for example, leak data to third parties in order to function –just as the 
bridges of Long Island did not need to be designed in a way inaccessible to busses- 
the incentive to do so nevertheless is very strong as it is currently the key strategy to 
make money.  
Second, the invisible character of the mediations brought forth by the smart 
artefacts hinders a thorough questioning of our interactions with these artefacts. How 
to style an interaction if you are not even aware that you are in such an interaction? 
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In other words, how to have trust when you are not aware that you are in a dependent 
situation where something is at stake? 
Third, the closed design of the smart artefacts hinders users to appropriate 
them in a trustworthy manner. While there is always the possibility to use an artefact 
in a way that was not foreseen by designers or to put it in a completely different user 
context than was first intended (an image that comes to mind is a TV advertisement 
where an older man uses his iPad as a chopping board to prepare dinner), due to the 
low interpretative flexibility for users, the options are limited.  
Finally, the promise of smart services and smart artefacts to cater to our every 
need, smoothening the paradoxical character of human life may wrongfully persuade 
us to believe that we can completely control and even resolve the complexity inherent 
in human life.  
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6 
Open Sesame. When your phone 
becomes your key. 
 
Central to this chapter is a rather mundane artefact: a key. Generally, it brings to 
mind a small metal device, used to open and lock doors. However, as small and at 
first sight insignificant as a key may look, it plays an important role in everyday life. 
Through the use of a key one can decide and control who is allowed to enter a place 
and who isn’t. Where walls are merely meant to keep people out –or ‘in’, depending 
on your perspective- keys offer choice. Keys bring along flexibility. As long as you 
have a matching key, you can go in and out of a room as you please. You can grant 
people access by giving them a key. You can deny them access by taking the key away. 
By locking the door, you distance yourself from the ‘outside world’ because only 
people with the proper key can enter. Keys therefore are strongly connected to the 
private sphere; they enable the creation of a private domain in which the control to 
access is delegated to the key and its owners. 
A branch of industry where the key is central to everyday business is, of course, 
the hospitality sector and more specifically the hotel sector
54
. After checking in at the 
hotel desk, providing the hotel owner with some necessary personal information such 
as name, address, a copy of an ID-card or driver’s license and credit card credentials, 
a hotel visitor receives the key to his or her room in the hotel. This key is the central 
artefact in the interaction between hotel owner and hotel guest. For the guest, the key 
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 However, it has to be noted that large global hotel chains no longer define the hospitality sector. We 
will see in the next chapter that increasingly also individual homeowners step in to the world of 
hospitality, providing places to stay by renting out their own houses.  
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is a necessary condition to obtain a private domain in a rather public environment. By 
offering the key, the hotel owner transfers a small part of her ‘ownership’ to the guest 
who now –within the boundaries of the hotel policy and common sense- ‘owns’ the 
hotel room for a certain period of time.  
Mutual expectations come along with such a transfer. The hotel visitor expects 
the hotel owner and the hotel staff to honour her privacy by not entering the hotel 
room unannounced. The owner wants the guest to keep the room intact and bring in 
the keys when leaving the hotel. This latter expectation, however, has been a 
challenge for visitors to live up to. In the rush of the moment, returning the keys may 
easily be forgotten.  
The problem of not-returned hotel keys is elaborated by sociologist and 
philosopher Bruno Latour (Latour 1992: 104; Latour 1990) who shows how a key 
attached to a weight may persuade the hotel guest to return the key to the hotel desk. 
By the association of different actants –hotel owner, key, a spoken request, an 
information board, a weight connected to the key- hotel visitors are prompted to 
change their action programme.  
I will recapture Latour’s analysis of the hotel key by retelling it in terms of 
trust. How does the chain of actants –human and nonhuman- change the action 
programmes and therefore the trust between hotel owner and visitor? 
While the weight attached to the hotel key may have had a significant impact 
on hotel practices, the innovations in the hotel sector did not end there. In recent 
years, there has been a shift from keys to keycards that make use of a magnetic 
stripe, smart chip technology, or RFID technology. The introduction of these 
keycards enables a different kind of transfer than the ‘old-fashioned’ hotel keys as 
Latour described them. Not only has the problem of forgotten keys become less 
important –a new keycard can easily be printed, making the old keycard merely ‘a 
card’ as it will no longer be able to open the door of the hotel room- it also opens up 
the possibility of adding new functionality to the key. Where the ‘old-fashioned’ key 
had a rather limited repertoire of functions, the keycard can be programmed to do 
much more. For example, it can be used to monitor the use of hotel facilities linked to 
the keycard or it can track the presence or absence of the hotel guest in the hotel. I 
will show how the keycard co-shapes a specific kind of trust relation between the 
hotel owner and the hotel guest, differing from the relation mediated by the hotel key. 
Finally, I will look into the newest, state-of-the-art hotel key, which actually no 
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longer is a key or a card but a smartphone. In 2014, the famous high-end hotel chain 
Hilton has invested 500 million dollars in the development of a digital environment 
brought together in an app, which not only makes it possible for a customer to select 
a specific room in the hotel and pre-order extra services, but which also turns a 
telephone into a digital key. By waving a smartphone in front of the lock, the door 
opens. With this innovation, a hotel guest no longer has to wait at the hotel desk to 
check-in and the hotel owner can assign tasks to his employees other than checking in 
guests.  
By focusing on the 4 Cs: context, construction, curation, and codification, I will 
show how trust is shaped through this new digital key and how it changes the 
character of the relation between the hotel owner and her guests. 
 
 
6.1 The hotel key and a cumbersome but handy key chain 
Who has not, at least once, forgotten his keys? I do not know if it was intended, but it 
seems that Latour could not have picked a better artefact than a plain and often 
forgotten key to illustrate how artefacts which at first glance only seem ‘neutral’ 
instruments in the hands of their users and, therefore, often forgotten in social 
analysis, do nonetheless matter and make a difference. In different writings, Latour 
therefore makes a convincing plea not to forget the nonhumans when analysing social 
interactions (Latour 1992; Latour 1993). 
To understand the importance Latour attaches to this inclusion of artefacts 
and other nonhuman actants, we first briefly have to go back to the previous chapter. 
There, we saw that in reaction to on the one hand the instrumental view of technology 
as a neutral instrument and on the other hand the deterministic –and overall 
pessimistic- perspective on the relation of human beings and technology proclaimed 
by the ‘classical’ philosophers of technology, more empirically-based, contextual 
approaches were developed. These different schools, which can be gathered under the 
umbrella of constructionism, consist of amongst others the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT), the Social Shaping of Technology (SST), and Actor Network 
Theory (ANT) developed by Latour together with John Law (van den Berg 2009: 29-
30). Likewise, also the philosophy of technology itself underwent changes and 
became, while interacting with these constructionist schools, more empirically 
informed and focussed on specific practices (Kaplan 2009).  
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While it is true that all these disciplines have different starting points and a 
specific methodology, they are united in their critique on the instrumental and 
determinist stance. Where the instrumental perspective does not take into account 
the way in which technologies bear values and pre-sort the actions of their users, the 
deterministic perspective has a rather one-dimensional view of the influence of 
technology, only taking into account the influence of technology on society. The 
constructionist disciplines offer an alternative view, which is based on a mutual 
shaping approach (Frissen 2004, 1994, 1997). In the interaction, both the users and 
the artefact are shaped and form an identity.  
 
6.1.1 Radical thinker 
Latour is probably the most radical thinker on this matter. He not only criticizes the 
deterministic and instrumental perspective but also other constructionist disciplines 
for grounding their position on the subject-object dichotomy and not really 
overcoming this divide, despite of their claimed intentions. Social constructivists, 
such as the adherents of the SCOT school, are too focussed on social factors in their 
analyses. Doing their best to avoid the pitfall of technological determinism, they fall 
in the pitfall of social determinism (van den Berg 2009: 32). Phenomenological 
accounts, on the other hand, with their emphasis on the intentionality of human 
beings towards their environment only assent to the subject-object dichotomy, Latour 
claims (Latour 1993; also see Verbeek 2000: 180-188).  
Latour develops therefore a theory, or better, a set of concepts that could 
replace the “technology/society” divide by instead focusing on technical mediation. 
The basic idea is that humans and nonhumans can only be understood through the 
networks that connect them. It is in their relation with other actants that humans and 
nonhumans are shaped. An artefact only gets meaning in the interaction with 
humans, and humans become who they are in their interaction with artefacts. 
Following Latour, to understand the way power relations work in society, we 
therefore also have to take into account the nonhuman actants and the way in which 
they persuade and mobilize other actants to display certain behaviour in social links.  
“I argue that in order to understand domination we have to turn away 
from an exclusive concern with social relations and weave them into a 
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fabric that includes non-human actants, actants that offer the possibility 
of holding society together as a durable whole” (Latour 1990: 103).  
In other words, if we want to understand power relations and moral behaviour we 
should include the nonhuman actants in our analysis and think through exactly how 
this technological mediation takes place. To illustrate how nonhumans are part of 
power relations and how all networked actants influence each other, Latour comes up 
with the example of the hotel owner who seeks a way to persuade his guests to bring 
back their hotel keys (Latour 1990; Akrich and Latour 1992).  
 
6.1.2 The problem of missing keys 
The history of modern hotels allegedly started in 1862 with the opening of the 
marvellous Le Grand Hotel in Paris (Ambrosino 2014). With 800 rooms and 
beautiful architecture, the Grand Hotel set a new standard in the hotel sector. Also 
the Grand Hotel’s key policy was a prime example of the way in which modern hotel 
business should be run. Metal keys were “attached to a big key-ring, which was hung 
on a board at the concierge office” (Ambrosino 2014: 3). Consequently, guests had to 
visit the concierge first in order to obtain their key or turn it in, as it was not allowed 
to have keys outside the hotel
55
.  
The hotel owner kindly requesting to leave the key at the front desk, did not 
seem to have much effect on the elegant French guests and also a sign with the 
explicit inscription “please leave your room key at the front desk before you go out” 
did not result in the behaviour demanded by the hotel owner (Latour 1990: 103). It is 
only when an “innovator” comes to the rescue and “displaces the inscription by 
introducing a large metal weight, the hotel manager no longer has to rely on his 
customer’s sense of moral obligation” (idem: 103).  
 
                                                   
55
 Latour never explicitly refers to an actual existing hotel or period of time in which he situates the 
problem of the missing hotel keys, because it obviously is more a thought experiment than it is an 
actual empirical case. However, I like to think of it as taking place in the early days of Le Grand Hotel. 
The board with the keys hanging in the room of the concierge still had to be invented and the hotel 
owner was desperately looking for a way to persuade the guests to turn in their keys. 
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“Where the sign, the inscription, the imperative, discipline, or moral 
obligation all failed, the hotel manager, the innovator, and the metal 
weight succeeded. And yet, obtaining such discipline has a price: the hotel 
manager had to ally himself with an innovator, and the innovator had to 
ally herself with various metal weights and their manufacturing 
processes” (Latour 1990: 104). 
What happens here cannot easily be understood by upholding a rigorous distinction 
between humans and nonhumans. For Latour, social interactions do not merely 
consist of human agents but include human and nonhuman actants alike. To 
understand how a bulky keychain changes the behaviour or ‘program of action’ of 
both human (i.e.hotel owner, guests) and nonhuman (i.e. the key, the weight) actants, 
one has to see how “the original program of action is thus translated or transformed 
in the technical mediation into a new one” (Verbeek 2000: 173). 
The program of action of the hotel manager is ‘I want the hotel guests to bring 
back their keys’ which may be in conflict with the program of action of the guests 
which are more focused on ‘having a nice holiday’. The latter is an anti-program 
because it does not align with the intentions of the hotel owner. The hotel owner can 
now try to connect with other actants to fortify her message. She can add an oral 
message to her wish: “please Miss. Anderson, return the key when you leave the 
hotel”; she can put up a sign with the same message; and she can attach a 
cumbersome weight to the key.  
Every time, the hotel owner includes a new actant in the chain of mediation, 
she tries to persuade the hotel guests to adapt their program of action. These 
associations with other actants are always a balancing act. If the hotel manager would 
not tolerate a single missing key, she would have to align with guards at each door to 
ensure that all guests give back their key. Although this might solve the problem, it 
would probably also lead to new problems, such as having no customers at all. And of 
course, there are always stubborn clients who may try to remove the weight from the 
key or new actants entering the scene like dogs traveling together with their bosses 
who see the key weight as something fun to play with. To become a predictable, stable 
action, not necessarily all but most anti-programs have to be countered. It then 
becomes something which people just do, without really thinking about it or 
questioning the request. “The customers obey the order, with only a few exceptions, 
and the hotel manager accepts the loss of a few keys” (Latour 1990: 105). 
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The initial message ‘return the keys when you leave the hotel’ is no longer the 
same because of the associations taken upon by the hotel manager. It has been 
translated. By displacing the message in to the weight added to the key it has 
transformed. The key together with the weight attached to it substitutes the hotel 
manager’s demand for returning the keys. The design of the key weight helps the 
hotel guest to return the key to the front desk. It is no longer something the hotel 
guest has to do by herself; it is partly delegated to the bulky key chain. In these 
associations of humans and nonhumans, changes occur. Because of their 
connectedness they are no longer the same entities. As Latour describes:  
“Customers no longer leave their room keys: instead, they get rid of an 
unwieldy object that deforms their pockets. If they conform to the 
manager’s wishes, it is not because they read the sign, nor because they 
are particularly well-mannered. It is because they cannot do otherwise. 
They don’t even think about it. The statement is no longer the same, the 
customers are no longer the same, the key is no longer the same –even the 
hotel is no longer quite exactly the same” (Latour 1990: 105). 
 
6.1.3 Trust between the hotel owner and the hotel guest   
Now that we understand the way in which Latour analyses the technical mediation 
taken place in the case of the forgotten hotel keys, it becomes possible to retell this 
story now focussing on the issue of trust. The hotel owner (trustor) has to deal with 
the complexity of not knowing for sure if her guests (trustees) will return the key to 
the front desk as they are supposed to. In the transaction of giving the key to the 
guest, there is something at stake. If the hotel owner wants to have a flourishing hotel 
business, she is bound to providing the guest with a key, running the risk of losing the 
key if the guest does not return it. Of course, there are some checks and balances in 
place. The guest has handed over her personal information to the hotel owner, 
making it possible to identify and trace her if something might go wrong. Moreover, 
the guest has signed a contract, agreeing to act according to the rules set in the hotel 
policy. Still, the hotel guest has the freedom to act (agency) in a way that is in conflict 
with the expectations of the hotel owner, making the hotel owner vulnerable 
nonetheless. Trust can never be forced or guaranteed. In that sense, trust is always 
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blind trust. It entails the suspension of looking for more evidence, more certainty, 
and accepting the uncertainty inherent in every social interaction. Trust is a fiction 
necessary to face reality. The hotel owner providing the hotel guest with the key acts 
as if she is sure about the way in which the guest will behave, while in fact she is not.  
Unfortunately for the hotel owner, this trust is often shattered, because of the 
absent-mindedness of careless hotel guests. The hotel owner finds it increasingly 
difficult to trust the hotel guests with the key and therefore tries to influence the 
situation by trying to steer the behaviour of the guests in the right direction. She calls 
upon the guests and puts up a sign, and although these actions help to remind the 
guests of the fact that they are in a situation where trustworthy action is expected 
from them, it does not significantly seem to impact them.  
In an effort to turn the tide, the hotel manager calls in the help from an 
innovator who comes up with the plan to add a weight to the key in order to make it 
physically less attractive for guests to take the key with them when leaving the hotel. 
Also in this new relation of the hotel owner and the innovator trust issues arise. The 
hotel owner has to trust the innovator to come up with a successful plan to persuade 
the guests. Next, when this invention is adopted in the interaction of hotel owner and 
guests, it also becomes an object of trust - of system trust, more precisely. The hotel 
manager then not only has to trust the guests, but also has to have confidence in the 
way in which the keychain functions. 
Finally, when adding the heavy keychain to the key, most of the guests adapt 
their behaviour and bring back the key. Although the interaction has changed because 
of the introduction of the weight attached to the key, it remains an interaction where 
trust is present. Trust is now distributed trust, as the trust first uniquely vested in the 
hotel guest is now shared between the hotel guest and the key with weight; or even 
more specifically, it is invested in the new association of hotel guest + key + weight.  
Although guests display more trustworthy behaviour because of the bulky 
keychain, they can still breach the trust of the hotel owner and take the key with them 
when they leave the hotel. In the altered relation, guests still have agency, which is a 
precondition for trust. If it could be possible to completely control the returning of 
the keys, trust would be redundant. Thus, although their actions are more predictable 
now they interact with the bulky keychain, hotel guests can still act differently than 
expected and hoped for by the hotel owner. Moreover, as already mentioned by 
Luhmann (1979), where technology is used to reduce complexity, it may solve the 
174 
 
problem while simultaneously creating new ones. For example, the new key chain 
persuades guests to return the keys but it also attracts new actants such as dogs who 
perceive the keychain as a toy that should definitely be played with. These actants 
may induce the hotel manager to rethink her policy for animals in the hotel and 
change the trust vested in hotel guests who travel with their dogs.  
 
 
6.2 When a key becomes a card 
In the example of Latour, the cumbersome keychain is a material strategy to persuade 
hotel guests to display trustworthy behaviour. Another strategy, however, could be 
not to try to change the behaviour of the hotel guests, but to see if it might be possible 
to rearrange the situation in such a way that there is less at stake for the hotel owner. 
In other words, if it is possible to provide the guest with a key which, when not 
returned, does not impose too much of a burden on the hotel owner. As we have seen, 
trust always is a risky business. If there is less to be risked, there is less need for trust 
as well.  
The hotel keycard seems to tick all the boxes. This plastic card, generally 
having the looks and size of a credit card- can be programmed to open a specific door 
for a certain period of time. If it is returned to the front desk, it can –depending on 
the type of card- often be reused by overriding the initial data and putting new data 
on it. If it is not returned, the costs to replace it by a new card are rather low. As a 
result, in this new situation there is less at stake for the hotel owner. 
While it is clear that the keycard is a successful strategy to deal with the 
uncertain behaviour of distracted hotel guests, it was not the prime reason to 
introduce the card in the hotel business. It was actually a 1976 lawsuit by famous 
singer Connie Francis that was the wake-up call for hotel owners to abandon metal 
keys and to look for alternatives. The lawsuit Garzilli vs. Howard Johnson’s Mother 
Lodges Inc led to $1,5 million in damages awarded to Connie Francis and her 
husband. In 1974, she was raped after an intruder opened her apparently locked 
sliding hotel door and entered her room. The Court found that the hotel had not 
fulfilled its duty of “reasonable care” and listed several reasons to substantiate its 
verdict. Amongst others: the doors were easily opened although they appeared 
locked, burglars had already entered the hotel four times through these sliding doors, 
and the safer locks that were ordered were still not installed (Sherry 1993: 355). As a 
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result of this verdict, hotels, together with their insurance companies, “learned that 
entrance and exit of their rented rooms related to their own liability and guests’ 
safety.” As a result, “[t]hey became more willing to pay for good security” (Giordano 
1997: 1). 
The keycard seemed to be the solution. A Norwegian inventor named Tor 
Sornes, who heard about the tragic event that happened to Connie Francis –one of his 
favourite singers-, invented the card in 1975. It was a plastic card with 32 holes, 
which made it possible to compose a unique code for every new guest (Ambrosino 
2014). Sornes calculated that there were over 4 billion possibilities, enough to provide 
the whole population of the Earth at that time with their own personal hotel card.  
With this card the privacy of the guests was assured more than in the situation 
with the ‘normal’ key. If previously a key was not returned, the only way to fully 
ensure the privacy of the room was to change the lock and buy a new key. This 
obviously is a time consuming and costly solution. More likely, the key was therefore 
merely replaced by a copy. Consequently, the hotel guest who still possessed the key, 
could access the room long after he or she was allowed to do so or sell the key on the 
street. Indeed, in the 1960s and ’70s these keys were sold on the black market for 
$500 (Sherry 1993: 355). Because in general the name of the hotel and number of the 
door was printed on the key chain, it was quite easy to make use of such an orphaned 
key. In the case of the keycard, however, when a card was lost or not returned, a new 
card could easily be printed. The privacy of the room would be less compromised as it 
was only in the time between losing the card and replacing it that unauthorized 
individuals could open the door, and then if and only if they would be able to trace 
the matching room number, which was not printed on the card. 
 
6.2.1 How do hotel keycards work? 
Where the first hotel keycard Sornes invented was a mechanical card –called the 
VingCard- of which the punched holes in the keycard had to match the template card 
put in the lock (Sornes 1979), he kept on working to improve the security of the card 
to finally introduce the electronic keycard, powered by LEDs in the beginning of the 
1980s. It was the predecessor of another type of keycard that became widely adopted: 
the card with a magnetic stripe. The magnet stripe has to be run over a sensor, which 
can then read the information on the stripe. There are several ways to encode the 
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information on the card.  
The first method that can be used is to “encode the check-out date of the hotel 
guest and the lock information. This tells the electronic lock that the key is supposed 
to open the door until the specified date and time. The hotel keycard is also issued the 
lock information. Every lock has an individual code”56. When the card is then inserted 
into the lock, the lock compares the information on the card with the information 
locally stored in the lock. 
The most common way to embed these magnetic keycards, however, is to wire 
every lock to a server. This gives the hotel staff more control over the keycards and 
makes it also easier to replace a lost card. Where with the first method the lock has to 
be manually reset when a keycard has gotten lost, with the second method this can be 
done from behind the front desk. Wiring the lock to the server can be done by making 
use of hardwired connections to a central computer or by making use of different 
sorts of radio waves.
57
 
The most recent keycard is the RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) 
keycard. These cards are provided with a radio sensor chip. When they are held close 
to a corresponding reader, the doors can be unlocked. Because these cards contain 
both microchips and radio technology, they are considered to be the most secure 
ones. Also with the RFID card, locks are connected to central computers. This can be 
done wirelessly, by installing routers and gateways that connect the locks to the LAN 
(Local Area Network) of the hotel. Or it can be done through wires, directly 
connecting the locks to the LAN of the hotel. Next to the lock itself, RFID lock 
suppliers offer hotels also different monitoring options, which I will discuss in section 
6.3.2.  
 
Up until now, I have talked about RFID keycards, but actually, as RFID facilitates 
contactless interaction, the shape of the key becomes less absolute. Not only can 
cards be used, but keyfobs and wristbands for example as well. Moreover, as the 
state-of-the art lock systems are compatible with NFC (Near Field Communication) 
 
                                                   
56 http://www.plastic-card-services.co.uk/information/hotelkeycardsinfo.html, Accessed 10 June 
2015. 
57
 http://www.magnetickeycards.com/, Accessed 10 June 2015. 
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and BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) technology, it also becomes possible to enable 
contactless communication between the locks and smartphones equipped with NFC 
or BLE58. 
 
6.2.2 Revised: Trust between the hotel owner and the hotel guest  
Just as the trust relations changed because of the introduction of the bulky keychain, 
the trust relations changed again with the introduction of the keycard. The keycard 
mediates in a different way the interaction between the hotel owner and the hotel 
guests, resulting in an altered trust relation between the hotel owner and the hotel 
guests. As we have seen, with the metal key, the complexity the hotel owner had to 
reduce by trusting his guests to return the key was rather large.  
With the introduction of the keycard, however, the hotel owner (trustor) 
becomes less vulnerable to breaches of trust. If the guest (trustee) does not return the 
keycard, this is much less of a problem than it was the case with the metal key. The 
owner –or the hotel staff- can just print a new one when a key has got lost.  
Moreover, the introduction of the keycard also in another way influenced the 
trust relation of hotel owner and hotel guest. In comparison with the traditional key, 
the keycard is more secure
59
. As a result, it becomes less likely that an intruder can 
enter the room. The positive expectations of the hotel guest, that the hotel owner 
provides her with a save place to stay will come to pass. As we have seen, trust always 
implies vulnerability, uncertainty; there has to be something at stake. By replacing 
the metal key with the keycard, this vulnerability is been substantially reduced.  
 
Is trust then no longer existent in the interaction of hotel owner and guest?  
 
Trust did not become redundant, as the interaction of hotel owner and hotel guest is 
certainly not completely defined by the transaction of the key or keycard. The hotel 
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 http://www.assaabloyhospitality.com/en/aah/com/press-room/product-documentation/, p8, 
Accessed 09 June 2015. 
59
 Of course, also keycards can be stolen or forged. Security is never 100%. For example, magnetic 
stripe keycards can be cloned and there are several tutorials online on ‘how to hack your hotel 
keycard’. 
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owner also still expects the guest not to cause any annoyance for the other guests and 
not to ruin the room. And the guests still expect the hotel owner and the staff to 
honour the privacy of their hotel room. Moreover, technology’s own weight brings 
along new complexity both hotel owner and hotel guest have to cope with. The hotel 
owner has to trust her suppliers to provide her with reliable cards and systems, the 
hotel guest has to become familiar with the way the cards work (how to put them in 
the card reader, how to make sure they do not get damaged). 
All in all, the introduction of the keycard did alter the trust relation, not 
because it led to a new distribution of trust –as was the case with the adding of the 
key chain- but because it reduced the vulnerability of the hotel owner and helped to 
establish a familiar world. While the introduction of the keycard adds up to a familiar 
world, necessary for trust to be established, it also introduces new complexity the 
actors involved have to relate to. 
 
 
6.3 When a keycard becomes a smartphone 
On 28 of July 2014, the prominent hotel company Hilton announced that as part of 
extending their customized digital services to hotel guests, they would make it 
possible for guests to use their phones as a key to open the lock of their hotel door. 
These new services would, amongst others, enable customers to choose their own 
room, pre-order services, skip the check-in at the front desk, and let them go straight 
to their room. Hilton declared to invest $500 million dollar to start this operation60. 
Also other hotel chains such as Starwood Hotels & Resorts (SPG) and Hyatt Hotels 
and Resorts started testing the possibility of using a smartphone to open doors 
(White 2014). Moreover, in brochures of suppliers, the possibility to convert current 
lock systems into systems that facilitate NFC and BLE which makes it possible to let 
smartphones and locks connect is being promoted61. 
We started this quest with a mundane metal hotel key that went missing more 
often than the hotel owner was willing to accept. Now, we find ourselves engaged with 
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 http://news.hiltonworldwide.com/index.cfm/newsroom/detail/27192. Accessed 09 June 2015. 
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the hotel key of the networked era, no longer a key but a phone. It seems as if with 
the future arrival of this keyless key, a new milestone in the history of hotel keys will 
be reached, bringing together the advantages of RFID enabled key systems, the 
managing software systems connected to the locks, and the functionality of the 
smartphone. By integrating the functionality of a key –opening doors- into the 
workings of a smartphone, the keyless key is a prime example of the connectedness, 
personalization and pro-activity we saw to be crucial to the current networked era. 
Then again, the fact that this technical change is not neutral, but brings along 
new complexity, new vulnerabilities, and therefore new trust interactions, does 
probably not come as a surprise. To include the way in which the networked ontology 
of both key and lock, both phone and lock, mediate and co-shape the trust of hotel 
owners and hotel guests, I will analyse them through the conceptual lens of the 4 Cs 
framework I discerned to analyse Internet technology: context, construction, 
curation, and codification. As there is not yet much known about the specific, 
technical workings of the door-opening smartphone, I will base this part of my 
analysis on the digital key apps that are already online, the press releases of the hotels 
themselves, their current privacy policies, the coverage in the media, and the 
brochures of suppliers of the lock systems and accompanying software to manage 
these systems in order to make the network of actants as complete as possible.  
 
6.3.1 Context 
How do hotel guests interact with the hotel and its staff when the digital key becomes 
an integral part of their stay at the hotel? How do they perceive their hotel stay when 
it becomes co-shaped by the app?  
First, guests have to download the designated app. This can be the app issued 
by the hotel itself –for example Hilton and Starwood both have their own branded 
applications- but there are also companies developing ‘third-party apps’62. Whereas 
the hotel-issued apps are designed to fit the specific services and brand of the hotel, 
the third-party app is more generic and compatible with all hotels that have installed 
the proper locks and interfaces.  
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Generally, all apps are designed in such a way that the interface is easy to use 
and functions intuitively. The average user should be able to just open the app, tap 
through the menu and find his or her way around the digital hotel environment 
without having to depend on extra instructions or assistance. 
Next, when the app has been installed and a reservation has been made, the 
guest can opt in to request a digital key. If the hotel already supports the digital key, 
the guest will receive a push notification –after checking in and confirming payment 
in the app- with the room number and the digital key –some kind of encrypted code- 
on the day of arrival. The guest can then go straight to the room, avoiding the check-
in at the hotel’s front desk. By waving the phone close to the lock on the door, the 
door can be opened. When guests want to check out, they can do that making use of 
the RFID tags around the hotel or in the app itself. After checking out, the digital key 
is cancelled and the phone can no longer open the hotel door.  
In addition to the digital key, the app also allows guests to personalize their 
stay. They can choose –making use of digital floor plans- which particular room they 
want and they can pre-order all kinds of services: all to make their stay as pleasant 
and seamlessly as possible.  
Already in 2010, a test was conducted in the Clarion Hotel in Stockholm to 
collect feedback of guests on the use of digital keys (see Pesonen and Horster 2012: 
14-15). The hotel provided 30 guests with an NFC-enabled phone they could use to 
make reservations and to receive a digital key. The results of the survey that was part 
of the trial showed that: participants appreciated not having to check in and out, they 
all saved time, almost all participants would use digital keys again if NFC compatible 
phones where available, and a majority of the guests also declared that “the service 
made their hotel stay more pleasant” (Brown 2011).  
Before starting their new digital services, also the Hilton chain took a survey to 
become aware of the wishes of their clients. They found that 84% were in favour of 
choosing their room and two out of three wanted more control over the room where 
they stayed63. 
Next to this first experiences reported by users, others who have tried out 
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similar digital keys, found it superior to the magnetic swipe cards because: 
 
“First, it’s much harder to lose a smartphone. Second, your smartphone 
can’t be demagnetized by other things in your pocket. Third, you can skip 
check-in completely and go straight to your hotel room – and you can skip 
the check-out, too” (Anthony 2014). 
Neuhofer et al. (2015: 7) developed an overview of some of the key experiences guests 
may have during their stay at the hotel and mapped the way in which smart 
technologies change those experiences. First, in the old situation –without smart 
technology- the settings for the comfort of the room are uniform. With smart 
technologies they can be personalized based on preferences known prior to the arrival 
of the guest, the settings can be dynamically updated during the stay, and also 
employees can update their observations through smart technologies.  
Second, without smart technologies the welcome moment at the desk is 
standardized and rather impersonal and general. With smart technologies this 
interaction can become personalized because the staff members not only already 
know the name of the guest and his or her preferences, the guest also already knows 
the staff members because they were already presented to the guest through the 
application.  
Third, without smart technologies, visits to the restaurant or other services 
also remain standardized. With smart technologies involved, the greeting and 
welcome can become personalized as the staff can already know the preferences of 
the guest. Updates of preferences can dynamically take place. All in all, the 
introduction of the digital key and the extra digital services provided by the app has 
to lead to a personalized and comfortable stay for the guest. 
 
Notwithstanding all these positive expectations concerning the digital key and the 
supporting smartphone application, from a user’s perspective some uncertainties also 
arise concerning the use of these digital hotel services. Ambrosino (2014) for example 
wonders what the impact of the keyless key may be on the guest’s interactions with 
hotel staff. Where Neuhofer et al. (2015) chiefly focus on the personalized experience 
made possible by smart technology, Ambrosino (2014) wonders if digital keys not just 
lead to more impersonal hotel experiences. If guests skip the front desk and can order 
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everything in the app, will there still be face-to-face interaction? For that reason, 
more traditional hotels such as the Ritz in London hang on to the metal key, in order 
to preserve the personal interaction with hotel guests. If the digital key will stimulate 
or hinder the interaction with hotel staff remains to be seen, but that the interaction 
will change is a given.  
Another question concerns the security of the application. As we will see when 
we look at the construction layer, the key and lock system is generally being judged as 
the most secure option. However, this judgement is primarily based on possible 
threads of malicious intruders or hackers coming from outside and does not so much 
take into account the interests of the ‘insiders’ or the curators (the hotel owner) and 
the way data is collected, stored and used through the use of the app.  
In addition, this focus on threats coming from the outside is also rather blind 
to the ways in which hotel guests themselves may misuse the application. Whereas in 
the situation of the old-fashioned metal key problems arrived because of the 
negligence of the guests, now problems may arise because guests create easy-to-break 
passwords, not being fully aware of the consequences it has when their phone 
suddenly becomes more than just their phone, but a way to gain access to their 
personal domain. The guest’s phone becomes more valuable and therefore also more 
attractive to steal or hack. 
 
6.3.2 Construction 
Where the guests interact with the interface of the app, all the technical processing is 
conveniently tucked away behind the sleek and intuitive design of the interface. As a 
result, the hotel guests are not directly confronted with the technical workings of the 
app or with the values that by means of the technology are embedded in the app. This 
makes their assessment of the digital key often superficial, as the most dominant 
options become: does or does it not work? Or, do or do I not use it?  
To take into account the technology of the digital key, we have to look –in 
Latour’s terms- at the network of nonhumans and humans that make it function. 
Consequently, it is not enough to merely look at the smartphone itself. We should 
also at least include the locks with which the smartphone interacts and to the 
managing system connecting with the locks. As a point of reference, I will look at the 
lock systems of supplier Assa Abloy, which Sornes’ company VingCard Elsafe is part 
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of, as it not only is one of the global leaders in lock systems, but also is the supplier of 
the Starwood Hotels and Resorts chain, one of the first hotel companies to introduce 
the digital key.   
However, it has to be noted that the network is much broader than merely 
these three components. Also the cable –often forgotten when packing your bag- to 
connect the smart phone to the electricity grid is part of this network and the grid 
itself is a necessary feature for the digital key to function. Unfortunately, it falls out of 
the scope of this chapter to include them all in the analysis.  
  
NFC 
The locks of ASSA ABLOY that connect with the smartphone work with RFID – as 
they first had to interact with RFID keycards- but now they are being upgraded to 
become compatible with NFC (Near Field Communication) and BLE (Bluetooth Low 
Energy) technology.  
NFC is a:  
“short range and wireless technology for data transfer without physical 
touch”[…] “NFC is an open standard so it can be integrated into many 
electronic devices. On the consumer’s side the primary NFC device is a 
mobile phone or a tablet computer. In combination with NFC, the device 
will act as a smart-key to gain access to services from any other NFC 
device or tag” (Pesonen and Horster 2012: 11). 
Madlmayr and Sharinger (2010: cited in Pesonen & Horster 2012:12) make a 
comparison between different wireless technologies and find that compared to 
Bluetooth and WiFi, NFC is superior because of its fast and automated connection. 
They remark that NFC could also be used to set up a Bluetooth or WiFi connection. 
NFC “originates in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology” but whereas 
with RFID “the focus is on identification, NFC is based on interaction” (Pesonen and 
Horster 2012: 12). Pesonen and Horster (2012:12) also list several advantages of NFC. 
They state that, amongst others, the technology is “compatible with existing RFID 
structures, tags and contactless smart cards”, that the “short transmission range 
provides inherent security”, and that “it is easy to use as users do not need to know 
anything about technology”. The NFC chip is increasingly being integrated in mobile 
devices such as in the iPhone 6, iPad mini 3, and the Apple Watch. This latter gadget 
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even has its own integrated hotel app, which apparently is compatible with the lock 
system of Starwood’s hotel chain (Boden 2015).  
BLE 
BLE –also promoted as Bluetooth Smart- is a low-power technology developed for 
short-range control and monitoring applications (Gomez et al. 2012: 11734). 
Bluetooth in general allows devices to communicate with each other over radio links. 
It is a global standard and is incorporated in almost all mobile phones, tablets, and 
laptops. Typically, Bluetooth enables communication over 100 metres, but by 
adapting the power rates, this distance can decrease to ensure the “appropriate 
combination of power consumption and distance” for the application that the device 
is intended for (Gupta 2013: 20).  
The Low Energy variant is the latest enhancement and is now part of 
Bluetooth 4.0 specifications. One of the biggest advantages of this technology is that 
because of its low power feature, devices compatible with this standard are expected 
to function on very low power rates. Consequently, these devices will be able to  
“operate for months or even years on coin cell or smaller batteries without 
the need for recharging or replacing batteries. This is very useful in 
applications (like hotel locks! EK) where it may be difficult to recharge 
frequently and longer battery life is important” (Gupta 2013: 6).  
Other advantages of BLE that are listed are: its small size, low cost, short range, faster 
connections, and security. Moreover, BLE can be built onto the existing Bluetooth 
infrastructure, making it easy to adopt (Gupta 2013: 7-8). 
One of the most promising BLE-enabled applications is the so-called Beacon. 
Apple, as a frontrunner in this domain, even developed its own iBeacon. These often-
small devices send out a unique identifier to a compatible app or device in the 
vicinity, after which a certain action can be triggered or a push notification can be 
sent. Apple, for instance, uses iBeacons in its stores to provide users with: extra 
product information tailored to the products the customers are looking at in a specific 
part of the store, special offers, and the opportunity to pay for the products through 
their phone, skipping the line in front of the checkout. In a similar fashion, iBeacons 
can also be used on hotel premises. 
 
Security of BLE and NFC 
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Both BLE and NFC are deemed to be secure, with NFC being the most secure because 
of its proximity requirements. More than NFC, BLE runs the risk to interfere with 
other transmissions and it is also more vulnerable to DDOS (Distributed Denial Of 
Service) attacks. Also, researchers at Context Information Security have shown that it 
is rather easy to monitor and record data sent by BLE empowered devices; they even 
developed an Android app to demonstrate this (Lester 2015). The researchers found 
that although BLE devices have a random MAC address –which network protocols 
need to identify devices-, these MAC addresses seldom change, making them in fact a 
unique identifier. Although it is possible to “implement public key encryption and 
keep packet sizes down, while also supporting different authentication schemes”64, 
the researchers found that:  
“Many BLE devices simply can’t support authentication and many of the 
products we have looked at don’t implement encryption, as this would 
significantly reduce battery life and increase the complexity of the 
application”
65
.  
For the hotel business –as we will see when discussing the involvement of the 
curators- the longer range of BLE is nevertheless very attractive as BLE beacons 
integrated in the hotel environment and may be used to enhance and personalize the 
stay of the hotel guest. 
It has to be noted that NFC also has its vulnerabilities. It is for example 
possible to replace a NFC tag with malicious content, seducing the unaware user to 
download malware on its device. Or, an ‘accidental’ bump against a virus-infected 
NFC enabled device can threaten the integrity of your device and the information 
stored on it. 
 
Managing systems 
Functionality is also of uttermost importance when looking at the property 
management systems (PMS) of hotels. Increasingly, all necessary hotel operations – 
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from checking in guests, maintenance, to security - are brought together in one 
managing system. Also Assa Abloy offers a modular system, giving hotels the 
possibility to build a system tailored to their needs and wishes. Assa Abloy offers an 
online and an offline management version. The offline version is the basic software 
program with options such as: easy check-in, access management, payment with the 
keycard. 
The online option gives the hotel owner the opportunity to extend the offline 
system by different modules such as a Security Operations module to detect 
wandering intruders (for example, when someone uses one card to try to open 
different doors, this card automatically is cancelled), immediately block access to 
certain areas, and track users (by seeing the user’s last registered locations). Also, it is 
possible to add a module called Frontdesk Operations, which includes the 
automatically activation of keycards upon check-in and in advance sending to the 
guests an SMS or e-mail with their room number66. 
While it is true that the data mostly stays in the property management system 
(Mitchell 2006), the smartphone –or RFID-enabled keycard- itself can function as a 
source of new data as it may transmit the data on the activity of the guest in the hotel 
to the management system. 
 
Security of management systems 
It is rather difficult to assess the security of the management systems as the hotels as 
well as the system suppliers do their uttermost best to protect the technical specifics 
of their proprietary technologies (Manley 2015). Especially in the early phase of 
development and implementation, hotel businesses want to obtain and keep an 
advantage over their competitors. This leads to superlative, but rather trivial 
language, such as:  
“Our commitment and strength is to offer the highest reliable security for 
both your hotel and your guests. Through experience, knowledge and 
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modern technology, VingCard has continued to deliver just that in over 30 
years”67.  
Harry Sverdlove (cited in White 2014), chief technology officer at the cyber security 
firm Bit9, comments that when it comes to security in the hospitality industry, the 
biggest challenge is that “convenience trumps security”.  
“While encryption –which hotels say they are using for mobile keys- 
certainly helps, the more difficult a digital system is to access and make 
changes to, in general, the harder it is to breach. […] A system flexible 
enough to accommodate requests for physical keys, multiple guests per 
room and other considerations is a priority for hotels concerned about the 
user’s experience, but these concessions can make the system more 
vulnerable” (White 2014). 
In general, hotel owners do claim that “the locks and mobile keys are designed to be 
equally secure as traditional room keys” and that they “prioritize guest and property 
safety above all else” (Manley 2015). All in all, it seems that when it comes to security, 
hotel guests simply have to trust the hotels and their system suppliers to have 
invested in appropriate technical security measures. 
 
6.3.3 Curation 
The most important curator of the digital hotel key is the hotel owner
68
. To 
understand hotel companies’ reasons for developing and implementing digital keys, 
one has to take into account the more encompassing trends in the hospitality sector. 
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These trends are, not surprisingly, linked to dominant, technological developments in 
society. As we have seen in the previous chapter, in our current networked era 
innovations in ICT enable more personalized and pro-active services. Providing 
customers with digital keys to give them more control over their stay fits neatly with 
this trend.  
A necessary condition to pro-actively cater to the personal needs of customers 
is the collection and analysis of large quantities of –personal- data. The hotel 
business, therefore, explores the potential of monitoring technologies, “not only to 
optimize existing processes but facilitate the creation of more meaningful and 
personalized services and experiences” (Neuhofer et al. 2015: 1).  
By collecting all sorts of data on their customers, hotels want to offer them a 
personalized and comfortable stay. Moreover, hotels want to seamlessly fit in the way 
in which their guests go about their businesses, which increasingly is by making use 
of mobile devices. Based on their own research and the pilots that were conducted, 
hotels conclude that “guests were thrilled to be part of the next-gen way of hoteling 
and eager to use the technologies at more properties” (Manley 2015). Chris Holdren 
(cited in: Manley 2015), senior VP of global and digital at Starwood Preferred Guest & 
Digital explains: 
“Our tech-savvy guests manage most aspects of their life and travel from 
their smartphone, and many no longer want to keep track of or fumble 
with keycards each time they enter their room. Because of this, we are 
constantly working ahead of the curve to implement the latest 
technologies and all of our brands are constant working laboratories for 
the latest innovations”. 
The gathering of data is already part of the hotel processes for quite some time. 
Through customer relationship management services (CRS), provided by companies 
such as Libra OnDemand, hotels collect information about guests. This information is 
not limited to what happens within the hotel –whether or not guests make use of 
room service, the restaurant, special offers, if there are incidents, …- but may also 
include information retrieved online (Lindberg 2013).  
With the arrival of the hotel app and -as a new part of that- the digital key, also 
geo-location information can now be added to the CRS database. Moreover, by also 
making use of iBeacons, guests -who have downloaded the designated app- can be 
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tracked and followed when they move around in the hotel. This information can not 
only be used to monitor hotel operations –for example if there is a queue in the 
restaurant- but iBeacons can also be programmed to send push notifications with 
special, targeted offers to the guest’s smart phone, when she is, for example, nearby 
the pool or cafe.  
 
From a user’s perspective, digital tools are designed to give guests the desired “choice 
and control” over their stay69. From the curator’s perspective, digital tools help to 
create personalized and pro-active services, which in the end must lead to more 
revenue for the hotels. Or, as Hilton Worldwide’s global head of digital services 
Geraldine Calpin puts it: 
“Everything we do is designed to better serve our guests so they are more 
loyal to our brands –including digital tools- thereby driving business and 
generating revenue for owners. We expect a high return on investment 
from the digital tools driven by increased brand loyalty and incremental 
revenue from push notifications, upsell opportunities and pre-arrival 
requests” 70.  
All in all, the implementation of the digital key should not only ensure that the 
customer’s experience of staying in a hotel is up to date and in line with her 
expectations of how a hotel in the networked era functions. The digital key is also a 
new tool in the hands of hotels to better get to know their customers by collecting a 
wide range of information –including geo-location data- of their customers, which 
then can be used to sustain customers’ loyalty to the brand and, in the end, make 
more money.  
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6.3.4 Codification 
Finally, as the last part of analysing the several conceptual layers of the digital key, we 
will look into the privacy policies of some of the digital key pioneers in the hotel 
business to see in which ways they issue rules and regulations about the digital key 
and the collection of data. While it is true that these privacy policies have to comply 
with the applicable legal requirements, hotel companies might well look for the 
borders of what is legally acceptable. Moreover, it is not always clear-cut what is 
allowed and what is not. Thus, as long as companies don’t get reprimanded, their 
interpretation of what is legally acceptable, which can be found in their issued 
policies, is determining.  
Hotel Corporation Hilton
71
 distinguishes between personal information and 
other information. The former is information that directly refers to a person, where 
the latter does not personally identify a customer
72
. This other information may also 
include, amongst others, data collected online through cookies; Hilton does not 
respond to “do not track” and other blocking technologies. The privacy policy of the 
Hilton Hotel states that personal information is being used to provide services 
requested by the customer and pro-active services initiated by the hotel (for example, 
promotions and prize draws). The other information “may be disclosed for any 
purpose”73. The Hilton hotel may also combine personal information and other 
information, which will then be treated as personal information.  
Information on the use of the digital key, which is being collected by the hotel 
as well, is also categorized as ‘other information’. When the app makes use of GPS, 
Hilton will make use of this information to locate a hotel nearby and/or to provide 
customers with “relevant location-based information”74. Hilton states that it will 
abide by the settings of the device when accessing these data. When they collect 
 
                                                   
71
 http://hhonors3.hilton.com/en/promotions/privacy-policy/english.html, Accessed 25 June 2015. 
72
 Hilton Hotel also refers to sensitive information (health data, racial data, ethnic origin, political 
opinions,…). They claim not to collect this kind of information unless the customer volunteers it. 
Health data, for example, when voluntarily provided, may then be used to provide better services to 
the hotel guests.  
73
 http://hhonors3.hilton.com/en/promotions/privacy-policy/english.html, accessed 25 June 2015. 
74
 Idem. 
191 
 
location-based information, they may share it with third parties.  
As the digital key can be part of a loyalty programme of the hotel brand, it may 
be necessary for guests to become a member of such a programme first, in order to 
receive a digital key. Consequently, extra information will most likely be shared, like 
an online profile, preferred airline partners, language preferences, and room type 
preferences.  
Starwood, another frontrunner in the digital key domain-, lists similar 
activities in its privacy statement. In addition, Starwood explicitly states that they 
also collect information from social media platforms such as Foursquare and 
Facebook, as guests can connect to these platforms with their hotel-issued app. 
Because a company such as Facebook makes it possible for third parties like 
Starwood to also collect the list of Facebook friends of the hotel guests, even 
information about people who are not frequenting the hotel can be kept in the hotel’s 
database.  
Marriot
75
, another hotel branch issuing digital keys, has included a separate 
paragraph in its policy about the use of beacon technology as well as a paragraph on 
liability concerning the use of the digital key. Concerning the former, Marriot states 
that when customers opt-in through their app –by giving consent to the sharing of 
information-, the hotel will collect information about them and send special offers 
through Bluetooth. Marriot will continue to do so, until the customer has logged out. 
If the app is running in the background, it will still gather information.  
Concerning the latter, the statement declares that if the use or misuse of a 
digital key leads to the hotel guest experiencing any kind of loss, the hotel is not 
liable. All members of the Marriot group and connected third partners: 
“expressly exclude any liability for any direct, indirect or consequential 
loss or damage incurred by any user in connection with his/her use, or 
inability to use, a digital key, including, without limitation any liability for 
loss of income or revenue; loss of business; loss of profits or contracts; 
loss of anticipated savings; loss of data; loss of goodwill; and for any other 
loss or damage of any kind, however arising and whether caused by tort 
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(including negligence), breach of contract or otherwise, even if 
foreseeable”
76
.  
In other words, whereas in 1976 the court in Garzilli vs. Howard Johnson’s Mother 
Lodges Inc explicitly pointed at the hotel’s responsibility of reasonable care for the 
safety and integrity of the room and instigated the introduction of the keycard as a 
safer medium than the traditional key, with the introduction of the digital key, hotel 
owners seemingly aim at putting this responsibility partly back into the hands of the 
hotel guest. Hopefully we do not need a new Connie Francis to see if this kind of 
exoneration holds.  
 
As we already established in the previous paragraph, hotels always have been 
collecting information about their guests. The introduction of the digital key is, rather 
than the base line, the icing on the cake when it comes to the collecting of data. 
Therefore, in order to get an idea of the true range of personal information gathering, 
one also has to take into account the other information strategies already put in place 
by the hotel.  
Taking into account the privacy policy of the Hilton hotel, the conclusion can 
be short: “at every touch point or guest interaction” personal information may be 
gathered
77
. This information includes –amongst others- contact information, 
personal characteristics, nationality, income, passport number and data and place of 
issue, travel history, etc. It may also include the collection and keeping of information 
and records “related to conversations, including recording or monitoring customer 
service calls”78.  
Personal information may also be obtained from third parties such as from 
airline and credit card partners, as well as information derived from social media 
sites. It may also be shared with affiliates, franchisees or business partners of the 
hotel. And the information will be retained “for the period necessary to fulfil the 
purposes outlined in this Statement (the privacy policy, EK), unless a longer retention 
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period is required or permitted by applicable law”79. 
All in all, the introduction of the digital key can be seen as a new strategy in a 
longer tradition of hotels to gather information on their customers. With the arrival 
of the digital key not only is a new tool being added to the hotel’s arsenal of 
monitoring tools, also a new sort of information is collected: geo-location data. 
Moreover, the digital character of the collected information enables the hotel not only 
to collect, but also combine, analyse and share the data, bringing forth questions 
concerning privacy and accountability. 
 
6.3.5 Revised and repeated: Trust between the hotel owner and the hotel guest 
With the arrival of the RFID card, and especially with the introduction of the 
smartphone as a digital key, the trust interaction between the hotel owner and the 
hotel guests has changed again. Whereas with the introduction of the bulky keychain, 
trust became distributed between the guest + key + chain, the use of the keycard 
decreased the vulnerability of the hotel owner, making trust less needed as a way to 
deal with the uncertain behaviour of hotel guests. With the arrival of the digital key, 
trust becomes important once again, as the complexity within the interaction rises, 
through the collection of data and the pro-active services based on these data.  
However, where in the previous situations it first and foremost was the hotel 
owner who had to bear the uncertainty of not knowing for sure if customers would 
return the hotel key, now the vulnerability increasingly lies with the hotel guest. 
Where the hotel through the collection of information comes to know its guests a lot 
better (making the future more predictable and therefore less complex), what exactly 
happens to and with these data generally lies beyond the knowledge and influence of 
the hotel guest. She has to trust the hotel owner to make use of this information in a 
trustworthy and secure manner.  
A shift in the trust relation has therefore occurred. Whereas in the previous 
settings the hotel owner was the principal trustor and the hotel guest was the trustee, 
now the hotel guest is the trustor and the hotel owner the trustee. The introduction of 
the digital key is not a neutral switch of instruments. It not only pre-sorts the 
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interaction of the hotel owner and the hotel guest. It also, because of the networked 
ontology of the digital key, which I analysed by making use of the 4 Cs, poses new 
challenges for trust.  
 
On the context level, we see that hotel guests are provided with an application that 
enables them to tailor their stay to their own preferences. They do not have to 
physically check in at the hotel desk and they can choose themselves which specific 
room they want to occupy. Moreover, the interfaces of the hotel apps are generally 
designed in such a way that they are easy to use and self-explaining. Ostensibly, this 
leaves hotel guests with more control and therefore less vulnerability or complexity to 
resolve. By circumventing the hotel owner –or more likely, her staff- at the front 
desk, it seems as if the interaction between hotel owner and hotel guest –and the 
vulnerability attached to this interaction- no longer takes place; it all is dissolved into 
a digital piece of transferable code. It now merely revolves around a hotel guest 
opening the door of her temporary private domain with her phone. The hotel owner 
has, so to speak, left the building, and the digital key has seemingly enabled a more 
direct interaction for the hotel guest. As a result, trust shifts from the interpersonal 
level to the artefact, to the system itself. As the interaction between hotel owner and 
hotel guest has vanished, trust is not to be found at the front desk of the hotel but in 
the interaction of the hotel guest with the digital key. 
Can the digital key be trusted? As we have seen in the previous chapter, this 
question is often translated in a rather superficial dual presentation: does it or does it 
not function properly, this digital key? Because of this dual perception of the digital 
key, the mediating workings of it are barely taking into account by the hotel guests.  
When we look at the construction of the digital key, which is dominantly based 
on NFC and BLE, it becomes clear that through these techniques the functionality of 
the digital key is not limited to the opening and closing of the hotel door. The digital 
key downloaded on the smart phone of the hotel guest does not only enable a new 
association with the guest, but also enables a new association with the curators, the 
hotel owners. They make use of the digital key and the app in which this digital key 
resides, to monitor guests and collect data on their behaviour. Taking into account 
some of the interviews conducted with these curators, their main reason for 
introducing the digital key is to make more money by gathering data in order to 
provide customers with pro-active and personalized services. This may partly be in 
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line with the interests of the hotel guests. Based on these collected data, hotel guests 
can receive the special offers and personalized services they desire. It may however 
also conflict with their interest when the collection of data is used for alternating 
purposes that reach far beyond their stay at the hotel.  
The quick review of the privacy policies (codification) of some of the hotel 
chains that are introducing the digital key, shows that not only can almost all data be 
collected and stored, it often remains rather vague as to with which parties’ 
information may be shared and how data is being combined and mined. A similar 
uncertainty exists when it comes to the security of the app and the digital key itself 
(construction). Due to ‘proprietary reasons’ suppliers and hotels remain silent about 
the security measures they installed to render the digital key as safe as possible.  
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Keys are not merely instruments to open a door or lock a room. With every 
innovation of the hotel key the central actors, the hotel owner and hotel guest, 
change. With every innovation, the hotel key mediates the interaction of hotel owner 
and hotel guest in a different manner. Because the interaction changes, the way in 
which trust is being shaped changes as well. Where the bulky key chain to a certain 
extent reduces the uncertainty hotel owners have to deal with, they still have to trust 
their guests to return their key. Vulnerability remains. With the introduction of the 
keycard, this vulnerability by and large dissolves. Because it becomes easy to replace 
the keycard, trust in the hotel guest to return it becomes less urgent.  
The introduction of the digital key again transforms the interaction of hotel 
owner and hotel guest on a fundamental level. It relocates vulnerability, making the 
hotel guest the trustor and the hotel owner the trustee. Just as it was the case with the 
keycard, the hotel owner is not depending on the hotel guest to return the digital key, 
which is located and remains on the smart phone of the hotel guest. However, 
although the digital key resides on the smart phone of the hotel guest, it is not solely 
her key. For the hotel owner as well, the digital key is opening doors, not to the hotel 
room per se, but it gives access to the personal information of the hotel guest, to her 
whereabouts and preferences, including her geo-location data. As a result, the hotel 
guest becomes more vulnerable, because she is being exposed to the monitoring 
workings of the digital key.  
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By taking into account the 4 Cs and looking beyond the mere experience of the 
hotel guest (context), this extra functionality of the digital key becomes visible and 
the new vulnerabilities within the relation of hotel owner and hotel guest can be 
mapped. As a result, it is also possible to foresee the challenges the digital key 
imposes on the trust relation of hotel owners and hotel guests.  
First and foremost, to speak of trust, actors have to be aware of the fact that 
they are in a situation where something is at stake. However, how can hotel guest 
move beyond merely assessing the functioning of the digital key to also appraising its 
mediating qualities? From a phenomenological perspective, there seems to be a gap 
between the contextual level, and the other Cs that deem to be crucial to understand 
the mediating workings of a networked artefact such as the digital key. 
Although trust often is placed in a non-reflected way, some basic assumption 
on the kind of situation one enters has to be present for trust or confidence to be 
placed. Hotel guests would have to become aware of the mediating workings of the 
digital key, which are now conveniently hidden away behind the interface of the app 
(construction) and in the hotels’ privacy policies (codification). If hotel guests are not 
aware –not even implicitly- of their vulnerability, of the complexity introduced by the 
digital key, they may feel misled or tricked into a situation when something goes 
wrong. This would be an unwanted side effect of the introduction of the digital key for 
both hotel owner and hotel guest.  
Second, as we have seen, while technology may reduce complexity, it 
simultaneously also brings forth new complexity. This also applies to the digital key. 
Not only is there the secrecy about the security measures set in place for which hotel 
guests have to confide in the suppliers and hotel owners. It also remains to be seen 
how the actions of hotel guests themselves are pre-sorted by the digital key. Will they 
be more careful with their phone, now it has a new function? Will they, for example, 
alter their password and not leave it unattended when going for an extra round at the 
cold buffet? 
 
All in all, because of the networked ontology of the digital key, more associations of 
actants are created –to return once more to the vocabulary of Latour- and more doors 
than just the hotel door are being opened. Consequently, this has an impact on the 
trust relations that are created, even beyond the awareness of some of the actors 
involved.  
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7 
Interpersonal system trust in Airbnb.  
 
 
Together with the introduction of the Internet came high expectations about the 
possibility of instigating new forms of governance, communities, and economic 
development80. Especially in the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, the 
Internet was characterized as a technology that could break down physical 
boundaries, make time differences irrelevant, and facilitate direct interaction without 
intermediaries.  
Supporters of this Open Internet perspective - also referred to as the Open or 
Digital Commons - include engineers, hacker groups, p2p communities, online 
entrepreneurs, and all kinds of political activists
81
. Obviously, this is not a 
homogeneous group of users, but what they nonetheless have in common is their 
belief in self-regulation (and as a consequence their dislike of governmental 
regulation), in bottom-up participation, and problem solving. The open internet 
adherers are convinced that the Internet can open up a space for people to 
experiment with their identity, giving them the opportunity to become who they want 
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 This chapter is partly based on, and includes sentences from Keymolen 2013.  
81
 These Open Internet adherers are not necessarily academics or people who are interested in 
publicizing or engaging in academic debate. Nonetheless their activities on and visions of the Internet 
are of great importance because they co-shape the evolution of the online world. Therefore, to attend 
to their ideas and activities, one has to take into account non-academic sources such as blogs, online 
discussions, videos, etc. 
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to be, not constrained by the physical limits the offline world imposes on them. “All 
they see are your words” Turkle (1995: 184) writes. The disruptive power of the open 
Internet will enable people to organize themselves, cutting out the centralized, 
traditional powers of governments and large companies.  
This utopian belief in the power of the open Internet has been widely contested 
by scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds (also see chapter 4). For 
example, Deibert et al. (2012a) state that already in 2000 this early optimistic phase 
of the Internet had to make way for a time where access to the Internet increasingly is 
being monitored, denied, and controlled by governmental actors. There also is a flow 
of reports, books, and articles on techno-regulation (Zittrain 2008; Lessig 2006; 
Goldsmith and Wu 2008; Wu 2011), and on the impact of censuring measures on 
human rights in cyberspace (Morozov 2011; Deibert 2008; Deibert et al. 2010; 
Deibert et al. 2012a), all, from different angles, contesting trust in a free and open 
Internet. 
Notwithstanding these critical voices, the open Internet community remains 
strong. New concepts –although still with a reference to the ‘old world’- such as P2P 
community, online commons, collaborative consumption, and sharing economy82 
signpost that the new, decentralized Internet-powered society finally has arrived. 
One of the recent advocates of this movement is Rachel Botsman who, 
together with Roo Rogers, has written what has been referred to as ‘the bible’ of the 
shared economy: “What’s mine is yours. How collaborative consumption is 
changing the way we live” (Botsman and Rogers 2010). Grounding their idea of 
collaborative consumption on the concept of an Open Internet, Botsman and Rogers 
claim that a new economy will arise built on the key values of “critical mass, idling 
capacity, belief in the commons and trust between strangers” (Botsman and Rogers 
2010: xvi).  
Amongst others, they focus on Airbnb, a platform for people who want to rent 
out their spare room or house and travellers who want to find accommodation, to 
show how people can access certain goods instead of owning them, not by depending 
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 Although all these names refer to slightly different parts of the open Internet movement, I have put 
them here together because they do all believe in the power of the Internet to leave traditional societal 
structures behind. 
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on large, centralized actors such as hotels, but by building on personal relations. 
Botsman and Rogers find in the Internet the possibility to overcome distances and 
bring people together to collaborate in an ‘old-fashioned’ way. Based on 
interpersonal trust, people will be able to collaborate on online platforms in a way 
that resembles their familiar, face-to-face interaction in small communities. They 
state that:  
“Online exchanges mimic the close ties once formed through face-to-face 
exchanges in villages, but on a much larger and unconfined scale. In other 
words, technology is reinventing old forms of trust” (Botsman and Rogers 
2010: xiii). 
Restoring interpersonal trust through the connective power of the Internet is key to 
the fundamental changes Botsman and Rogers foresee.  
Without any doubt, trust between individuals is a necessary condition for a 
successful shared economy in general and even more specifically for a platform like 
Airbnb that brings together people from all over the world. While I therefore agree 
with Botsman and Rogers that trust online is essential for interpersonal interaction 
and that much of the complexity inherent in human interaction can be dealt with 
through the act of trust, the online context, however, is not a neutral environment 
merely facilitating interpersonal trust.  
I will argue, by analysing Airbnb through the lens of the four Cs that Botsman 
and Rogers too narrowly focus on the context level. By not sufficiently taking into 
account the other Cs (curation, construction, and codification), they mistakenly 
believe that “technology is reinventing old forms of trust” where, in fact, a new form 
of trust –which I will call interpersonal system trust- is being established. 
This is not merely an issue of deviating definitions. I will argue that by their 
narrow focus on the users of the platform, Botsman and Rogers broadcast a 
misleadingly utopian message, which eventually may backfire as it makes them blind 
to the challenges -and certainly also chances- the other Cs may evoke. Trust between 
the users of Airbnb but also of the users in Airbnb form the primary asset of its 
business model. Remaining blind for the way in which curation, construction, and 
codification play a role in the establishment of trust, may actually result in the 
erosion of trust. Therefore, a different, less utopian perspective on the influence of 
the online platform on trustworthy interactions has to be developed. 
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7.1 What is collaborative consumption? 
The advocates of collaborative consumption83 or the shared economy can be 
characterized as belonging to this mixed group of netizens that endorse the Open 
Internet perspective. They strongly believe that, through the Internet, interpersonal 
relations can be built which will support a new economic model based on sharing. 
Instead of owning a car, you share one, you no longer buy clothes but swap them, 
and instead of going to the bank to beg for a loan, you turn to peer-to-peer lending 
sites to look for individual investors. Where the 20th century was defined by hyper-
consumerism based on owning; collaborative consumption or a shared economy 
based on access will characterize the 21-century.  
As we have seen, collaborative consumption stands in the – in Internet terms - 
‘long tradition’ of approaching the Internet as a technology to empower people. That 
it is a trend unlikely to fade away soon is supported by the fact that, besides Botsman 
and Rogers, a lot of other key-authors, such as Tapscott (2006, 2010), Chesbrough 
(2006), Benkler (2006), Bauwens (2012), and Rifkin (2014) write about similar 
developments. Moreover, there is growing attention for this phenomenon in 
international media. The Economist, for example, predicted one of the important 
trends in 2013 as the “ownerless economy expands” (Malnight and Keys 2012). And 
already in 2011, TIME magazine viewed collaborative consumption as one of the “10 
ideas that will change the world” (Walsh 2011). 
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 With their 2010 book, Botsman and Rogers have allegedly coined the term ‘collaborative 
consumption’. However, over the last few years, the term ‘sharing economy’ has increasingly become 
popular, more or less ousting ‘collaborative consumption’. In an interview 
(http://magazine.ouishare.net/2014/03/communities-the-institutions-of-the-21st-century-an-
interview-with-rachel-botsman-2/ accessed 15 December 2015) Botsman states that to her the ‘sharing 
economy’ is more specific than ‘collaborative consumption’. As Airbnb fits the collaborative 
consumption paradigm and simultaneously is also part of the ‘sharing economy’, I will use both terms 
interchangeably when I analyze Airbnb.  
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7.1.1 Four principles of collaborative consumption 
Botsman and Rogers (2010) identify four basic principles that lie at the heart of this 
new movement: critical mass, idling capacity, belief in the commons, and trust 
between strangers.  
Critical mass stands for the required momentum to make a collaborative 
consumption initiative successful. For example, if I want to rent an electric saw, but I 
have to drive an hour to get one, this tempers my will to participate. An initiative 
needs enough participants – how many exactly depends on the kind of initiative - to 
make it attractive.  
Idling capacity refers to the core assumption that there is a large offer of 
things and services, which by redistribution can be made useful elsewhere with the 
Internet as a distributor par excellence.  
With the belief in the commons, Botsman and Rogers refer back to the well-
known article of Garrett Hardin (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons” which 
describes how people who self-govern a piece of land that no one owns, will 
eventually take too much, damaging all participants. However, the advocates of 
Collaborative Consumption assert the opposite. They claim that, especially on the 
Internet, it is possible to provide value to the community and at the same time enable 
social value to expand for oneself. A digital common can become a reality.  
With trust between strangers we touch the central principle of collaborative 
consumption. On online peer-to-peer platforms, the traditional role of the 
middleman who enables third-party trust ceases to exist. Based on rating-systems 
and other reputation schemes, known from websites such as eBay, trust between 
strangers can be enabled. 
 
7.1.2 The concept of trust in Collaborative Consumption 
Although these four principles are all very important and lie at the heart of the 
movement, I will chiefly focus on trust, which probably is the most challenging one to 
accomplish (Brodwin 2012)84.  
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 The biggest barrier to participate is the “… concern that a lent item would be lost/stolen (30 
percent), followed by worries about trusting the network (23 percent) and privacy concerns (14 
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Trust as described by Botsman and Rogers (2010) seemingly has a direct 
nature. It is first and foremost something that happens between persons and 
therefore is in line with what in this book is called interpersonal trust. Botsman and 
Rogers refer back to times where interactions were based on strong ties of friendship, 
family relations, reciprocity, and reputation. Apparently, the interactions on 
collaborative consumption platforms resemble these by-gone interactions. For 
Botsman and Rogers, curators and technology only have a facilitating role. In the end 
it is up to the users of collaborative consumption platforms to build trust, 
consequently, making action possible.  
With this conceptualization of interpersonal trust in a context of collaborative 
consumption, Botsman and Rogers deviate from the system trust described in 
chapter three. Chapter three discussed the arrival of large systems in late modernity, 
consequently making interpersonal trust relations no longer sufficient to deal with 
the complexity inherent in everyday life. People increasingly had to vest their trust in 
the systems and the experts who controlled the systems, in order to go about their 
business in society. The hotel business is a prime example of such a system. Where 
personal relations were no longer sufficient to find a place to stay while traveling 
abroad, hotels became the trusted parties to fill this void. With the arrival of Airbnb, 
this intermediary becomes redundant. Through the connective power of the Internet, 
people can again rely on interpersonal trust. In this sense, the trust as described by 
Botsman and Rogers supposedly reverts to the pre-modern, small community based 
idea of trust. The idea of cutting out the middleman goes hand in hand with 
abandoning trust in the system. 
 
The interpersonal trust in the collaborative consumption context also differs from the 
concept of “face work” Giddens (1990) introduced to explain how at the entries of the 
system people employed by these systems are functioning as their ‘human face’. 
These intermediaries of the system are regarded as crucial for the effectiveness of 
system trust. For example, flight attendants are the face of the air traffic system; our 
interpersonal interaction with the flight attendants enables us to trust the air traffic 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
percent)” (Bauwens et al. 2012: 135). 
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system. The trust we –hopefully- have in the flight crew is, however, not of a mere 
interpersonal character. It is not based on a shared history, friendship or family 
relation. Rather, there is a kind of trust-loop developed in the interaction between 
traveller and flight attendant. On the on hand, the flight attendant mediates as it were 
the interaction of the traveller with the air traffic system, instigating overall system 
trust. On the other hand, the trust a traveller has in the flight attendant is partly 
based on the fact that he or she works for a company that has selected and trained the 
attendant to become an expert in his or her work.  
The interpersonal trust as described by Botsman and Rogers, therefore, is 
fundamentally different from this kind of face work. In the case of collaborative 
consumption, the ‘flight attendants’ are cut out of the interaction. Contrary to the air 
traffic case, on collaborative consumption platforms, there is no face work being 
done by system representatives. On the contrary, the curators of these platforms 
move as much as possible to the background in order to give room to the 
interpersonal interaction and trust building between users. From the perspective of 
Botsman and Rogers, the only face work being done in the collaborative consumption 
systems is by the users themselves. The curators provide tools to the users of the 
platform in order to enable “self-managed exchanges and contributions”. These tools, 
such as a secure payment system, online personal profiles, and rating systems, which 
will be discussed extensively in the paragraphs on context and construction- should 
restore reputation mechanisms, which means that: 
 “[w]e have returned to a time when if you do something wrong or 
embarrassing, the whole community will know. Free riders, vandals and 
abusers are easily weeded out, just as openness, trust and reciprocity are 
encouraged and rewarded” (Botsman and Rogers 2010: 92-93).  
 
7.1.3 The concept of technology in collaborative consumption 
The direct, interpersonal nature of trust in the collaborative consumption paradigm is 
underpinned by an instrumental perspective on technology. The Internet in general 
and the platforms of shared economy communities specifically are being approached 
as simple service-hatches, connecting users and facilitating their interactions.  
While it is true that all technologies can be seen as ‘tele-technologies’ (Weibel 
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1992) -bridging the ontological gap human beings experience in themselves, amongst 
themselves, and in their relation towards the world- this bridge is always of a 
temporary nature. In the collaborative consumption paradigm, however, not much 
attention is being paid to the technology’s own weight. Or, to rephrase it once more in 
Plessner’s terms: they only take into account the immediateness of the interaction 
and not the mediated aspects of it.  
This tacit presupposition translates itself in their analysis into a sole focus on 
the interaction of the users, the intentions of the users and how they put technology 
to work (the context level). The ways in which a specific, online environment is 
shaping the building of trust itself is not an object of analysis (construction). Because 
they under-conceptualize technology, they are also less aware of the networked 
ontology of the platform that enables an active role for the curators of the platform 
(curation) and the power struggle between different stakeholders over the control of 
the platform (codification). 
 
7.1.4 Collaborative consumption: a utopian standpoint 
All in all, this instrumental perspective on technology together with a rather 
incomplete perspective on interpersonal trust can be partly traced back to the 
utopian and rather misleading belief in technology as a means to not only bridge but 
also overcome the hiatus that defines human beings. Although human interactions 
are always simultaneously direct and indirect, human beings have the tendency to 
dismiss the aspect of indirectness and act as if their interactions are simply of a direct 
and stable nature. They try to set aside the triviality (Nichtigkeit) of their existence 
and flee to a utopian world –Plessner speaks of a utopian standpoint- in which they 
can find a final ground, a definitivum that provides them with a predictable 
environment. While Plessner describes how this desire to find a final ground leads 
human beings to the domain of religion, nowadays this domain has to move over in 
favour of the domain of technology. As de Mul (2001: 20) notes:  
“in the secular world,… the Internet functions as the ‘holy grail’. It is a 
resource that promises us attributes which up until now belonged to God: 
omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence”.  
The utopian perspective of the collaborative consumption movement, trying to make 
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whole and direct what will always be partly broken and indirect, makes them blind to 
technology’s own weight, the eccentric positionality of human beings and how these 
two shape trust. In the second part of this chapter, I will therefore look at Airbnb as a 
case of collaborative consumption to show that how the perspective on how trust 
‘works’ in the shared economy may shift when one opts for a more layered 
perspective, taking into account the networking effects of the Internet technology on 
the building of trust. 
 
 
7.2  Airbnb 
A prime example of collaborative consumption and more specifically of the shared 
economy is the platform Airbnb. Airbnb started in 2008 with a couple of airbeds on 
the ground in the home of Airbnb founders Brian Chesky and Joe Gebbia. Running 
out of money, they thought that providing a place to sleep and breakfast to people, 
who weren’t able to book a hotel because of a saturated hospitality market, would be a 
way to pay for their own house. They knew people were having problems finding a 
place to stay during the Industrial Design Conference, held in San Francisco. 
Therefore they listed a message on the conference website, advertising their spare 
room, breakfast, and good company. Different people responded and they were 
surprised it did not feel as if they had strangers visiting their home. An idea was born. 
Although they initially encountered difficulties gathering funds for their idea, 
they were able to raise the necessary startup money, develop a business plan, and 
attract investors. In 2009 they changed airbedandbreakfast.com in Airbnb.com. It 
were no longer just airbeds listed on the site, but also whole houses, castles, boats, 
islands, etc.85 In 2010, 210.000 users were registered on Airbnb.com. You could then 
find 28.000 properties in more than 157 countries, across 8.122 cities (Botsman and 
Rogers 2010: xi). Over the years, Airbnb grew explosively, now accounting for more 
than 35.000.000 registered users, 1.200.000 accommodations (of which 600 castles) 
across 34.000 cities in 190 countries86. For every booking made on the platform, 
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206 
 
Airbnb charges a service fee, ranging from 6% t0 12% of the subtotal of the booking87. 
Making use of the four core principles of collaborative consumption as defined 
by Botsman and Rogers (2010), it becomes possible to understand why Airbnb is a 
prime example of collaborative consumption. 
 
Critical mass. Reading the short history above, it becomes clear that Airbnb has 
enough participants to fulfil the goal for what it was set up to do. This critical mass is 
important because Airbnb needs “a core group of lay and frequent users” to give body 
to their community (Botsman and Rogers 2010: 81). As reputation is key to the 
functioning of Airbnb, frequent encounters are needed to build up a profile that can 
function as a token of trustworthiness.  
Botsman and Rogers (2010:75) chiefly focus on critical mass to describe “the 
existence of enough momentum in a system to make it become self-sustaining”. 
However, they do not address the question of whether there is also a maximum of 
participants for a platform such as Airbnb to perform well. Taking into account the 
rapid uptake of Internet connectivity and the fact that there are no real barriers for 
people to sign up, no limits –besides for having a residence to rent or money to pay 
for it- are set. As we will see later on, growing numbers of participants also brings 
along risks for Airbnb: from attracting professional landlords and agencies to 
criminals and frauds. 
Idling capacities. It is not enough to have enthusiastic participants. There also 
have to be enough houses and spare rooms to be rented out. If you wanted to make 
use of Airbnb in the starting days, you first had to check where there were hosts 
active, now you can pick your destiny first and then see where you want to be staying. 
Around the globe, you can now find a large range of properties. The founders of 
Airbnb saw the discrepancy between on the one hand a rather saturated and 
stagnated market of hotels and on the other a reservoir of dwellings around the 
world, which could now easily be distributed through the Internet.  
Belief in the commons. Airbnb is built on a strong belief in the commons. The 
idea that by sharing you are not only adding value to the community but can also gain 
personally is at the core of Airbnb. The more people take part in Airbnb, “…the better 
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the system works for everyone- there is a ‘network effect’” (Botsman and Rogers 
2010: 91). So, even when you make use of Airbnb for selfish reasons (you want a 
cheap place to stay or some extra money in the bank), participating in Airbnb 
nevertheless creates value for the people involved. 
Trust in strangers. Airbnb would not be able to exist if trust between strangers 
was unfeasible. By providing users with some tools on their platform –reviews, 
connection to social media account such as Google or Facebook, a safe payment 
method-, the most fundamental complexity of an Airbnb interaction is reduced. 
“Airbnb does not routinely perform background checks on its users”88. At the end of 
the day, it is up to the users to build trust.  
 
Now that we know what the vision and premises of collaborative consumption are 
and how these relate to the sharing economy spurred by Airbnb, it is time to look at it 
from a different angle and analyse Airbnb through the conceptual lens of the four Cs. 
It may not come as a surprise that the context level of Airbnb extensively overlaps 
with the vision of Botsman and Rogers. As the interaction of users, the way they build 
up trust and belief in the commons is key to collaborative consumption, the context 
level fits neatly with Botsman and Rogers’ perspective. The utopian belief that users 
can interact through Airbnb solely based on interpersonal trust is in fact the core of 
Airbnb’s business model. The company goes to great lengths to promote this vision by 
presenting its users as a strong, connected, and trust-building community. However, 
things come to look different –and increasingly interesting- when one also takes into 
account the other Cs (curation, construction, and codification). 
 
 
7.3 Context 
The way in which a platform is designed pre-sorts the options users have in order to 
shape their online interactions. As a result, the platform strongly influences the way 
in which users are able to establish trust. Botsman and Rogers (2010) see it as the 
role of the curator –in this case, the company Airbnb- to create an environment in 
 
                                                   
88
 Although Airbnb does reserve the right to perform a background check nonetheless. 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/4?topic=357 Accessed on: 21 July 2015. 
208 
 
which trust online can thrive. It is then up to the users to take on these tools to 
develop an online reputation and ‘materialize’ their interactions, making them visible 
to the whole community.  
Airbnb provides users with a myriad of options to gain trust. For example, they 
offer offline ID validation89, users can log in to Airbnb making use of their social 
media accounts, Airbnb can validate the photos of the locations that are put online, 
etc. (also see Abramova et al. 2015: 2). 
One of the most dominant tools provided to establish trust on the platform is 
the online reviewing system. Users can judge each others’ reputation or 
trustworthiness by giving a review. Because these reviews are public to the Airbnb 
community, they should enable self-regulation, making it possible for users to make a 
better decision about who they want to rent out their place to and –from the other 
side- with who they want to stay. Research being done in the domain of e-commerce 
shows that reviews have a positive effect on the willingness of customers to interact 
with online vendors (McKnight et al. 2002b; also see McKnight and Chervany 2002; 
McKnight et al. 2002a).  
The basic rationale behind this reviewing system is that people on the one 
hand want to safeguard their own reputation and therefore have an incentive to act 
trustworthily. On the other hand a good reputation brought forth by good behaviour 
in the past says something meaningful about the way in which a person will act in the 
future. Reviews are therefore often determining in accepting or denying a guest (see 
for example: Thomas 2014). Axelrod (1984) refers to this process as “the shadow of 
the future”. If someone wants to establish a durable relation or wants to participate in 
a community for a longer period of time, it is necessary to act in a reliable way to 
convince people of his or her good intentions, consequently making interaction 
possible.  
Botsman and Rogers (2010: 218-219) speak of “reputation capital”. It is a 
currency that claims “you can trust me”, and in Botsman and Rogers’ view it is one of 
the pillars of the new, shared economy90. Completely in line with their belief in 
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 To verify the identity of users, Airbnb –amongst others- makes use of government-issued 
documents, users are asked to upload to the company. 
90
 Airbnb is not the only platform and definitely not the first to have such a review system inserted 
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transparency within the community, Airbnb goes even a step further and offers users 
also the possibility to comment on reviews. Research indicates that in some instances 
a confession or apology of the host –for example, because the room was not clean- 
may have a positive impact on the trusting beliefs of potential guests confronted with 
negative reviews (Abramova et al. 2015). Studies suggest that because high ratings 
are judged to be central to the success of Airbnb, hosts may go to great lengths to 
receive excellent reviews. From rejecting guests whom they believe to be unsuitable, 
to starting all over again with a new property page freed from negative publicity 
(Zervas et al. 2014: 12). 
Although it is generally accepted in e-commerce as well as in the domain of the 
shared economy that reputation systems are a valuable tool for users to assess the 
trustworthiness of their peers, recent research indicates that the impact of reviews on 
Airbnb has little to no effect on the behaviour of users looking for a place to stay (Ert 
et al. 2015). The researchers (Ert et al. 2015: 25)–to their surprise-  
“did not find evidence for the effect of online review scores on market 
prices. Further exploration of this result revealed that review scores had 
no effect on Airbnb prices because these scores were exceptionally high 
and thus lacked sufficient variance.” 
Based on an analysis of 600,000 properties listed on Airbnb, researchers found that 
nearly 95% received a 4.5 to 5 star rating (with 5 being the maximum). Virtually none 
of the analysed properties have a rating lower than 3.5 stars (Zervas et al. 2015). 
Rightfully so, Thomas (2014) doubts if the world could be as perfect as the Airbnb 
rating system wants users to believe. Although it is difficult to determine exactly why 
the ratings are so high, Thomas (2014: 23) argues that next to the hesitance people 
may feel to criticize people in public, in the shared economy -as promoted by Airbnb- 
there is a common feeling of belonging and positivity which people do not likely want 
to interfere with by giving a bad review. Ert et al. (2015) assume that the reciprocity 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
onto its platform. Mother of all online rating systems is that of eBay. This online second-hand 
marketplace already introduced its peer-to-peer monitoring scheme in 1996. Because of its rating 
system, traders can build up a reputation of a trustworthy buyer or seller, enabling new interactions.  
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of the rating system causes the high ratings. Mutual feedback between guest and host 
may result in retaliation (idem: 26), making it less likely for users to give a negative 
report. Moreover, because of the personal interaction that may occur within the 
Airbnb experience, participants are also less willing to provide negative feedback 
(idem: 26). All in all, the lack of diversity in the rating of the listings on Airbnb, 
makes the rating less valuable for users to assert the trustworthiness of the host and 
make a decision on where to stay. 
However, Ert et al. (2015) discern another trust tool that does seem to have an 
effect on the behaviour of guests on Airbnb: the picture of the host. Their results 
suggest that guests by looking at the picture of the host assess his or her 
trustworthiness. This visual-based trust is established unconsciously as only a 
minority (8%) explicitly mention the picture of the host as a factor of influence (Ert et 
al. 2015: 28). Hosts who are aware of this trust factor can based on this knowledge 
choose a trustworthier picture by for example uploading a picture presenting them 
smiling and looking straight into the camera. The findings also suggest that women 
are found to be more trustworthy, consequently, it may be beneficial for a 
heterosexual couple to put the picture of the woman online.  
While the posting of the host’s picture may boost trustworthiness, it may also 
have unwanted side effects. A recent study of Edelman and Luca (2014: 2) shows that 
after controlling for other factors, “non-black hosts charge approximately 12% more 
than black hosts for the equivalent rental”. Posting a profile picture, ostensibly a 
neutral tool to enhance trust, in fact brings about discrimination91. This conflicts with 
the core principles of the open Internet movement, which builds strongly on the 
liberating and emancipating force of the Internet.  
Finally, another tool to enhance trust Airbnb has implemented on its platform 
is the possibility for prospective guests and hosts to communicate before a 
reservation is made. Although Airbnb cannot oblige people to contact each other, they 
do nudge this behaviour, for example by keeping track of the host’s response rate and 
speed. The latter, amongst others, influences the place of the host in the search 
 
                                                   
91
 It would be interesting to investigate if Airflow, Airbnb’s own pricing algorithm which also advises 
hosts about the pricing of their listing, takes into account the ethnicity displayed on the profile picture. 
If this would be the case, the discrimination would in fact be partly instigated by the algorithm.  
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ranking and may therefore impact the likelihood of receiving bookings. 
If all these trust tools do not lead to a trustworthy interaction, users have the 
possibility to flag other users. On any moment in the interaction on Airbnb, users 
have the possibility to click on a flag when they believe something is suspicious or 
inappropriate92. Airbnb investigates each flag on a case-by-case basis. By delegating 
some of the policing of the platform to its users, Airbnb makes them into ‘deputy 
sheriffs’ (Torpey 2000; Lahav 2000). Although it is not their primary responsibility, 
users are incorporated into the system nonetheless. This strategy of 
‘responsabilisation’ (Garland 2001) fits the collaborative consumption approach 
where users should take the lead and curators should facilitate and follow. 
 
 
7.4 Construction 
When it comes to the ‘back office’ or infrastructure of Airbnb, about the way in which 
the company builds, maintains, and develops their platform, not much information is 
officially been published. Or as Mike Curtis, Airbnb’s vice president of engineering 
puts it: “Anything that is completely core and unique to our business… we’ll keep 
that”93. Airbnb considers the search algorithm, which is central to the platform, to be 
their intellectual property. Airbnb releases bits and bytes of information about the 
search algorithms only in general terms, about the way in which the company mines 
data, and for which purposes these data are being used. Looking at general media 
coverage, their own policies, reports, and blog posts, there are, however, a few broad 
lines that can be discerned which shed some light on these fundamental, technical 
workings of the platform. More specifically, I focus on those technical aspects that are 
closely connected to the building of trust in the community.  
 
The Airbnb platform can be accessed on the World Wide Web by making use of a 
computer and it can also be downloaded as an application on mobile devices such as 
tablets and smart phones. On all devices, their search algorithm is one of the central 
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 https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/4. Accessed: 28 July 2015. 
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 http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/06/17/airbnb-open-sources-software-to-lure-talent-amid-insane-
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operations taking place. As this algorithm is the primary tool for prospective guests to 
find their host, it is key to the functioning of the platform. Airbnb describes its search 
algorithms as working: 
“with uncertain and incomplete information to routinely understand the 
specifics of local markets and geography in order to estimate the quality of 
the platform’s inventory and answer users’ queries with relevant results, 
while keeping in mind the hosts’ preferences”94.  
On their website,95 Airbnb explains that the underlying principle guiding their 
approach to design the search algorithm is that they: “want to reward hosts that 
deliver a great experience to guests”. The three main categories that affect the search 
are: the quality of the listing, the ease of booking, and guest preferences.  
The first refers to aspects such as the way in which the booking is presented 
(accurate description, professional photographs), if the pricing is competitive, the 
quality of the reviews, and to what extent the account is verified.  
The second has to do with things such as the speed and consistency of the 
response of the host, if the host has an updated calendar in order for guests to know 
when the property is available, and if the host has ever cancelled a booking (which 
Airbnb judges to be a very negative factor). 
The third refers to, amongst others, the relevance of the location, social 
connections (for example if the host and guest have mutual friends, Airbnb can detect 
that if users link their Facebook profile to their Airbnb account), and the 
personalization of results (the search rank may vary from query to query). 
In addition, April 2015, Airbnb started to also include the preferences of the 
host to decide on the ranking of the search results. As Airbnb concludes: 
“personalization can be effective on the buyer as well as the seller side”96. 
Consequently, the top results do no longer include listings completely tailored to the 
guests’ preferences, but room has also been made for the wishes of the hosts, for 
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 http://nerds.airbnb.com/search-airbnb/?_ga=1.247282116.1978383405.1437126877. Accessed: 22 
July 2015. 
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 https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/39. Accessed: 22 July 2015. 
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example concerning the duration of the stay and the amount of visitors. This led to a 
3,75% increase of matches on the platform (also see: DeAmicis 2015).  
Next to the ranking of their search results, Airbnb, by mining the data 
collected on their platform, also aims at personalizing97 the overall experience users 
have on the platform. For example, based on the location of the user, earlier travels 
and searches, Airbnb alters the welcome page on their website, highlighting locations 
Airbnb believes might be of interest to this individual user. 
 
All in all, even without all the specifics on the functioning of the search algorithm and 
their personalization practices, it becomes clear that these techniques are in fact the 
backbone of the platform and have a leading role in shaping the familiar world of 
Airbnb, necessary for trust to be established. By aiming at predicting where travellers 
want to go, by tailoring the search results to the preferences and wishes of users, 
these techniques reduce the complexity inherent in a global network, which Airbnb in 
fact is. Without some guidance, brought forth by the search engine and the 
personalization of the platform, the complexity would likely be too high, making it 
almost impossible for users to trust and bridge the uncertainty gap. Random search 
results carry the risk of alienating users, where personalized search results may have 
already neutralized some fundamental basic uncertainties, which trust on its own 
would not be able to cope with. Where Airbnb in its communication always 
emphasizes it is a “community” of like-minded people, these techniques bring this 
mantra into practice by creating an online world that fits the beliefs and expectations 
of its inhabitants.  
 
Although Airbnb is rather secretive about their key algorithms, they nevertheless are 
also open sourcing some of their code98. Airflow, for example, is such an open-source 
project. It is a platform that can be used to structure and analyse data. In the context 
of Airbnb, it “segments the raw data from customers’ mouse clicks, including listings 
they’ve viewed or reservations they’ve made, and structures them into summaries for 
Airbnb staff to analyze” (Boulton 2015).  
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Another open source project is Airpal99. This is a web-based query tool that 
can be used to structure and analyse data. It has a very user-friendly interface that 
even enables employees who are not familiar with SQL to write queries and look for 
data in the database of Airbnb. One out of three Airbnb employees has run a query 
through this system.100  
A third project is Aerosolve101, a machine-learning library. This software 
Airbnb uses to help it better understand “the relationship between the price of an 
Airbnb listing in a given market and factor in demand for that listing”(Boulton 2015). 
Indirectly, these open source projects give the outside world an idea of the 
techniques developed and used within Airbnb. These technical tools support Airbnb 
in their effort to create a familiar world for their users. But also on another level, 
these open source projects contribute to trust relations. One of the reasons for Airbnb 
to make these projects publicly available is to establish a trustful relation with the 
tech community on which it leans heavily. By giving back to this community, Airbnb 
not only wants to build a trustful relation, it also hopes to attract engineers to come 
and work for the company. 
 
 
7.5 Curation 
For Botsman and Rogers the actors who develop, run, and maintain platforms for 
collaborative consumption are mainly “curators” and “ambassadors”, earning money 
by creating “the right tools and environment for familiarity and trust to be built” 
(idem: 92). In the end, it is up to the users to establish this trust.  
However, when looking into the working and functioning of Airbnb, it 
becomes conspicuously clear that Airbnb does much more than merely facilitate 
connections between travellers and hosts. Over the years, Airbnb has increasingly 
taken on a more active and steering role when it comes to ensuring trust in the 
community.  
A turning point was the widely publicised case of an Airbnb-host whose house 
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was completely ransacked by travellers in 2011. EJ, the pseudonym of the host, 
blogged about her experience and accused Airbnb of letting her stand out in the 
cold102. After this incident, Airbnb immediately invested in a dedicated Trust and 
Safety team, by adding, amongst others, former intelligence officers and government 
investigators to their work force (Chesky 2011; also see Gannes 2013). Since then, this 
team monitors the interactions online, investigates suspicious interactions, and also 
functions as a mediator when users have a disagreement they cannot solve 
themselves. 
Because all interaction takes place on the platform of Airbnb, the company has 
a pile of data at their disposal of which they can make use to police their community. 
For example,  
“[i]f a host uses the words Western Union in a conversation with a guest - 
a sign that they may be trying to route around Airbnb’s system- the 
company will block the message. If a host and guest are repeatedly 
booking rooms with one another, it could be a scam to build fake positive 
reviews.” (Tanz 2014: 19-20). 
These and other analytic data analyses provide each user with a trust score. If this 
score turns out to be too low, Airbnb will further investigate the user. In addition, 
every user that has been “flagged” by another user will be looked into. 
So, while it is true that on the context level, users have at their disposal a range 
of tools to interact and build trust, these tools are not solely their tools. By 
monitoring the way hosts and guest make use of these tools, Airbnb can steer and 
redirect these interactions. On the one hand this sort of monitoring, is a measure that 
adds to the trust building in the Airbnb community. For example, by detecting and 
subsequently kicking frauds, criminals, and other people with malicious intends off 
the platform, the risks for users are mitigated, which makes it easier to act on trust. 
On the other hand, more subtly, Airbnb nudges its travellers in behaving in a 
trustworthy manner. For example, in 2013 Airbnb employees personally called every 
group of eight people and more that booked a stay in New Orleans during the Super 
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Bowl to wish them a nice stay and remind them to treat the properties with care 
(Gannes 2013).  
Airbnb’s active measures to ensure the security of their platform –in order to 
boost trust- may, however, also induce the opposite reaction. When Airbnb 
introduced its verified identity programme and users were asked to upload 
government documents in order to clear their identity, this led to public outcry in the 
community103 104 (Banerjee 2014; Roudman 2013). People protective of their privacy 
or wary of identity theft did not want to comply. This incident illustrates the 
challenge Airbnb faces to strike a fair and acceptable balance between security on the 
on hand and privacy on the other. Both are important to develop a familiar world 
where trust can be established. However, when the ‘costs’ of security rise to a certain 
level, users may start to doubt if the prospective savings of booking through Airbnb 
are worth the risk of identity fraud or other privacy intrusions. 
 
Airbnb does not just monitor the platform in order to be able to vouch for a 
trustworthy online environment; the company also uses this information to secure 
their own business model and to make sure they receive their fee on the booking. 
This, however, may sometimes conflict with the user’s interests.  
For example, by blocking the possibility of exchanging phone numbers or 
personal information until the moment of the actual booking, they do not only want 
to discourage scammers, but also make sure users stay on Airbnb and pay the fee. 
Although Airbnb through its monitoring activities on a general, system level does 
cover some of the possible security issues, they do not on an individual basis screen 
every user or perform a background check105. Blocking personal information deprives 
hosts and guests of the possibility of using this information to check for themselves if 
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they deem the person on the other side to be trustworthy106. At this point, there is a 
conflict of interest between Airbnb –ensuring their business model by blocking the 
possibility to share personal details- and the interests of the user –the missed 
possibility of checking for themselves if someone is trustworthy enough to take the 
leap-.  
 
Next to pro-actively intervening to mitigate risks for users, Airbnb also monitors its 
platform to identify possible negative experiences. An online blog post of an Airbnb 
traveller for example uncovers that Airbnb customer service may contact guests after 
a host has completed a refund to inquire about their stay107. Airbnb also has a 24/7 
hot line (telephone, chat, and e-mail) to assist their users if they encounter problems 
they cannot solve on their own. And finally, Airbnb has also set in place different 
kinds of insurances for both host and guest in order to refund their users when 
necessary. All these extra support measures must reassure users that Airbnb has a 
safety net when needed.  
This kind of extensive after-care can be of importance to the trust users have 
vested in the platform. When Airbnb as a system can convince users that their bad 
experience is merely an unfortunate incident and not a system failure, the loss of 
trust might be restricted to the interpersonal level and not become a loss of trust on 
the system level (Keymolen et al. 2010: 58-61).  
 
All in all, it becomes clear that Airbnb has a very active role in building and 
maintaining a familiar world for its users - a role which goes far beyond merely 
equipping their customers with trust-tools to sort things out on their own. Taking 
into account the global reach of the community and the risks involved, it is difficult to 
imagine Airbnb taking on a different position than it does now. Although in general, 
interpersonal trust can reduce much complexity and enable a wide range of 
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interaction, some sort of top-down, structuring power is needed to help turning a 
complex global network of hosts and guests into a familiar world.  
The proposition that the shared economy is about reinventing old forms of 
trust is therefore false. Rather, a new form of trust is being shaped where 
interpersonal interaction on the context level is strongly influenced by a pro-active 
environment (construction) steered by the curator Airbnb. I will refer to this kind of 
trust as: interpersonal system trust, emphasizing how both the interpersonal and the 
system level are intertwined.  
However, policing the platform and steering the interaction of their users does 
not come without risk for Airbnb. Not only may users perceive some measures as 
being too intrusive, sometimes the interest of Airbnb as a business may conflict with 
the ability of Airbnb as a community to build trust. 
 
 
7.6 Codification 
The disruptive power of Airbnb, not only deranging the hospitality sector (Zervas et 
al. 2014; Guttentag 2013; Ikkala and Lampinen 2015), but the local communities in 
which it operates as well (Gottlieb 2013; Morozov 2014), has evoked legislative and 
societal upheaval, which incontrovertibly has had an impact on trust amongst its 
users. In this section, I will look into these recent, legal and governmental 
developments and more specifically, I will focus on the impact these changes have on 
trust in Airbnb as a platform. As we will see, the codification developed by Airbnb is 
not necessarily in line with the codification imposed by the government. 
 
At the basis of Airbnb lies the idea that through the Internet, platforms can be created 
on which individuals connect and based on mutual trust interact, –if necessary- 
sorting things out on their own. In line with the beliefs of the Open Internet 
movement, Airbnb therefore not only wants to cut out large corporate intermediaries 
such as hotels, it also wants as little governmental intervention and external 
regulation as possible. This seemingly incompatibility of traditional governmental 
actors and pioneers in the shared economy can be explained in two ways.  
Generally it is stated by actors in the shared economy such as Airbnb and Uber 
–another major player and disrupting power in the taxi-business- that current 
legislation is out-dated and not fitted to cope with the innovation brought forth in the 
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domain of collaborative consumption (also see: Guttentag 2013: 8-9). Legislation 
should therefore be reformed to cater the innovation in this sector. Another 
explanation, brought forth by Benjamin Edelman, associate professor at Harvard 
Business School, is that these companies deliberately “tend to skirt laws” (Edelman 
2015) as it gives them an advantage over their competitors and in the end a 
significant larger market share.  
All in all, with the large expansion of Airbnb over the recent years, not only the 
role of the company behind the platform became more visible and imperative – as I 
argued in the previous sections -, also different governmental actors stepped in to 
regulate the sharing economy of Airbnb. Where it has clearly been the strategy of 
Airbnb to “to root itself as deeply as possible before confronting its legal issues” 
(Guttentag 2013: 10), the company can no longer avoid the question if they comply –
and if not how to ensure they do- with the legal principles of the different states in 
which they operate. 
For one thing, the way in which Airbnb is set up, does not particularly fit the 
heavily regulated hospitality sector (McNamara 2015). The company  
“disclaims any liability for use of its services. Instead Airbnb encourages 
users to be aware of their particular locality’s rules, zoning restrictions 
and tax regulations, before placing a home or apartment up for rent on 
Airbnb’s site” (McNamara 2015: 152). 
Because local laws may vary when it comes to for example hotel and tourist taxes and 
regulating short-term rentals, one has to look state-by-state, or city-by-city, to see 
how the rules may apply to Airbnb hosts. Focussing for example on the state of New 
York, one of the largest Airbnb markets, citizens are allowed under state law108 to rent 
out their residence for less than 30 days only when they are present in the house 
themselves. Professional landlords on the other hand, who are not present, are not 
allowed to rent out their properties for less than a month. The aim of this law is to 
prevent residences from becoming hotels109.  
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There are also other legitimate reasons for cities to maintain such laws. 
Guttentag (2013: 9) listed four: first, cities want accommodations to abide to certain 
safety and health standards. Second, a continuous float of tourists may be a burden 
for a local community. Third, an abundance of short-term rentals may negatively 
impact the local housing market. Fourth, the promise of profits from short-term 
rentals may instigate immoral behaviour (for example, landlords evicting tenants to 
earn more money through short-rental activities). 
As some rulings show, these local laws can have severe consequences for 
Airbnb hosts in the state of New York. In 2013, the Environmental Control Board 
decided that Nigel Warren, an Airbnb host, had to pay $ 24oo for violating these 
state’s laws110. After appealing, the fine was thrown out, because Warren could prove 
that his roommate was present when the guest was in the house and they therefore 
maintained a “common household”, an exception allowed by the state’s rules on 
short-term rental. The decision of the Environmental Control Board was, however, 
very narrow. The board made it conspicuously clear that they ruled in favour of 
Warren only because of the presence of his roommate. This judgement therefore did 
not really provide legal certainty to other Airbnb hosts who are in general not present 
when renting out their house. Or as the State Senator Liz Krueger, a Democrat 
representing Manhattan and supporter of the 2010 law on short-term rentals in 
reaction to this ruling states:  
“The vast majority of Airbnb’s business in New York City — short-term 
rentals of apartments in residential buildings without any permanent 
residents present — remains unambiguously illegal” (cited in: Carrns 
2013). 
In February 2015, another landmark case (42nd & 10th Assoc. LLC v Ikezi) took place 
in New York where a tenant was evicted from his house after the court found that he 
was engaged in profiteering by renting out his rent-stabilized house111. This ruling will 
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obviously have an impact on the way in which Airbnb hosts renting out their rent-
stabilized house look at their activities. Moreover, this court success also affected 
landlords as more of them are now preparing to sue their tenants for participating in 
Airbnb (Marsh 2015). 
 
Next to individual hosts that are being prosecuted, also Airbnb itself has been –and 
still is being- confronted with demands from legal authorities. Although the company, 
up until now, has not been held liable for illegal activity on its platform, it does have 
access to all the data about the activities taken place on the platform. Access to this 
data would make it much easier to find possible wrongdoers.  
In the fall of 2013, the Attorney General of the state New York, Mr. 
Schneiderman, issued a subpoena to receive information concerning the hosts of 
Airbnb. He wanted this information in order to check if Airbnb hosts residing in his 
state were paying taxes under the state’s law. In addition, he wanted to investigate the 
possibility that Airbnb was being used for the exploitation of illegal hotels (also see:  
Macmillan and Karmin 2014).  
After negotiations that took more than 6 months, Airbnb and the Attorney 
General reached an agreement112. Airbnb assented to hand over an anonymized data 
set of Airbnb users, stripped from personally identifiable information. In the 
following year, the Attorney General would start hunting down Airbnb hosts that 
were in violation with the state’s laws. Airbnb was obliged to disclose information 
concerning these hosts that are under investigation, when requested by the Attorney 
General.  
In August 2014, as a consequence of this agreement, Airbnb was asked to hand 
over “the unredacted, personal information on 124 individuals”113, all having multiple 
listings on the platform. After informing the hosts involved, Airbnb handed over their 
information to the Attorney General. All in all, the investigation of the Attorney 
General’s office resulted in a report, issued October 2014, which stated that 72% of 
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the listings that appear on Airbnb are in violation of the state’s laws114. Although 94% 
of the Airbnb hosts have at most two listings online, the other 6% of the hosts 
dominated the platform with up to hundred dwellings online counting for 37% of all 
host revenue. These 6% hosts were regarded as commercial hosts115. 
Airbnb contests these findings by claiming that the report does not take into 
account the 200o allegedly illegal listings Airbnb had already taken down.  
 
If Airbnb wants to maintain trust in its platform, it is crucial it finds a way to come to 
terms with the limitations set by the law. The uncertainty deriving from the legal 
position of hosts can be a threat to the sharing community on which Airbnb is based. 
Clear, shared, and predictable rules add to the familiar world where trust can thrive. 
Just as trust on the interpersonal level is a strategy to deal with the complexity 
inherent in human life, the legal system is a strategy to deal with this same 
complexity on the societal level. In a society without some sort of legal system, all the 
complexity has to be dealt with on the interpersonal level, making it much harder to 
cope with risks that might affect people personally but cannot be influenced by them 
individually. A legal framework set in place can neutralize some of the most basic 
complexities, bringing forth a familiar world in which there is room for interpersonal 
interactions based on trust.  
The upheaval caused by the investigations of the Attorney General and the 
different court cases form a disturbance to this familiar world. Suddenly, very 
fundamental and shared assertions within the Airbnb community are deprived of 
their self-evident character. As the reactions of Airbnb hosts on the story of Neil 
Warren show, although they appreciate the efforts of Airbnb to help Warren, they 
also worry about what the legal consequences of their own participation on the 
platform may be. As one Airbnb hosts writes on the Airbnb blog116: “Are we going to 
be taken to court and fined? Should we all pull our listings till we know?” 
Airbnb cannot promise to its users that it will never hand over their data to 
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officials. If Airbnb is required by law, the company will have to comply as also stated 
in their terms and conditions.  
 
Just as their users, Airbnb cannot ignore the legal reality, they can, however, try to 
change it. Over the years, Airbnb has become a fierce defender of the possibility to 
collect so-called hotel taxes on behalf of its users117. The company sent a letter to all 
members of the New York State legislature asking to adapt the law in order to make 
this collecting of taxes possible. On its website, completely dedicated to the New York 
Airbnb community, it also mobilizes its users to take action and write to their 
legislator118. Although Airbnb never saw or presented itself as a hotel, rather its main 
goal was to side-step hotels altogether, “formalizing its relationship with tax 
collectors” could be seen as “the first step toward gaining broader legal acceptance” 
(Griswold 2015) and restoring trust in the community.  
Where the state of New York persisted and up until now made no changes to 
the law, cities such as San Francisco, Portland, and –in Europe-, Amsterdam did 
accommodate Airbnb by requiring them to collect local taxes. While making 
individual arrangements with local authorities is the strategy Airbnb probably is 
planning to follow, it will not be the end of all legal uncertainty. For example, only 
recently in the Netherlands –despite the agreements with individual cities-, the 
federal tax authority started an investigation to see if Airbnb hosts are in compliance 
with national rules on income tax (van Noort 2015). It is to be expected that more of 
these investigations will follow in other countries as well.  
As a way of concluding this section, it has to be noted that all these 
governmental interventions are not merely based on governmental actors who want 
to make sure the state –or city- does not miss out on tax money. Governmental actors 
also are called upon by society to intervene. Different authors (Gottlieb 2013; 
Guttentag 2013; Thomas 2014; Morozov 2014; Prof. J. Schor interviewed by: Bouma 
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2015) argue that people are increasingly also confronted with the negative effects of 
Airbnb in everyday life. Only those who have something to share –or are able to pay 
for it- can participate, leading to a divide in local communities. Moreover, for local 
communities the constant arrival of new Airbnb guests can be a burden and weaken 
social cohesion. Especially, the exploitation of illegal hotels making use of the Airbnb 
platform can have a negative impact on the quality of living. Next to their agreement 
with Airbnb to collect taxes, the city of Amsterdam therefore also started a hotline for 
its citizens, which they can call if they experience nuisance or suspect illegal short-
rent activities in their vicinity. Within two weeks, the hotline already led to the 
discovery of four illegal hotels119.  
All in all, it can be concluded that Airbnb faces some challenges to maintain 
trust in its platform. Not only must it find a way to come to an agreement with local 
laws and authorities to restore the familiar world online for its users, Airbnb is also 
increasingly being confronted with opponents who see trust being put to the test in 
local communities because of the misbalance that occurs due to the constant arrival 
of new Airbnb guests.  
 
 
7.7 Conclusion: Why the sharing economy is not just about you and me 
By analysing Airbnb, as a prime example of the collaborative consumption 
movement, I have showed that although trust between strangers is definitely key to 
the functioning of the platform, it certainly is not the whole story. By taking into 
account the construction, curation, and codification of the platform, a more nuanced 
image is painted of the way in which trust is being established.  
It then becomes clear that the way in which the platform is designed and more 
specifically the way in which the algorithms pre-sort users’ interactions and 
consequently have an impact on the way in which trust is being built. Moreover, the 
interests of Airbnb as a platform play a leading role in this trust building. As trust 
between users is central to the business model of Airbnb, the company goes to great 
length to facilitate trust. However, sometimes, the company’s interest may conflict 
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with those of the users, consequently limiting the options users have to build trust. In 
addition, Airbnb increasingly has to deal with legal issues. Not only is this a challenge 
to trust vested in the platform as these legal quarrels bring along much uncertainty, 
but the initial self-regulation central to the collaborative consumption movement also 
has to make room for a more traditional, external, and top down regulation from 
governmental actors.  
 
By analysing trust in the shared economy through the conceptual lens of the four Cs, I 
endorse the claim of the collaborative consumption movement that trust between 
strangers is a necessary condition for any initiative in this domain to become 
successful. However, I strongly disagree with the utopian belief that Internet 
technology enables us to restore old forms of interpersonal trust; rather a new kind of 
trust occurs characterized by the intertwinement of the interpersonal and the system, 
which I referred to as interpersonal system trust. If the case of Airbnb shows us 
anything worth to remember than it must be that trust in the shared economy is not 
just about you and me, but about you, me and the system, in all its facets, that brings 
us together.  
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8 
A too familiar world. 
 
One of the greatest challenges in the networked era is to acquire knowledge out of all 
the information that is piling up around us120. Personalization has been regarded as 
the technical solution to this problem. By filtering information based on the profiles 
of users, it becomes possible to create tailored information environments. Other 
authors have referred to the same phenomenon as filter bubbles (Pariser 2011) and 
echo chambers (Sunstein 2007). 
These information environments are stretched out over the online and offline 
domain (if it is even possible to still clearly discern the two nowadays). On the 
Internet, where data are constantly multiplying, it has become impossible to 
efficiently search and find information without some technological assistance in the 
form of filtered and ranked content. In addition, rather than presenting users with 
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random or general advertisements, items or services, online companies personalize 
their offers to fit the profile of the potential customer. In the offline domain, as we 
explored in chapter six, new technologies such as iBeacons in hotels make it possible 
to tailor the ‘real-life’ environment of hotel guests. Also the promises of ambient 
intelligence include the development of a personalized and pro-active living 
environment (van den Berg 2009). Because it is online that these personalized 
information environments are currently the most developed, they will be the main 
focus of my argument. 
   
Many consider online personalization – the possibility to tailor online services to the 
individual needs and preferences of users – as one of the “Holy Grails” in the world of 
ICT (see: van der Hof and Prins 2008; Nabeth 2008; Chen and Stallaert 2014). The 
search engine Google, which provides users with search results relevant to their 
individual context, is a prime example of online personalization. Facebook also 
personalizes its services by ranking the posts on a user’s timeline in order of 
importance, and online advertisement companies make use of behavioural targeting 
–a specific application of online personalization- to provide clients with tailored ads, 
sometimes following potential costumers all over the web (also referred to as 
retargeting). Obviously, online personalization has many advantages. It provides an 
easy retrieval of relevant information, it boosts the effect of advertisement, and it 
enables a more efficient and adequate way of doing business. In short, it makes 
online interactions run smoothly.  
 
It is clear, nevertheless, that personalization may also cause privacy issues as it is 
based on the collection and analysis of large amounts of personal data (Solove 2004; 
Benoist 2008; Brownsword 2008; Chellappa and Sin 2005; van der Sloot and 
Borgesius 2012). Privacy issues may negatively impact trust. For example, when users 
feel online companies are not respecting their privacy, this may negatively influence 
the trust vested in these curators (Liu et al. 2005; Metzger 2004; Flavián and 
Guinalíu 2006).  
Personalization, however, can also interfere with trust on another level. As 
personalization becomes increasingly sophisticated as well as ubiquitous, it may also 
fundamentally shape the familiar world. The way in which personalization influences 
the familiar world and therefore has an impact on the way trust is being established 
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will be the central topic of this chapter.  
From a philosophical anthropology perspective, I will analyse how profiling –
the current dominant technique enabling personalization- has an impact on the way 
in which meaning is being constituted. Where up until now, they way in which human 
beings perceive the world has always had an intersubjective character, due to 
personalization this perspective increasingly becomes subjective. And, where this 
world has always been characterized as one of evolving stability, due to 
personalization it becomes determined by a fixed stability. 
 
While personalization on the one hand reduces complexity and therefore helps to 
create a familiar environment by predicting the needs of users, on the other hand, I 
will argue, a perfect –or almost perfect- personalized interface may result in a ‘too 
familiar world’. This too familiar world may strengthen on the one hand users’ self-
confidence by presenting them with information that affirms their initial beliefs. It 
may also make them less perceptive for information that challenges their behaviour. 
Online personalization provides users, therefore, with an individualized familiar 
world instead of a shared familiar world necessary for interpersonal trust to be 
established.  
Research indicates that when people are experiencing a threat and are looking 
for information –for example a diagnosed patient who googles information on 
treatments- they have the tendency to only expose themselves to information they 
prefer (Liao and Fu 2013: 2366). This tendency is only being fortified by 
personalization. Without being confronted with alternative beliefs of others or 
contradicting information, it becomes more difficult to comprehend the motives of 
other persons or feel empathy for their considerations (Nussbaum 1998). Moreover, 
it might also reduce social capital (Pariser 2011) and weaken deliberative democracy 
(Sunstein 2007). For example, research on extreme right videos on Youtube indicates 
the existence of an “extreme right filter bubble” as users can “be immersed in this 
content following a short series of clicks” (O'Callaghan et al. 2013: 9).  
All in all, personalization practices make it more strenuous to bridge the 
ontological distance human beings face in their interactions with others. Reverting to 
Plessner’s distinction between the animal Umwelt and the human open world, I will 
argue that a personalized world of information tends to become an Umwelt instead of 
an open world, nudging human beings to cling to their centric instead of their 
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eccentric positionality. Personalization may hinder the bridging of the ontological 
distance between human beings. In a personalized world interpersonal trust erodes.  
 
I will first analyse online personalization through the lens of the four Cs. Starting with 
the level of construction, I will look into the functioning of profiling and 
personalization. Then, I will look at the curation of the personalized interface by 
focussing on the personalization practices of Google. Third, I will take into account 
the codification concerning personalization. Finally, I will look at the context level, 
making use of some key concepts of mediation theory, which were already presented 
in chapter four. After this analysis of the personalized interface, I will examine the 
influence of personalization on the familiar world and interpersonal trust, elaborating 
on the work of philosopher Helmuth Plessner, amongst others.  
 
 
8.1 Construction 
Personalization can be perceived as  
“a form of user-to-system interactivity that uses a set of technological 
features to adapt the content, delivery, and arrangement of a 
communication to individual users’ explicitly registered and / or 
implicitly determined preferences” (Thurman and Schifferes 2012: 776). 
A necessary condition for online personalization is automated profiling. By means of 
algorithms, databases filled with huge sets of data are mined to create, discover, or 
construct knowledge (Hildebrandt 2008: 17). Profiling is used to create profiles of 
individual users or groups based on which personalization can take place. These 
profiles can be seen as “hypotheses” (idem: 18); predictions about future preferences 
and behaviour. Interestingly, these hypotheses are not necessarily based on a 
common sense expectation or on earlier-established knowledge. The hypotheses 
often just “emerge” in the process of gathering and analysing data (idem).  
In the context of his research on behavioural targeting, Borgesius (2014) 
discerns 5 stages in the profiling process. First, there is the collection of data. In this 
phase, firms gather data about the behaviour of people by tracking them online. They 
drop for example a cookie – a small, non-intrusive text file – in the potential buyer’s 
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browser which enables them to identify this specific device when visiting a website 
(Watts 2012). Etzioni (2012: 929) reports the use of “supercookies” which are not 
only difficult to detect but can even reinstall themselves after they are removed. Also 
Facebook, with its Like button implemented on many websites, is able to track the 
visitors of those websites even when they are not a Facebook-member themselves 
(Roosendaal 2010). 
Second, the data is stored, often “tied to a unique identifier such as a cookie” 
(Borgesius 2014: 61). In this stage, a profile is made of a user. A profile is “a set of 
correlated data that identifies and represents a data subject” (Hildebrandt and 
Backhouse 2005: 106).  
In phase 3, the collected data is analysed. By making use of algorithms, the 
data is mined, looking for correlations and patterns that may shed a light on 
preferences of the user. In the end it is the goal of this analysis to make a prediction; 
for example –when it concerns an advertisement company- about the probability a 
user will click on an ad.  
Phase 4 is the phase of data disclosure. Data brokers collect and sell personal 
information, which other companies in their turn can use to personalize their content 
or services (Borgesius 2014: 70-71). It is, however, not always necessary to buy the 
data. Online retailers for example that want to make use of retargeting can also turn 
to companies such as Google that started testing this specific form of profiling - they 
refer to it as remarketing- in 2009 (Helft and Vega 2010) (For a legal analysis of 
Google's advertisement activities see: van der Sloot and Borgesius 2012).  
The final phase is the phase where the targeting actually takes place. Based on 
the collected, stored, and analysed data, content tailored to the profile of a specific 
user will be displayed. Because the content is personalized, different visitors may 
experience different websites or different information environments, contributing to 
the arrival of a personalized online environment (for more emperical research in 
online personalization see: Mikians et al. 2012; O'Callaghan et al. 2013; Nguyen et al. 
2014).  
 
Personalization online can take on different forms. Probably one of the most well-
known examples of personalization is the recommendation tool of Amazon. This 
algorithm allows the company to personalize its website by providing users with 
tailored recommendations based on their purchase history and by connecting one 
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item to another item (Linden et al. 2003). An example of such a recommendation 
could be: people who bought “Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone” also bought 
“Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets” (Rowling 1997, 1998).  
Another example is the personalization of website content. For instance, news 
sites increasingly tailor their content to the individual profiles of visitors. In order to 
do so, they increasingly “…rely on software algorithms to predict readers’ content 
preferences” (Thurman and Schifferes 2012: 775). 
Another application of personalization is behavioural targeting: “the 
monitoring of people’s online behaviour, to use the collected information to show 
people individually targeted advertisements” (Borgesius 2014: 30).  
A sub-class of behavioural targeting, which has skyrocketed the last couple of 
years and is an important feature of the personalized web is retargeting (Beales 
2010; Helft and Vega 2010; Lambrecht and Tucker 2013). Online retailers do not 
merely want to display a website or an ad tailored to the specific interests of their 
visitors. Better still, since visitors often leave the website without purchase, 
corporations want to follow visitors all over the web with personalized ads in the 
hope to persuade them to buy the item –or a related one- that they have shown 
interest for in the past.  
E-advertising companies make this real-time targeting possible by monitoring 
online behaviour. If a potential buyer is for example looking at a pair of shoes, a 
cookie is placed into her browser connecting it to that pair of shoes (Steel 2007; Helft 
and Vega 2010). When she leaves the online shoe retailer, surfing to another website, 
the company is alarmed and automatically starts bidding on advertisement space on 
that other website, ensuring a personalized shoe-advertisement shows up when that 
web page has been loaded. All this happens fully-automated in a mere 6 
milliseconds
121
.  
Borgesius (2014: 77) also reports that there are even firms whose core business 
it is to personalize websites based on demographic, behavioural and historical 
information. It is also possible to morph the design of websites. “Morphing involves 
automatically matching the basic ‘look and feel’ of a website, not just the content, to 
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cognitive styles” (Hauser et al 2009: 202 cited in Borgesius 2014: 77). 
 
 
8.2 Curation 
As we have already established in previous chapters, the vision of an open and free 
Internet as it was proclaimed in the early 90s can be judged as utopian and perhaps a 
little naïve. It is now generally recognized that online curators such as search engines, 
online businesses, and other information intermediaries have a big say in what kind 
of information a user has access to. Personalization fits this larger tendency to 
monitor, pre-sort, shape, and increasingly control the information environment. 
From a curation perspective personalization can be perceived as: 
“[…] an organisational strategy of companies, governments and other 
organisations to provide services by means of ICTs to a large number of 
individual customers worldwide on an individualised basis” (van der Hof 
and Prins 2008: 113). 
Although users have the feeling they are anonymous online and nobody is interested 
in their online activities, the opposite is the case (Benoist 2008: 168). Almost 80% of 
the most often-visited websites use tracking technology to gather information of their 
visitors (Angwin 2010) and a majority of them use this information to tailor their 
interface to the personal profile of their users.  
The basic rationale behind this personalization is that if users are presented 
with tailored information, they will be more interested, and hence buy a product. 
However, as Borgesius (2014: 36) notes, there is no consensus on the effectiveness of 
targeted advertisement. In their recent economics study on advertisements making 
use of behavioural targeting, Chen and Stallaert (2014) found that not in all cases 
does behavioural targeting pay off. Their research indicates that for small publishers 
it might be best to stay with traditional advertising, while when there is sufficient 
competition among similar advertisers, “the behavioural targeting revenue for the 
online publisher can approach double the income from traditional targeting” (Chen 
and Stallaert 2014: 447). In spite of these fluctuating findings, advertising companies, 
who are large contributors to the personalized information environment online, spent 
more than an estimated $ 1.3 billion in targeted advertising in 2011, and it is expected 
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that this figure has only risen the years that followed (Chen and Stallaert 2014: 430). 
 
Many large curators online make use of personalization. To better understand their 
incentives in doing so, I will focus on Google as its business model leans in two ways 
on personalization. The company uses personalization to tailor their search results 
on the one hand and to sell targeted advertisement on the other. Mager (2012) 
speaks of the “service-for-profile model”. A user can use the search engine free of cost 
because the profile Google creates is sold to profit-making corporations, or at least 
advertisements based on this profile are sold.  
Although the average user will know Google mainly for its activities as a search 
engine, the company’s revenue is mostly based on their advertisement activities. In 
2014, the company generated 89% of its revenue from advertisers
122
. In order to both 
rank search results and sell advertisements, Google has to have access to a large body 
of behavioural data to create user-profiles. Taking into account their status as an 
“obligatory passing point” (Mager 2012: 776) for almost everyone who wants to find 
information online, a lack of data does not seem to be very likely.  
However, little is publicly known about the way in which Google personalizes 
its search results (Hannak et al. 2013: 528). Google might relate a query to the user’s 
search history and has the ability to cross-reference this information with data 
coming from their other services such as Gmail and Google Docs (Tene 2008: 1448). 
In addition, Google always makes use of contextualization (Enge 2011). The search 
engine takes into account context elements such as geography, language, and 
seasonality to make the interaction between its interface and the user run smoothly. 
In addition, even when a user is not logged in to Google, the search engine 
personalizes its results by making use of cookies. For a period of 180 days, a cookie 
linked to the user’s browser keeps track of the search history.  
Also, when it comes to Google’s behavioural advertising program, it is not 
completely clear which data Google uses to build profiles of its users (van der Sloot 
and Borgesius 2012: 78-79). Research indicates (Gomez et al. 2009), nevertheless, 
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that Google is dominant when it comes to tracking websites, as 92 out of the top 100 
websites Google is able to monitor. Moreover, taking into account the privacy policies 
of other Google services such as YouTube, it seems that many data are gathered when 
making use of these other Google products (in this example, by looking at YouTube 
video clips) (van der Sloot and Borgesius 2012: 77-78).  
All in all, it becomes clear that Google has access to a lot of data about the 
online behaviour of users and that all these sorting techniques enable Google to 
create profiles it can use to tailor its list of search results to the specific needs of the 
user as well as base its targeted advertisement on. Both the pre-sorting and ranking 
of information in order for users to find relevant information, as well as the targeted 
advertisements contribute to an online individualized information environment. As 
not just Google, but more and more online parties are using these personalization 
technologies, Pariser (2011: 111) states that in the end:  
“we’ll increasingly be forced to trust the companies at the center of this 
process to properly express and synthesize who we really are”. 
 
8.3 Codification 
Similar to the arrival of Airbnb, personalization, being a new technique leaning 
heavily on the collection and analysis of data, has also started several legal 
discussions. For instance, while it is clear that behavioural targeting or 
personalization involves the processing of data, it can be questioned if these data 
generally are also personal data. Again looking at Google, the company defines 
personal information as:  
“information you provide to us which personally identifies you, such as 
your name, email address, or billing information, or other information 
which can be reasonably linked to such information by Google”
123
. 
However, as Van Der Sloot and Borgesius (2012: 83) remark, this definition by 
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Google is narrower than the definition of personal data provided by the Data 
Protection Directive (Directive), which is the regulatory instrument that focuses on 
the processing of personal data in the EU. In the Directive, personal information is 
defined as:  
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity”
124
. 
 
The Article 29 Working Party, an independent European advisory body on data 
protection and privacy consisting of the data protection authorities of all EU member 
states, has elaborated on this definition, explaining that information not only relates 
to a person because the content is about the person, but also when information is 
used to evaluate or influence the behaviour of a person
125
. In addition, it is also stated 
that to decide if a person is identifiable all the means that reasonably can be used by 
either the controller –in our example Google- or anyone else to identify the person 
should be taken into account. Taking the previous into consideration, Van Der Sloot 
and Borgesius (2012) conclude that in general behavioural targeting involves the 
processing of personal data. They write:  
“[t]he collection and analysis of personal data of Internet users is a 
process that falls within the definition of processing of personal data in 
the Directive. Google is the controller as it determines the goal of the 
processing, targeted advertising, and the means by which the data are 
processed, such as determining the data mining techniques. In short, the 
Directive is applicable” (van der Sloot and Borgesius 2012: 85). 
However, this broad perspective on what personal data is, as being put forward 
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by the Working Party, has also met resistance. In line with this perspective, for 
example also IP addresses are considered to be personal data. Not only has Google 
objected to this perspective, but also legal scholars such as Zwenne (2013: 8) argue 
against such a broad interpretation, as it will lead to the situation that “data 
protection law will apply in many situations where it is not needed”. 
This discussion on personal data is important for users because if personalized 
data are being processed and the Directive is applicable, the privacy of the users 
involved is protected by the standards and requirements set in the Directive
126
. 
Consequently, if personalization includes the processing of personal data, there has to 
be one of the legal bases listed in the Directive on which this processing takes place. 
The unambiguous consent of users –the Directive speaks of data subjects- as a legal 
basis is almost always required when curators –the Directive speaks of data 
controllers- process personal data for behavioural targeting (Borgesius 2015).  
However consent is in ‘crisis’, Schermer et al. (2014) convincingly argue (also 
see: van Eijk et al. 2012). Users click ‘agree’ without giving it a second thought or 
reading the ‘terms and conditions’. As a consequence, they agree to data processing 
without fully understanding the impact. Not only may this uninformed consent 
weaken the trust of users in data processing, it can also impose problems on the 
curators as they are processing personal data based on a shaky consent, as it may not 
truly reflect the wishes of the user. 
 
All in all, it becomes clear that the uncertainty about the legal grounds for 
personalization makes it difficult for the average user to understand on which legal 
protection she can count. Van der Hof and Prins (2008: 116-117) suggest that the 
attention of data protection should shift from  
“individual sets of personal data towards the statistical models, profiles 
and algorithms with which individuals are categorized in a certain group 
or ‘identity’. After all, these models and algorithms are privately owned 
and thus unavailable for public scrutiny. The interests of personal data 
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protection however, seem to require that they are made known to the 
public and thus are part of the public domain”. 
‘Knowing that’ personalisation takes place is of course a necessary condition 
for any reflection on the matter. However, ‘knowing how’ personalisation 
shapes the informational environment becomes even more important 
because of the increasingly ubiquitous presence of personalization and its 
potential impact on a variety of domains in everyday life. Returning to 
Google as our prime example of a curator who makes use of personalization, 
its privacy policy clearly states that:  
“our automated systems analyze your content (including emails) to 
provide you personally relevant product features, such as customized 
search results, tailored advertising, and spam and malware detection”127.  
However, what is not included in the privacy policy is the rationale behind the 
personalization. What are the mechanisms behind assigning a user a specific profile? 
And how does this profile lead to presenting this user with certain content and 
depriving her of others? To put it differently, users are notified that personalization is 
taking place, but the way in which this happens remains secret. What is needed, van 
der Hof and Prins (2008: 117) argue, are  
“instruments to enhance the visibility of and knowledge about how 
personal data are used and combined, on the basis of what data 
individuals are typified, by whom and for what purposes.”  
In her inaugural lecture, Hildebrandt (2013a) also explicitly addresses this issue. If 
users –or as Hildebrandt puts it more eloquently “inhabitants of cyberspace”- are 
entitled to gain insight on the logic of the processing of their personal data, could 
companies ‘hide’ behind trade secrecies or property rights? In any case, as the excerpt 
of Google’s privacy policy illustrates, companies are certainly not pro-actively 
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http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//intl/en/policies/privacy/google_
privacy_policy_en.pdf, Version 30 June 2015, p3. Accessed 12 August 2015. 
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providing users with this kind of information. Therefore, if users want to know, they 
would have to actively request for information first. And then, even if users receive 
information on the rationale behind the processing of their personal information, 
given the complexity of these systems and algorithms, would they be able to fully 
comprehend it? Hildebrandt (2013a: 19) argues that it may be more effective to 
rethink how “legal protection can be incorporated as a default in the architecture of 
cyberspace” (also see: Hildebrandt 2015). Anticipating the second part of this 
chapter, it will be this lack of transparency concerning the logic behind the 
personalization which hinders users to look beyond their filter bubble. 
 
 
8.4 Context 
How does personalization affects users’ experience? Authors like Latour (1992), Ihde 
(1990), and more recently Verbeek (2011b) have convincingly argued that 
technologies are not just neutral instruments performing a pre-defined task, but are 
artefacts that also influence the actions and experiences of their users in often 
unforeseen ways. Personalization co-shapes the way in which Internet users perceive 
reality. This co-shaping of users’ experiences and actions is also referred to as 
“technological mediation” (see also chapter five). It is important to understand that 
this technological mediation is two-fold. Technology and users have a permanent 
stake in shaping each other. More than the “building bricks”, they are the “products” 
of their interaction (Verbeek 2000: 183). Therefore, online personalization is not just 
about a personalized interface but also about a personalized user. In the interaction, 
the user is often unconsciously –and sometimes even unwillingly- shaping the 
interface based on her online behaviour. Conversely, the interface, presenting the 
online world in a personalized manner, is affecting the user by pre-sorting her choices 
and actions (Pariser 2011).  
In all mediation a translation takes place (Ihde 1990). Some aspects of the 
online world are amplified, while others are reduced. Looking at the personalized 
interface, it even is its principal goal to amplify the information that fits the profile of 
the user and to reduce information that is irrelevant to it. The personalized interface 
pre-sorts a specific kind of interpretation and shapes what counts as real (also see: 
Verbeek 2011b). 
The way in which smart artefacts mediate interactions or open up the world 
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for human beings can take different forms. In chapter five, I introduced the 
immersive hermeneutic relation to define the interaction of users with their 
personalized information environment. This immersive hermeneutic relation shares 
some of the characteristics of the hermeneutic relation as described by Ihde but it 
also differs from it, mainly because of the networked ontology key to smart artefacts 
and services.  
In a hermeneutic relation, an artefact represents reality in such a way that its 
users have access to it by engaging with the concerning artefact. When a user does a 
Google search on her computer, the computer is the “object of perception”, however, 
it is simultaneously “referring beyond itself to what is not immediately seen” (Ihde 
1990: 82). The screen of the computer represents the online world to the user. It 
represents in a sensible way the bits and bytes which cannot be perceived with the 
naked eye. In this hermeneutic relation of user and personalized interface, the user 
can, so to speak, read herself into any possible, online situation without actually 
being there (see: Ihde 1990: 92). The computer is not transparent but opaque and the 
user has to master certain skills in order to interact with the device. It is not through 
but by (Verbeek 2000: 142) the ability of the interface to visualize the online world 
that it becomes meaningful to the user.  
   
However, this kind of hermeneutic relation also falls short on certain levels to capture 
the distinctiveness of the interaction with the personalized information environment. 
The online environment in which the user reads herself into also has an immersive 
character (also see Verbeek 2015: 219). She gets deeply engaged with the online 
service or the interaction with others through an online platform while smart 
algorithms constantly monitor her actions and simultaneously adapt and personalize 
her interface.  
Moreover, the interface of the computer does not merely represent a specific 
aspect of the world, but it refers to a different reality! The online personalized world 
includes algorithms (construction), references to virtual contexts (my Facebook 
timeline), and connections with the offline world (the pictures of my friends 
represent real persons, the information I find on Google shapes my experience of the 
‘offline’ world). The interface that enables me to read myself into the online context is 
simultaneously an integral part of this context. As Søraker (2012) argues, in the 
networked era it becomes increasingly difficult to clearly distinguish between 
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fundamental concepts such as technology and world, since the interface that 
mediates the online experience simultaneously is the online world itself.  
“Virtual worlds are both worlds and technologies; the computer 
simulation is both the underpinning of the virtual world and the means of 
mediation” (Søraker 2012: 504). 
When technology and world become intertwined on such a fundamental level as is the 
case in the personalized information environment, it becomes increasingly difficult 
for users to evaluate the influence of the technology on their perception of reality. It is 
impossible to have a ‘naked perception’ or a non-mediated perception of the online 
world based on which a user can judge if its representation is sufficient or fair. 
Without the interface, there is no online world. Van den Hoven (1998) speaks of 
“artificial authorities” to emphasize the reliance of users on their devices to function 
properly. The average user might be able to read the interface, but not to explore the 
inner workings of the underlying profiling technologies. Van der Hof and Prins 
(2008: 121) warn:  
“Personalization… may force individuals into restrictive two-dimensional 
models based on the criteria set by technology and of those who own and 
apply the technology”.  
The impossibility to see through the functioning of the underlying profiling 
technologies also shows that, although we speak of a personalized interface or a 
personalized information environment, the person concerned has not much control 
over her information environment. The mediation of perception taking place through 
the interface is a mediation enabled by other parties, mostly information 
intermediaries. These companies have their own interests, which do not necessarily 
align with the interests of the user (Mager 2012). Introna and Nissenbaum (2000: 
175) predict that: 
“… information seekers on the Web, whose experiences are mediated 
through search engines, are most likely to find large, popular sites whose 
designers have enough technical savvy to succeed in the raking game, and 
especially those sites whose proprietors are able to pay for various means 
of improving their site’s positioning. Seekers are less likely to find less 
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popular, smaller, sites, including those that are not supported by 
knowledgeable professionals. When a search does yield these sites, they 
are likely to have lower prominence in rankings”.  
All in all, we can conclude that from a user’s perspective the personalized interface 
mediates –just as other artefacts do- the way in which reality is presented. 
Personalization makes it possible to amplify some information, while reducing 
others. However, particular to this mediation is that it becomes increasingly difficult 
for users to take a step back and reflect upon the mediation, as the world and 
technology - in the case of the personalized information environment - are 
fundamentally intertwined. As personalization is mostly in the hands of online 
curators, users have to rely on them to present the online world in a fair manner. 
Moreover, where artefacts such as a thermometer or a compass, open up the world in 
a more or less similar way to their users, the personalized interface mediates the 
online world in a unique way to its users. Consequently it can no longer be taken for 
granted that what I see will be the same as what others see. 
 
8.4.1 Four Cs: where are we now? 
Analysing online personalization through the lens of the four Cs provides us with a 
picture of a wide variety of online curators that use profiling techniques to tailor their 
content and services to the user’s preferences. There is debate on the legal 
underpinning of activities such as behavioural targeting as it is not always clear if the 
data that are processed are personal data and if the consent often required to process 
personal data in this matters is given in a well-informed way. There is also the appeal 
to shift perspective and, instead of focussing on the data, to look more to the way in 
which users can regain control over what happens to them based on this data 
processing and to make the logic behind profiling and the personalization of content 
more transparent. Users may benefit from personalization because it enables them to 
retrieve information more easily and make their interaction online more efficient. 
However, because the processes underpinning their information environment are 
opaque, they cannot critically reflect upon it nor assess the impact it has on their 
everyday life.   
 
What does this all have to do with trust? 
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If we can see online personalization as the first step towards a personalized ‘lifeworld’ 
in the networked era, this development –when it has reached its full growth- could 
fundamentally change the character of the familiar world that is a necessary 
condition for trust to be established. The implicit, shared assumption, which partly 
constitutes the familiar world, namely that all human beings perceive the world more 
or less in a similar way, will erode. Increasingly, human beings will reside in their 
own personalized information environment, their own “filter bubble” (Pariser 2011), 
gradually lacking the shared background necessary for trust to thrive. 
I will first recapture the role and function of the familiar world for trust. Next, 
making use of Plessner’s distinction between the open world of human beings and the 
“Umwelt” of animals, I will analyse the impact of profiling and personalization on the 
familiar world. 
 
 
8.5 A familiar world  
As we have seen in the second and third chapter, a familiar, shared background of 
experience is a necessary condition for trust to be established. Trust can only reduce 
complexity in a world that is already to a certain extent familiar. There are two main 
sources for this complexity: the other and time, revealing a social and a temporal 
level in the complexity of the world.  
On the social level, complexity comes into the world because of the possibility 
of unanticipated actions by fellow human beings, constituting a source of insecurity. 
We cannot read the minds of others. They have to a certain extent the freedom to act 
in ways that cannot be foreseen by others.  
On a temporal level, human beings are aware of the discrepancy between 
possible futures and the one future that will become reality. In the present they have 
to cope with an over-complex and undetermined future. Therefore, trust also has to 
do with anticipating the future. Trust is “to behave as though the future were certain” 
(Luhmann 1979: 10).  
If people now constantly had to consider the possibility that they perceive the 
world in ways radically different than others do or that natural laws were not 
universal but susceptible to change, they would become paralyzed because of such an 
uncanny environment. The complexity brought forth by time and the other would 
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simply be too overwhelming. There has to be some familiarity first in order for 
human beings to be able to trust - to act as if they know for sure what the future will 
bring. If there was no familiarity, the hiatus located in the self, between the other and 
me, and between the world and me would be impossible to bridge. 
 
Trust can only take place in a familiar world in which existence is already structured 
in a pre-reflexive way. We take the presence of the world, our fellow human beings 
and the objects we encounter for granted. In everyday life, we do not doubt their 
existence. We expect to see and experience the world in a way similar to our fellow 
human beings. They are, so to speak, “presupposed and co-experienced” (Luhmann 
1979: 18). Our experience of the world automatically entails the intersubjective 
constitution of meaning. “There is no differentiation in the operation of constituting 
meaning and world, which brings everybody together in a diffuse consensus” 
(Luhmann 1979: 18). Plessner refers to this condition as the “Mitwelt”. The way 
human beings are in the world, even when they are alone, is always a being-together-
with-others. The familiar world is always an intersubjective world. 
Although this familiar world invokes stability, it does not entail that it is 
unchangeable. On the contrary, the familiar world as it is an intersubjective world is 
always the result of the coming together of perspectives. As Hildebrandt (2015: 183) 
puts it: “[w]e are forever guessing each other’s interpretations”. The familiar world 
always remains intertwined with the open, complex world, which it, to a certain 
extent, regulates. Therefore, the stability provided by the familiar world is always an 
evolving stability.  
 
It has to be noted that this complexity is not merely a burden, a hurdle we have to 
take in order to live our lives. This complexity is also productive, as it persuades us to 
act, to be creative, to imagine (for an analysis on the importance of imagination see: 
Schinkel 2014). For example, while it is true that our fellow human beings by their –
to us- unpredictable behaviour add to the complexity we have to deal with in 
everyday life, simultaneously, it is also through their presence, through their 
perspective on the world that “man’s environment becomes man’s own world” 
(Luhmann 1979: 7). By presenting us with other perspectives of the world, they make 
us aware of the world’s horizon of infinite possibilities.  
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8.6 Profiling 
In the familiar world of human beings complexity always shines through, even more 
so in late modern society where high consequence risks are part of everyday life 
(chapter three)
128
. As a result, human beings are constantly engaged in all sorts of 
‘complexity-reducing activities’. They trust (of course), they rely on their social roles, 
on the security brought forth by institutions, on the control they gain by using 
technology, and on the structuring effect of the law.  
Interestingly, if we approach profiling no longer as a mere technological 
process, but look at it from a more functionalistic perspective, it can also be 
categorized as a ‘complexity-reducing activity” human beings engage in. The core 
activity of this technology, namely to automatically categorize and generalize 
information, is not merely confined to machines. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the 
non-reflective profiling of algorithms resembles the way living nature, including 
human beings, interact with their world on a daily basis. In order to hold their 
ground, plants, animals, and human beings all make use of what we might call 
biological profiling to filter their overly complex environment (Hildebrandt 2008: 
25-30). In a routine-like manner, they are “[…] extracting relevant information from 
the environment” in order to adapt themselves to this environment and survive (idem 
2008: 26). In line with Hildebrandt (2008: 24) we can say that “[…] profiling is not 
only a part of professional and everyday life but also a constitutive competence of life 
itself in the biological sense of the word”.  
 
8.6.1 Animal and human profiling 
To understand how profiling is in fact an important element in the everyday life of all 
living nature, we turn again to the work of Helmuth Plessner (1975). According to 
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 Nevertheless, in daily life people may often ‘forget’ that the routines inscribed in their bodies are 
human-made and therefore changeable (Plessner 1978). And although all interaction is mediated, 
human beings experience it as direct, dismissing possible side effects of the mediating artefacts at 
hand. Human beings tend to uphold a utopian belief in a stable and unchangeable world, steered by 
universal rules.  
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Plessner, animals are ‘captured’ in a “Funktionkreis”. They are aware of their 
environment as far as their building scheme permits them. Consequently, the 
information they receive while profiling their environment can only be of use in a 
specific situation, for example, when they perceive an enemy close by and have to 
choose between fleeing and fighting. Although especially higher mammals have a 
certain awareness of their environment, they cannot reflect upon their choices. They 
cannot break out of the actual situation, sit down, and wonder how to bring their 
strategies to perfection based on the gathered information over time. All information 
that is acquired by profiling their environment must fit into their pre-existing 
knowledge frame. Not aware of a past or future, non-human animals live “here and 
now” in an “Umwelt”, a closed environment limited by their building scheme 
(Plessner 1975).  
 
Just like other animals, profiling by human beings often takes place in a routine-like 
manner. We rely on the predictability of the social roles we all play and the shared 
background of values and rules. Human beings tend to forget that the routines they 
follow and the rules that are set in society in fact are social constructs and not natural 
laws. To reduce the complexity inherent in human life, human beings are in an often-
unconscious way generalizing and categorizing the information around them. This is 
what constitutes the familiar world. From this perspective, the familiar world of 
human beings is also an un-reflected world. The third anthropological law of Plessner 
captures this human urge to live as if the world is a well-ordered place, by speaking of 
a utopian standpoint people strive for. There is, however, always the possibility of 
questioning routines and changing them. 
Notwithstanding the fact that human beings mostly act without giving it a 
second thought, this does not mean their reflexive attribute is unimportant or even 
superfluous. On the contrary, according to Plessner, human beings differ from other 
animals because they are “conscious of their consciousness”. Human beings are 
aware of the fact that they are the ones who are profiling the world. Because of their 
eccentric positionality they are aware of the world’s contingency, confronted with the 
fickleness of time and the other. They do not live in a pre-existing, fixed environment, 
tuned to their building scheme as other animals do. The familiar world of human 
beings is indissolubly connected to the complex world it orders. Complexity always 
shines through. The boundaries of the familiar world may be structuring but they are 
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never concluding. Human beings have to mould their own world through culture, 
language, and technology. They have the ability to break out of an actual situation 
and become aware of its contingency. This second-order awareness means that, so to 
speak, from a distance human beings can look back and reflect upon the course of 
action, able to consider possible alternatives. Often, this awareness is triggered by 
conflicting opinions of others, challenging the existent knowledge frame. Eventually, 
this confrontation might lead to the adjustment of an initial set of beliefs. De Mul and 
Van Den Berg (2011) refer to this process of evaluating internal and external motives 
as “the reflexive loop”.  
The most fundamental difference between the animal Umwelt and the 
familiar world of human beings is that the Umwelt cannot be shattered, - there is no 
world beyond the familiar world, so to speak - where the human familiar world, on 
the other hand, always remains a world ‘under-construction’. 
 
 
8.7 A too familiar world online  
When we now take this distinction between an open world and a closed Umwelt and 
look at the functioning of automated personalization online, we can determine that 
these techniques invite users to live in a closed Umwelt rather than in an open world. 
This shift may affect the familiar world in two important ways: it may lead to the 
construction of a subjective instead of an intersubjective familiar world. And, it may 
result in a fixed instead of an evolving stability.  
First, by feeding users a string of information that only affirms their pre-
existing, individual beliefs, profiling technologies build an online world, which 
resembles the closed world of animals, determined by their Funktionkreis. In 
personalized information environments, the action of human beings is constantly 
interpreted and anticipated by algorithms. While these algorithms may have access to 
the [data on] users’ behaviour, these users do not have access to those profiling 
techniques and therefore “no way of guessing how we are being ‘read’ by our novel 
smart environments” (Hildebrandt 2015: 183; also see: Hildebrandt 2013b: 19-22). 
As a result, meaning is no longer intersubjectively constituted but subjectively. The 
personalized information environment reflects the user’s individual preferences and 
is no longer the result of the ‘coming together of perspectives’. It can no longer be 
presupposed that the way in which I perceive the world is more or less in line with the 
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way others perceive it. This basic and fundamental uncertainty which familiarity 
normally neutralizes is under scrutiny. Online, people reside in a personalized 
Umwelt or a ‘too familiar world’. Contrary to the cultural and open world, this is not a 
shared familiar world [Mitwelt] in which meaning is inter-subjectively constituted.  
 Second, as personalization is about predicting users’ preferences and pro-
actively adapting the content and services based on these predictions, the chance of 
being confronted with deviating opinions of others or conflicting information 
becomes in general far less likely. Solving the ‘problem’ of contingency – as we have 
seen in chapter five - by putting all faith in the computational powers to predict and 
consequently control the future, may turn out to be an impoverishment of our lives. 
As it happens, it is often these moments of disturbance and conspicuous complexity 
shining through in the familiar world that fire up the eccentric positionality of human 
beings, instigating creativity and new perspectives. Taking into account that “[…] 
conscious reflection is the incentive to create new habits […]”(Hildebrandt 2008: 27), 
personalization is wired to spur stagnation or fixed stability instead of evolving 
stability.  
 
All in all, the personalization of the lifeworld, especially when this bearing is not just 
constricted to the online domain, will lead to a personalized information 
environment. It may well be that on a personal level trust in the self or self-
confidence will be strengthened as the beliefs of human beings are constantly 
conformed and reaffirmed. However, on the interpersonal level, the ontological 
distance human beings have to bridge may enlarge. Consequently, interpersonal trust 
may erode in a personalized information environment.  
 
 
8.8 Challenges for trust 
Similar to the other chapters, I want to speak of challenges for trust – and not merely 
of ‘problems’ or ‘adversities’ (although these are definitely there) - as I strongly 
believe that we still have room to manoeuvre and design, sell, regulate, and interact 
with these technologies in such a way that the too familiar world I have sketched does 
not necessarily have to become reality. Some may argue that a too familiar world due 
to personalization will not arrive in any case, as technology will never reach the 
perfection needed to speak of such a fundamental shift. Some research indicates that 
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only 17,50% of the search results online currently are personalized and the obvious 
personalization we know from retargeting, users in general do not find difficult to 
identify as such.  
However, one can wonder how perfect this technology has to be in order to 
have the effect of rendering the familiar world subjective and fixed. In addition, 
where one, isolated personalized domain in life may not immediately lead to a 
personalized information world, an accumulation of personalization practices may 
well have this impact. Where it becomes increasingly difficult to change technologies 
once they are integrated in everyday life -especially if the Internet of Things as 
described in chapter five takes flight - we now, with online personalization as a prime 
example of what may be yet to come, have the opportunity to carefully think through 
how we want personalization technologies to be designed. On several levels, first 
initiatives are already being folded out. The interplay of personal, technical, curation, 
and regulation strategies might make a difference.  
 
8.8.1 Strategies for making the familiar world not too familiar 
By changing their interaction with the personalized interface, users are able to adjust 
its workings. This “domestication” (Silverstone and Hirsch 1992; Frissen 2004, 1994) 
of artefacts often occurs when the artefact is embedded in daily practice. In his book, 
Pariser (2011) recommends several personal strategies to replenish the filter bubble 
with new and diverse information.  
By altering her daily routines online, a user can open up the personalized 
interface and indirectly persuade it to build in new elements of information. Or as 
Pariser (2011: 223) states: “[…] varying your path online dramatically increases your 
likelihood of encountering new ideas and people.” Another strategy is to prefer 
websites that are transparent about the profiling technologies they use to websites 
that are not. By being conscious about the kind of interfaces one uses, the influence of 
a personalization can be minimized.  
 
However, a necessary condition for successfully getting around personalization 
practices is some basic knowledge on how profiling technologies work. The user 
should become emancipated. If users are sleepwalking into a personalized 
information environment, they cannot change their routines. Unfortunately, 
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knowledge about online personalization is often absent. Pan et al. (2007) for example 
show how college students are not aware of the ranking strategy of Google and blindly 
trust the search engine by clicking on the first search results that pop up, even when 
the abstract seems less relevant.  
In his pamphlet “Program or be programmed”, Rushkoff (2010) makes a stand 
against digital illiteracy and encourages the development of basic programming skills 
for all Internet users. Having insight into the basic workings of programming must 
strengthen users to use personalized interfaces in a more informed way. Developing 
digital literacy or e-skills is also on Europe’s digital agenda. It is assumed that 
children can benefit more from the Internet when they are better able to recognize 
and deal with online risks such as a biased online environment (de Haan 2010; Sonck 
et al. 2011). 
 
However, even if users become more aware of personalization practices and want to 
be able to evaluate, adapt, protest, or block certain practices, they also need to have 
the tools to act upon this knowledge. Further developing the legal framework may 
enable users to do so. Hildebrandt (2011a) develops the idea of ‘legal protection by 
design’. With this concept, she does not refer to some sort of ‘top-down’ regulation or 
invisible disciplining of users. Rather, it refers to “a new articulation of legal 
protection” (Hildebrandt 2013a: 20); for example, by designing technology in a way 
that access to personal data is facilitated and the logic behind the automated decision 
is made comprehensible to the user. We should: 
“develop intuitive interfaces with which citizens can gain insight into the 
multiple manners in which they are ‘being read’ by their smart 
environments. This should give them the means to come to grips with 
potential consequences” (Hildebrandt 2013a: 19-20). 
On a similar note, Koops (2011) argues that it is not very effective for users to control 
the process of collecting and managing data as such. It would be more useful to make 
the process of decision-making transparent. Users should be able to control how 
companies, but also governments make use of personal data. 
 
Also technical measures may help to counter a too familiar world. In line with the call 
for more transparency for users, researchers (Nagulendra and Vassileva 2014) 
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developed an interactive visualization to make users more aware of the 
personalization and filtering online. The results of their research show that such 
visualization leads amongst others to increased users’ awareness.  
Another strategy to counter the too familiar world could be programmed 
serendipity: the intentional replenishing of the personalized interface with random 
information. By including a portion of information that not directly derive from the 
personal profile of the user in the interface, the personalized information 
environment may again become more evolving instead of stable and fixed.  
The question remains however, based on which parameters this ‘un-
personalized’ stream of information should be built. Sheer randomness – as the 
opposite of personalization - could easily result in information that is of no interest to 
the user at all. With Gadamer (1972), we could say that to get the conversation 
started, we should find ourselves between the limits of ‘strangeness and familiarity’. 
If the random information is completely strange to the user, she will probably not be 
interested nor make an effort to evaluate it. If the information is completely familiar, 
no repositioning will take place either. Programmed serendipity therefore is, to a 
certain extent, depending on the same personalization techniques it is supposed to 
counterbalance. To replenish the interface with information that will catch the 
attention of the user, some basic interests of the user simply have to be known first. 
Eventually, taking Gadamer’s limits a step further, it might come down to finding the 
right balance between random and personalized information. 
Computer scientists and programmers have taken on the task of finding this 
balance and safeguarding serendipity in the online world (Maccatrozzo 2012; Campos 
and De Figueiredo 2002). For example Campos and De Figueiredo (2002) have 
investigated the possibility of programming for serendipity. They developed a 
software agent called Max “that browses the web in order to find information that 
might stimulate the user, especially information that the user is not focused upon” 
(idem 2002: 52). Making use of, amongst others, the user’s profile and a lexical 
database, Max formulates suggestions based on the generation of alternatives, the 
selection of also less significant concepts, replacing selected concepts by other, 
related concepts, and random stimulation (idem 57). 
Also Helberger (2011), who addresses the problem of personalization first and 
foremost from a policy perspective, sees concrete design principles as a manner of 
ensuring diverse information exposure online. She speaks of diversity by design and 
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analyses four different conceptions of exposure diversity which could inform the 
design of internet technologies such as Electronic Programme Guides and search 
engines, namely: “Discovering the Difference, Exposure to Diverse Media Outlets, 
Promoting Personal Autonomy, and Encouraging Serendipitous Discoveries” 
(Helberger 2011: 464).  
All in all, it becomes clear that programmed serendipity could help to 
safeguard the open character of the online world, but only if curators are willing to 
cooperate. To a certain extent, their willingness depends on –legal- regulation. 
 
As a way of conclusion, I would like to stress that these strategies for making 
the familiar world not too familiar should be approached as a whole. While I may be 
optimistic about the possibility of consciously shaping and designing our smart 
artefacts and environments, I am absolutely pessimistic as it comes to the leverage of 
individual actors. The room to manoeuvre for the average user is small and 
superficial if she has no meaningful legal and technical tools at her disposal to take a 
stance against wrongful and/or unwanted personalization of both commercial and 
governmental actors. And as the interests of curators and users of technology do not 
always align, it may well be that the interests of the curators precede those of the 
users, if a clear and adequate legal framework is not set in place. In a too familiar 
world we gain stability and predictability, but it may also turn out to be an obstacle 
for trust as a productive way of dealing with the complexity inherent in human life. 
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9 
Epilogue 
 
I began this book by saying that every philosophy starts in wonder. Throughout this 
book, I have found some fruitful entries (at least that is what I hope!) to begin to 
understand the way in which people nowadays vest their trust in the wide variety of 
smart artefacts they use to build and cherish their relations and environment.  
I approached trust as a strategy to reduce complexity inherent in human life. 
But also the activity of analysing trust, –of trying to wrap my mind around trust by 
capturing it in a net of concepts, neatly distributed over eight chapters- is in fact a 
complexity-reducing strategy in itself.  
By trying to define it, to understand it, giving it a place in a pre-existing 
framework or familiar world of philosophical and sociological theory, my goal was 
unmistakably to reduce the complexity that surrounds trust.  
Nevertheless, I never aspired for trust to become a docile concept, obedient to 
all my whims. I never aimed at undoing all of the wonder that surrounds it. Taking 
my own research to heart, I know better than to believe it is even possible to take 
away all complexity; or all wonder. I therefore like to think of this book as being 
successful if it has reduced the complexity surrounding trust to such a level that a 
productive stance can be developed to analyse, face, and even resolve trust-related 
issues in the networked era.  
 
By developing the 4 Cs framework (Context, Construction, Curation, and 
Codification) I on the one hand want to make trust and how it functions more 
insightful, diminishing its ‘fuzziness’. On the other hand I want to provide a tool of 
analysis that does justice to the complexity of trust. By looking at trust from different 
angles, by uncovering the different levels represented by the four Cs, turning trust as 
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a diamond, as it were, round and round, I want to show its different facets.  
The 4 Cs framework can be used to analyse existing practices in the networked 
era, as I have illustrated in the chapters 6,7, and 8. Interestingly (and slightly 
personally disturbingly), by applying the framework, I stumbled upon my own 
shortcomings. Although I believe that in the previous chapters the framework has 
sufficiently proven its value by bringing to the fore the intertwining of the different 
levels of trust in the networked era, it actually deserves more than merely an 
overambitious philosopher in technology to operationalize it. The framework actually 
calls for multi-disciplinary research in which scholars from other disciplines -such as 
social scientists, legal scholars, and technologists- participate in order to further 
deepen the analysis of the 4 Cs.  
Next to a tool of analysis, the framework can also be put to use when designing 
smart artefacts, environments, and services that foster trust. Although this book does 
not provide clear-cut answers as to which specific mechanisms have to be 
implemented to ensure such trust-enabling practices, by discerning the 4 Cs it, 
nevertheless, pre-sorts which aspects have to be taken into account. This makes the 4 
Cs framework useful to ethicists and policymakers. 
Developing a framework not just to analyse but also evaluate trust in the 
networked era, presumes that there is something at stake; and that we could do 
better. Throughout the book I spoke of “challenges for trust”, emphasizing the room 
we have to manoeuvre, rethink and redesign our relationships mediated by smart 
artefacts and services in the networked era. Let me first elaborate a bit on whom I 
refer to with “we” before looking at what I believe have become the biggest challenges 
for trust in the networked era.  
 
Before really delving into the subject of trust in the networked era, I was very 
optimistic about the possibilities for the individual user to reinvent –and keep 
reinventing- his or her interactions in the networked era. In line with the ideas lying 
at the heart of the Open Internet movement, I was convinced that smart artefacts and 
the Internet in general were carriers of freedom, enlarging the palette of actions of 
human beings. Acknowledging Plessner’s first anthropological law of human beings, 
that they are “artificial by nature”, I of course was aware that the own weight of 
artefacts also steers our actions, but I was nevertheless more focussed on -and 
convinced of- the power of human beings to create their environment and the way in 
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which this was fortified by new technological developments.  
However, during the research for this book I came to see that the room for 
average users to actively shape their mediated interactions is actually rather limited. 
The interpretative flexibility or multistability on the context level is restricted and 
even under siege due to the strong tendency of other major actors such as 
governments and companies to increasingly steer and control the context level. 
Moreover, users often are not even aware that they are visible to –and easily 
manipulated by- curators, putting them in a situation of invisible visibility, 
reinforcing the power imbalance. 
This observation immediately proves the necessity to analyse trust in the 
context of all the Cs and not merely focus on the context level, which regularly 
happens in trust research. When one only looks at the context level, for example 
when analysing the introduction of the digital key app in the hotel business or a 
collaborative consumption platform such as Airbnb, it mistakenly seems as if 
interpersonal trust is reintroduced by smart technologies and transparency, user-
friendliness, and direct contact are fostered, where actually, this utopian belief in 
restoring direct and trustworthy interaction is mediated by technologies and 
monetized by curators. Though trust on social network sites and other interactive 
platforms may resemble interpersonal trust, it is in fact mediated through-and 
through. Therefore, I called it interpersonal system trust to emphasize the 
intertwinement of the interpersonal and the system. 
Is this intertwinement of the interpersonal and the system the end of trust in 
the networked era? I would say on the contrary. It actually urges us to expand our 
perception of the “we” and to make sure that our analysis not only focuses on the 
users but includes also the actors on the other levels, like the companies, 
governments, and designers who are creating and curating the artefacts. Too often, 
the responsibility of creating trustworthy interactions is first and foremost being put 
on the shoulders of average users. They should vest their trust wisely and if they 
cannot or do not want to be vulnerable to possible risks they should simply stop 
making use of smart artefacts and services.  
In the networked era or hyperhistory, however, retreating from technology is 
no meaningful option as technology in general and ICTs specifically are at the core of 
daily life. Cutting out these technologies would saddle people with too high a price to 
pay. If you would even consider holding users responsible for their use of smart 
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artefacts than at least they should be provided with a choice that exceeds the ‘take it 
or leave it’ option. It is only when the responsibility to create a familiar world is 
shared by all actors operating on the 4 C levels that the room for the average users to 
shape their relations with these powers can become meaningful.  
All in all, as smart artefacts and smart environments, characterized by their 
radical nearness in the networked era, increasingly become central to everyday life, 
users should be empowered not to just adopt but also adapt them. Discussions 
should therefore not merely focus on the way users interact with technology but also 
include the role of other actors such as companies, designers, and regulators in 
contributing to the familiar world and the design of trust-enabling smart artefacts. 
 
Throughout this book, I have put forward several challenges to trust; coming to the 
end, I will concentrate on the ones I consider to be the most critical. 
First, the familiar world, necessary for trust to thrive, is under threat. The 
basic idea that human beings perceive the world in more or less similar ways, 
reducing this first and radical complexity of living in an unpredictable environment 
shared with fickle others, becomes pressured when this environment one-sidedly 
starts interpreting human beings in order to establish personalized and pro-active 
life-worlds. The basic starting point that human beings should be understood as 
always in interaction with their environment, must be comprehended as an 
interaction that goes both ways: environment and human beings are constantly 
shaping each other. Meaning and identity are not self-imposed but emerge out of the 
interaction.  
Currently however, we see a move toward a smart environment and smart 
artefacts that are constantly interpreting and interacting with human beings; while 
human beings can only guess based on which –automated- processes this 
interpretation takes place. Consequently, they lose the ability to co-shape meaning 
and identity. This might result in a too familiar world as illustrated in chapter 8 
which analysed online personalization. But it might also lead to a completely 
unfamiliar world where people get trapped because there is no room to relate in a 
meaningful way to this smart environment.  
Second, the growing aversion to accept uncertainty as part of human life 
shoves away trust as a manner to deal with uncertainty by embracing it as part of 
every interaction. The unceasing, recurring utopian belief in technology as a solution 
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to all problems human beings face seems to have reached a new climax with the 
arrival of Big Data. The conviction that data-driven decision making, information-
fuelled services, and smart devices will solve ‘the problem of contingency’ and will 
bring us a society built on ‘omnipotence and omniscience’, makes us blind for the 
artefacts’ own weight and the impoverishment of human life if we for the sake of 
certainty (or safety) willingly suppress our eccentric positionality and the productive 
openness it brings along.  
To understand the way in which human beings and artefacts shape each other 
it can be very illuminating to look at both their default settings. Originally, the default 
setting is the way in which a device or service is being programmed when it leaves the 
factory or the [online] shop. Research indicates that 95% of the users do not bother to 
change their settings; consequently, the power of the defaults should not be 
underestimated
129
.  
 
I believe that human beings also have a default setting and this default setting is: 
trust. Trust does not come by foot and leave by horse, as Thorbecke presumably 
claimed. To trust is one of the most fundamental actions human beings undertake to 
carve out their lives. Moreover, trust is robust; it can take a hit. It enables us to act, 
create, and take a chance without becoming paralyzed by all the possible futures lying 
ahead of us. I repeatedly stated that trust is a fiction as it is a kind of pretending to 
know what will happen while we actually don’t have a clue.  
Paradoxically, this makes trust the most real fiction I can imagine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
129
 http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/01/default-settings-change-phones-
computers, accessed 10 December 2015. 
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11 
Samenvatting 
 
Ondanks de berichtgeving over de NSA die op grote schaal het Internet surveilleert, 
de cybercriminaliteit die groeit en de online platforms die winst maken door 
persoonlijke data te verzamelen en verkopen, lijken mensen niet het vertrouwen te 
verliezen in de online wereld. In tegendeel. Mensen maken in toenemende mate 
gebruik van diensten en producten online. Als verwondering ten grondslag ligt aan 
filosofisch onderzoek, dan is de volgende paradoxale verwondering het startpunt voor 
dit boek:  
“hoe kan het dat mensen zo ogenschijnlijk eenvoudig vertrouwen stellen 
in hun slimme internet-apparaten, terwijl er duidelijke redenen zijn om 
dit niet te doen.” 
 In mijn onderzoek ben ik erachter gekomen dat deze tegenstelling in feite de 
brandstof is waarop vertrouwen draait: niet met zekerheid weten wat de toekomst 
brengt en desalniettemin handelen. Vertrouwen is handelen alsof je zeker weet wat 
de toekomst brengt terwijl je zeker weet dat je nooit zeker zal weten hoe zaken zullen 
lopen. In die zin kan vertrouwen dan ook gezien worden als een sprong, het 
overbruggen van een hiatus, een verschil tussen de stand van zaken in het heden en 
die in de toekomst. De relatie tussen vertrouwen en contingentie is dan ook cruciaal. 
Immers, als we wel zeker zouden weten hoe de toekomst zich ontplooit, dan was 
vertrouwen overbodig. Dan zouden we geen sprong hoeven wagen, we zouden niet 
hoeven doen alsof we zeker weten hoe het verder gaat, we zouden het gewoon weten. 
Vertrouwen is een strategie die het mogelijk maakt om te gaan met onzekerheid 
inherent aan het menselijk bestaan. Vertrouwen heft die onzekerheid niet op maar 
288 
 
reduceert het tot een dragelijk niveau, waardoor die onzekerheid uiteindelijk haar 
problematisch karakter verliest en handelen mogelijk wordt (Möllering 2006:6). 
 
Gebaseerd op het vroege werk van de socioloog Niklas Luhmann over vertrouwen –
die de functie van vertrouwen benoemt als het reduceren van complexiteit-, plaats ik 
vertrouwen in een familie van concepten die in samenhang vertrouwen duiden. De 
leden van deze familie zijn: interpersoonlijk vertrouwen, systeem vertrouwen (in het 
Engels: system trust oftewel confidence), een vertrouwde wereld en de reductie van 
complexiteit. De aanname is dat vertrouwen –zowel vertrouwen tussen mensen 
alsook in systemen- zich altijd afspeelt in een al enigszins vertrouwde wereld.  
 
Om te begrijpen hoe vertrouwen ‘werkt’ wanneer er slimme apparaten en online 
omgevingen de interactie mediëren, heb ik het 4 Cs raamwerk ontwikkeld die het 
mogelijk maakt vertrouwen te analyseren op een gelaagde wijze die recht doet aan de 
netwerk-ontologie van deze artefacten. Het 4 Cs raamwerk bestaat uit de volgende 
onderdelen: Context, Curatie, Codificatie en Constructie.  
Context refereert aan de wijze waarop gebruikers hun interacties ervaren 
gemedieerd door slimme artefacten. 
Curatie staat voor de actoren die de slimme artefacten en internet omgevingen 
vormgeven en beheren. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn overheden en private partijen (zoals 
Google of Facebook).  
Codificatie staat voor de regels die curatoren opstellen voor het gebruik van 
slimme artefacten en internet omgevingen. Afhankelijk van de casus waarnaar 
gekeken wordt kan het met name gaan om wetgeving, maar ook afspraken tussen 
betrokken partijen over het gebruik van het artefact of de dienst, het privacy beleid,… 
Constructie, tenslotte, verwijst naar het ontwerp van het artefact zelf. Wat is 
mogelijk en onmogelijk voor de gebruiker? Worden er data verzameld en hoe wordt 
daar mee omgegaan? 
 
Dit 4 Cs raamwerk voorziet in een analytisch kader waarmee casussen geanalyseerd 
kunnen worden zoals gedaan is in hoofdstuk 6,7, en -in meer algemene zin- in 8. 
Anderzijds kan het ingezet worden in meer evaluatieve praktijken waarbij 
bijvoorbeeld ethici of beleidsadviseurs het 4Cs raamwerk gebruiken om vertrouwen 
in bepaalde diensten te beoordelen. Of het kan gebruikt worden als instrument om 
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vertrouwenswaardige artefacten en diensten te ontwikkelen door vertrouwen op het 
niveau van de 4 Cs in het ontwerp te waarborgen. 
 
Het proefschrift is als volgt opgebouwd: 
 
Hoofdstuk 1 betreft de introductie. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt vertrouwen op het ontologisch niveau geanalyseerd. Op basis 
van het werk van Niklas Luhmann en Helmuth Plessner, wordt het overbruggen van 
de hiatus als belangrijkste verklarende kracht verder uitgediept. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt vertrouwen in een sociologisch/historisch kader geplaatst 
waarbij wordt geargumenteerd dat interpersoonlijk vertrouwen in de laat-moderne 
tijd onder invloed van grote, mondiale systemen zoals het bankensysteem en het 
luchtverkeer steeds vaker plaats maakt voor systeem vertrouwen.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 4 staat het Internet als infrastructuur centraal. De vraag die ten 
grondslag ligt aan dit hoofdstuk is of het Internet kan functioneren als een 
vertrouwde wereld. Cruciaal hiervoor is de rol van de curatoren van het Internet en in 
welke mate hun eigen belangen in lijn zijn met het creëren en onderhouden van een 
stabiel Internet. 
  
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt gekeken naar het micro-niveau, naar de ervaring van de 
gebruikers van het Internet en slimme artefacten. Gebaseerd op onder andere het 
werk van Helmuth Plessner en mediatie theorie analyseert dit hoofdstuk hoe 
vertrouwen tot stand komt in het netwerktijdperk. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt de eerste casus en laat zien hoe het 4 Cs raamwerk kan 
gebruikt worden om vertrouwen in een specifieke gebruikerscontext te duiden. De 
casus betreft de introductie van digitale hotelsleutels op smartphones en toont hoe 
door het in gebruik nemen van nieuwe technologieën in de hotel business, de 
vertrouwensrelatie tussen hotel en klant verandert. 
 
Hoofdstuk 7 focust op het platform Airbnb dat wordt gebruikt om mensen die een 
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kamer of huis verhuren voor tijdelijk verblijf in contact te brengen met mensen die op 
zoek zijn naar zo een plek. De idee van de “nieuwe digitale economie” die aan dit 
initiatief ten grondslag ligt is dat door middel van technologie, oude vormen van 
interpersoonlijk vertrouwen hersteld kunnen worden. Door in de analyse het 4 C 
raamwerk toe te passen, wordt het echter duidelijk dat niet een oude vorm van 
vertrouwen wordt hersteld maar een nieuwe vorm tot stand komt: interpersoonlijk 
systeem vertrouwen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 8 gaat dieper in op de ontwikkeling om in toenemende mate informatie-
omgevingen (online, maar in de toekomst zeker ook vaker offline) te personaliseren. 
In dit hoofdstuk staat de vraag centraal of een proactieve, gepersonaliseerde 
informatie-omgeving ook leidt tot een vertrouwde wereld waarin vertrouwen kan 
floreren. De conclusie is dat personalisatie kan leiden tot een té vertrouwde wereld 
die wel zeer herkenbaar is voor het individu maar waar het aan gedeelde waarden en 
perspectieven ontbreekt. Bovendien worden mensen door de omgeving ‘gelezen’ 
zonder dat ze zij zelf in staat zijn de omgeving ‘te lezen’ waardoor de interactie tussen 
mens en omgeving in toenemend mate eenzijdige van aard wordt. 
 
Tenslotte wordt in de epiloog teruggeblikt op de belangrijkste ontwikkelingen en 
uitdagen voor vertrouwen in het netwerktijdperk. 
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